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Abstract
US oil dependence poses grave health, environmental and economic risks to the
United States and its citizens. Yet, at the same time, several major corporations
financially benefit from the oil dependent status quo. Through an investigation of how
auto-manufacturers have been involved in the formulation, implementation and
outcomes of both Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and
Hydrogen Fuel Cell research policy (the FreedomCAR partnership) under the
administrations of George W. Bush this thesis argues that the representation of the
interests of (primarily) the Big Three US automobile corporations resulted in the
protection of the oil dependent status quo from major political change.
In this regard, this thesis investigates two interlinked questions: “why, over the past
forty years, has the US not adopted a coherent energy policy to deal with its oil
dependence?” and “how are corporations powerful in the US?” Focusing mainly on
the latter question to explain the former, the thesis has four main original
contributions. First, it provides an analytical framework for understanding the power
of a corporation working as a political actor which reconciles many diverse
mechanisms of influence and that allows an understanding of how these
mechanisms can reinforce and complement one another. Second, in applying the
framework, it provides two original policy case studies, which are based upon data
gathered during fieldwork in Washington D.C. and Ann Arbor, Michigan. Third, the
thesis demonstrates the validity of a holistic focus upon policy evolution, rather than
policy making, for understanding questions of power and influence; it demonstrates
the need to return to broader analysis of “who governs?” – or Held and McGrew’s
(2003, p.8) “Who rules, in whose interests, by what mechanisms and for what
purposes?” – than is currently carried out in US interest group literature. Fourth, this
thesis shows how corporate power in domestic politics is connected to the
international consequences of US oil dependence and the world problems that such
dependence exacerbates.
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“'In practice it is impossible for the modern state to maintain an independent control
over the decisions of big business. When the state extends its control over big
business, big business moves in to control the state.”
Aneurin Bevan
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Chapter 1 – Oil Dependence: An Introduction
At the heart of this thesis are two inter-linked problems. The first, a real-world issue,
is the continued and growing American dependence on oil, and the many geopolitical,
health and environmental problems stemming from such dependence. The second
problem is the power of corporations within America and their capacity to have their
interests represented in the process of policy evolution. The link between these two
problems is that if corporations who profit from oil dependence are powerful then
there is a possibility that these corporations will use their power to protect the
profitable status quo (with high levels of oil consumption) against government
intervention, and so ensure that the US remains dependent upon oil.
Both of these interlinked problems were prominent during the presidency of George
W. Bush. Oil dependence was a major issue upon which the Bush administration
introduced several policies and which was high on the national radar due to the
continued rise in the price of oil from 2003 onwards. In a slightly different manner,
corporate power was noticeable during Bush’s tenure due to the media discussion of
links between the administration and major corporations – particularly oil
corporations (Dye et al., 2011 pp.86-87). It is because of the prominence of both of
these issues during Bush’s terms that this time period is the primary historical focus
of this thesis.
The importance of studying just one of these interlinked problems on its own is
difficult to overstate. American oil dependence, as this chapter explains, is linked
with climate change, US foreign policy and the health of the US economy, among
several other important factors. Equally, corporate power ties into many
contemporary political debates concerning the constitution of US society – there are
debates about issues such as genetically-modified organisms, internet governance
and the obesity epidemic that corporations are very involved in – and basic
normative concerns about the role of private authority in democratic society. In
dealing with these major issues, this research is important on both democratic
normative grounds and practical, problem-solving grounds. Moreover, while the
research focuses on the US, its analysis can possibly be of use for understanding
corporate power around the world.
Yet, despite the importance of these topics there is a relative dearth of studies
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covering either of them, and none on how they intersect. Instead, oil dependence
has generated a literature that focuses upon the geopolitical consequences of US oil
dependence (i.e. Bromley, 2005, Klare, 2005, Yergin, 2006), but does not explore
the domestic politics that have created and continued US oil dependence. Similarly,
the issue of corporate power in the US has not been a particular focus of research
(Drutman, 2010, Miller and Mooney, 2010, Mosley and Singer, 2009) and instead
questions about corporate power in the US have been subsumed in wider questions
of interest group influence (Hart, 2004). This lack of specific attention to the power of
business is reflected by Graham Wilson (2006 p.33), who said “there are about a
hundred political scientists studying parties and elections for every one studying
business and politics.” Similarly, Wilks (2013 p.1) notes “The business corporation is
arguably the most influential and least studied institution in contemporary political
life”. This research thus explores an intersection between two literatures that both
largely overlook the areas where the intersection occurs. The lack of research into
the intersection allowed this research to simultaneously uncover new empirical
material and to analytically innovate. Analytical innovation was also allowed by the
adoption of an iterative-parallel emergent research design, which is where the
analytical framework is refined and sharpened during data collection and by the data
collected, rather than (as in a deductive design) the analytical framework specifying
the data collected.
The lack of research also meant that while there are two inter-linked problems that
are central to the thesis it was necessary to focus upon one problem that can be
explored in greater depth as part of a study of the other. So, the primary focus of this
research is investigating corporate power in the context of oil dependence; corporate
power will be explored in political situations that contribute to, or could see the
reduction of, oil dependence. The thesis, then, only touches upon the construction of
US oil dependence, but studies corporate power in greater depth. In light of this
focus, this chapter serves to first unpack oil dependence as the background to this
study before explaining how this background gives direction and structure to the
thesis.
Oil Dependence
“Keeping America competitive requires affordable energy. And here we have a
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serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable
parts of the world.”
George W. Bush, State of the Union 2006
On the 28th August 1859, in Titusville, Pennsylvania, Edwin Drake successfully
drilled the first oil well in the US. Since this point, America has slowly, but surely,
built up an insatiable appetite for “black gold” and oil has come to be an essential
component of the American way of life. Oil seeped into everyday life by way of
plastics and petrochemicals. It also powered the planes, tanks and ships that
allowed the US to emerge as a global hegemon after the Second World War. But,
most importantly, it gave first the rich, then the everyday citizen, the freedom of the
open road, with sales of private automobiles rising from 2.2 million in 1930 to 11.5
million in 1969 (Wards Automotive, 2012).
In 1973, however, the dynamics that had propelled the oil revolution were upset as
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) started an embargo
against the US. OPEC’s embargo had the effect of quadrupling world oil prices and
of keeping oil prices high throughout the 1970s (Keohane, 1984). In addition, the
Iranian revolution of 1979 caused world oil prices to rise even higher and ensured
high oil prices until 1986. This period of high oil prices was in part responsible for the
worldwide economic downturn and the stagflation that plagued world economies
during this period (Hamilton, 2003) and which gave rise to the neoliberal victories of
both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Soederberg et al., 2005 p.9).
Because of the increase in the price of oil, since 1973 there have been numerous
attempts to reduce America’s consumption of oil. Each of the three Presidents of the
1970s committed himself to reducing oil consumption as part of ending the “energy
crisis”. During this period the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, a
55 mile-per-hour speed limit on interstate highways, and biofuel subsidies were all
introduced, and both the Department of Energy and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
were created (Yergin, 1991). Jimmy Carter (1977), the President most committed to
energy reform, even declared oil consumption restraint “the moral equivalent of war”
as he built on the success of his predecessors in reducing US oil consumption. By
1985 the US had reduced its consumption to 15.7 million barrels per day (bpd) from
1973’s 17.3 million bpd (Energy Information Administration, 2010a).
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However, while total crude oil usage was cut, the cuts were mostly achieved by
reducing the use of oil for large-scale power generation, industrial processes and
residential heating and power generation. In contrast, and in spite of the introduction
of CAFE standards, the use of oil for transportation actually grew during this period
as more and more Americans owned cars and drove further (Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, 2009). This continued expansion of transportation’s oil
usage, alongside a decrease in the cost of oil starting in 1986, saw the beginnings of
the reversal of the trend in overall declining oil consumption. Likewise, with oil prices
low, policy inactivity from 1986 onwards was the norm. Brief oil price spikes and the
sporadic activities in response to these spikes – such as the rise in the price of oil
following the Gulf War and Clinton’s Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles –
reaffirmed the continued salience of the issue, but in the main oil dependence had
dropped off the political radar. The 1990s even saw a reduction in the fuel efficiency
of vehicles on the road as ownership of lower-efficiency vehicles (particularly SUVs)
grew (Campbell, 2005 p.954).
When George W. Bush came to power US consumption had grown again to 19.5
million bpd (Energy Information Administration, 2010a). At this point, the US,
accounting for less than 5% of the world’s population, consumed 25% of the world’s
production of oil. Put in other terms, in 2001 the US consumed around 1.13 trillion
litres of oil, or 10 litres of oil per person, every single day (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2009). A third of this consumption was satisfied by domestic oil production.
Yet because US domestic oil production had peaked in the 1970s, and had been
slowly declining ever since, further decreases in the domestic satisfaction of US oil
consumption were predicted. The rest of US oil consumption in 2001, around 13
million bpd, was satisfied through imports from around the world.
This situation had created political concern about American “oil dependence” or
America’s “oil addiction”. The main use of these phrases was by politicians
concerned with the reliance of the US on other countries to provide vital oil supplies.
In particular, there was (and is) concern about the US being reliant on oil imports
from countries that are seen as hostile to US interests – a varied list that has recently
included the majority of the Middle East, Venezuela and Russia (Engdahl, 2004
p.265) – which led to a policy of diversification of supplies and an emphasis on oil
diplomacy outside of OPEC states. Moreover, such an understanding of oil
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dependence is also utilised in the majority of the academic literature on US oil
dependence, which has resulted in the marked international bias of the literature.
Yet understanding oil dependence as primarily an international issue misses many
important domestic aspects of America’s relationship with oil and many of the
problems that come with this relationship (Greene and Tishchishyna, 2000 p.2). Put
simply, American society is fundamentally premised upon the notion of continuing
supplies of oil; it is an oil-dependent society that would cease day-to-day functions
without oil. The primary way in which American society is premised on oil is that the
vast majority of its transportation infrastructure can only be run using oil. So, whilst
the US uses oil as a raw material in industrial manufacturing (involved in the
production of agricultural fertilisers, plastics, detergents, etc) many of these oil-based
products can be manufactured in a non-oil-based manner or have non-oil substitutes.
However, with transport, oil is effectively non-substitutable (Goel, 2004 p.486);
without substantial modification America’s 300 million vehicles cannot run on
anything but oil. In this respect, the US has experienced growth in its level of non-
substitutable oil dependence, with the percentage of oil used by transportation
having risen from 50.86% of the total US oil consumption in 1960 to 70.88% in 2008
(Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2009).
It is worthwhile, then, to distinguish between the dependence of a society on oil and
the reliance on imports engendered by this dependence: between oil dependence
and import reliance. Moreover, with this distinction it is possible to see that oil
dependence can be separated from import reliance; to see that oil dependence can
exist without import reliance. For example, Britain, like most countries in the world, is
oil dependent, but it has little import reliance because of North Sea oil satisfying the
majority of demand. Figure 1-1 illustrates this point in the US.
Focusing only upon import reliance and the problems associated with it – which is
what both the majority of oil dependence literature and the US political establishment
does – misses many of the wider negative consequences and costs associated with
oil dependence, and, by only partially analysing the problem, leads to partial
solutions being adopted, such as diversification of supply.
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So, with this broader understanding of oil dependence, the most direct and obvious
cost of it is the cost of oil imports. In 2001 alone the US spent $74 billion on oil
imports (US Census Bureau, 2012). In fact, between 1970 and 2005 the cost of US
oil imports has been estimated at standing at $8 trillion in 2005-adjusted dollars
(Greene, 2005 p.45). Because of the large cost of oil imports, importing oil was also
responsible for a large proportion of the US trade deficit; during the Bush
administrations oil imports were responsible for between a third and half of the total
annual trade deficit (The Economist, 2010). This cost cannot be avoided by policies
focused upon import reliance – diversification of supply, for instance, is unlikely to
reduce the cost of oil imports.1
Such is the volume and cost of oil imports that changes to the price of oil have
significant effects on the US. Even a $1 increase in the price of a barrel of oil has a
large impact on the cost of funding US oil dependence (Lugar and Woolsey, 1999
p.89) as the US has imported 8.5-12.5 million barrels of oil a day since 2000 (Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, 2012). Additionally, in contrast to the majority of the
period 1986-2003, where the price of oil remained below $25 a barrel, the cost of oil
1 The price of oil is set on a global basis (although with regional and quality variations) and, due to the
inelasticity of oil demand, is primarily determined by the level of supply.
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has been at a level above $25 a barrel since 2003. In fact, after several years of the
price of oil rising, the price reached $148 a barrel in summer 2008; a historic high.
Since the post-2008 price crash oil has not returned to its previous price band and
has remained above $75 a barrel (Energy Information Administration, 2010b). 2
Throughout the Bush period this direct cost of oil dependence thus increased
significantly.
Moreover, such increases in the price of funding oil dependence appear to be
inevitable in the future due to two factors. First, developing states, such as China
and India, are rapidly increasing their consumption of oil and placing additional
demand on the international oil markets, and are likely to continue to do so (Yergin,
2006). Second, oil is a finite and non-renewable resource that human society is
consuming in large amounts, which means, if societies continue to be reliant on oil,
oil must run out. Before it does, however, the supply of oil will become increasingly
constrained and prices will consequently rise.
Beyond the cost of oil imports, the use and production of oil also has a negative
impact on the environment. As well as major and well-publicised oil spills, such as
Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon, that have destroyed entire aquatic
ecosystems and ruined pristine tourist areas (Jernelöv, 2010), there are many minor
leaks that occur throughout the process of getting oil from drill to its end use; small,
and not so small, amounts of oil are regularly spilt at drilling rigs, from oil tankers,
from oil pipelines, at oil refineries, from tanker trucks, at petrol stations and from
automobiles (Tamminen, 2006 pp.28-45). As oil is toxic to animals and plants these
oil spills, while small, cumulatively have a large negative impact on the environment
and the biosphere (Owens, 2002 p.116).
In addition, the use and production of oil emits greenhouse gases (GHGs) that
contribute to anthropogenic climate change. The US Department of Energy
estimates that for every gallon of oil-derived fuel used 25 pounds of GHGs are
released; resulting in the collective total for all US vehicles being 20 billion tons of
GHGs released every day (Tamminen, 2006 p.41). In fact, the US transportation
2 At the time of writing, the two benchmark oil prices – West Texas Intermediate and Brent (from the
North Sea) – have a large gap in prices, with West Texas Intermediate being cheaper despite its
slightly higher quality. While these two prices have historically moved together, there is lower-than-
expected yield from the North Sea and an increase of supply in the US. Most notably, the West Texas
Intermediate price has been affected by the boom in the use of oil shale (Terazono, 2012). Oil shale is
also partially responsible (alongside the continuing high price of oil) for the 2010 changes in fig. 1-1.
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sector alone accounts for 1/15th (6.6%) of global GHGs emissions (Greene and
Plotkin, 2011). Thus, American transport, as well as being responsible for a majority
of US oil imports, is also a major contributor to climate change (Elkind, 2010 pp.128-
129). During the Bush period, however, recognition of these issues as part of
debates on oil dependence was resisted, as members of Congress preferred to
“focus exclusively on energy security issues and disregard the effects for climate
change, trying to keep it off the agenda” (Bang, 2010 p.1649). In fact, the focus on
energy security came to the active detriment of environment concerns, with deep sea
drilling being used to increase the supply of oil at the risk of damaging the marine
biosphere (spills on land are usually less damaging to the biosphere) (Fantazzini et
al., 2011).
Further to the emission of greenhouse gases, America’s dependence on oil also
encourages environmental damage around the world. Developing oil-producing
countries often either have their National Oil Companies extracting oil in an
environmentally damaging manner or have sufficiently lax environmental laws that
allow supermajor3 oil companies to operate in a manner that pays little attention to
environmental damage caused – as Shell and Texaco are accused of doing in
Nigeria and Ecuador respectively (Boele et al., 2001 p.77, Kimerling, 1990 pp.849-
850). While the damage may occur elsewhere, the impetus for environmental
damage in oil-producing countries is partially provided by the American demand for
oil, and, in a number of cases, caused by US-owned companies.
A more recent manifestation of the impact of America’s dependence on oil creating
environmental damage in other countries, and an example of how an understanding
of import reliance as the only problem can produce poor partial solutions, is the
utilisation of Canadian tar sands. Tar sands are deposits of degraded, low viscosity,
crude oil mixed with sand and other debris, which require a large amount of
processing, mainly involving the intensive use of steam, to reach the standard of
conventional oil (Nikiforuk, 2010 p.11). The extraction and processing of these sands
destroys large swathes of land, pollutes water and, due to the energy intensity of the
refining process, “contributes considerably more carbon emissions than oil from U.S.
(or many other foreign) wells” (Hakes, 2008 p.108). The scale on which the tar sands
3 The supermajor oil companies are BP, Chevron (includes Texaco), ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell,
Total and ConocoPhillips. These six corporations are the largest privately-owned oil companies in the
world.
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industry operates is staggering, with one of the tailing ponds that stores waste water
– which is so toxic that propane cannons are fired to scare away waterfowl from
potentially (and fatally) landing on it – being the largest manmade structure on earth
(Nikiforuk, 2010 p.82). The majority of the oil produced from these sands goes to the
USA and has served as an important part of diversification to mitigate the problem of
import reliance.4
As well as an environmental cost, the use of oil, particularly for transport, can also be
seen to bear a direct human cost. Air pollution caused by the use of oil has been
linked with “increased risk for multiple adverse health effects including asthma and
allergic diseases, cardiac effects, respiratory symptoms, reduced lung function
growth, adverse reproductive outcomes, premature mortality, and lung cancer”
(Samet, 2007 p.1026). Reflecting such concern, a sign at every gasoline station in
California (Tamminen, 2006 p.27) states “chemicals known to the state to cause
cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm are found in gasoline, crude oil, and
many other petroleum products and their vapors, or results from their use.” Equally,
although much more difficult to avoid with alternative transportation systems, is the
accidents that come from the use of transport facilitated by oil; with around 37,500
people killed and 2.2 million people injured in traffic accidents in the US in 2008.
While these costs are not unique to the US, the level at which they occur is far higher
than other developed countries. This difference can be seen in the American
consumption of transportation fuels, which reflects both the amount of driving done
by Americans that own cars and the sheer number of cars Americans own. In 2006,
the US consumed 6.49 litres per capita per day (LCD) of transportation fuels. In
comparison Japan consumed 2.18 LCD (which was 33.6% of American
consumption), the UK 2.84 LCD (43.7%) and Germany 2.37 LCD (36.4%). Even
compared to similarly-developed countries that also have the disadvantages of low
population density and large territorial areas US consumption was gluttonous; with
Australian consumption being 4.2 LCD (64.8%) and Canadian consumption being
4.82 LCD (74.3%).5 As fig 1.2 shows, this situation is not new.
4 Tar sand oil is subject to extensive current debate in the US due to the plans to extend the Keystone
pipeline, which carries the oil into and across the US.
5 Canada and Australia actually have population densities 10 times lower than the US, although
population density statistics are somewhat skewed by large uninhabited areas in both countries.
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As such, American oil dependence is unique, poorly understood and related to many
American, international and global problems. Therefore, understanding oil
dependence and the reasons underlying the continuation of US oil dependence is
vitally important for helping to understand many pressing problems facing the world
today, particularly climate change.
Thesis Organisation
Considering the uniqueness of American oil dependence and its relation to serious
national and international problems brings up many questions about the nature of the
American politico-economic system and about the operation of American society.6
While there are many worthwhile questions, this thesis focuses on the politico-
economic factors in particular as many of the problems are eminently political and
because the issue of oil dependence has, at times, been given priority in the political
arena. As such, the thesis is motivated by the question “Why, despite the numerous
problems stemming from it and long periods of high-level political concern, have
6 Elements of American society’s role in oil dependence have been discussed in a literature on the
notion of “automobility” (e.g. Urry, 2004, Bohm et al, 2006, Seiler, 2008).
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successive US administrations failed to enact policies that reduce oil dependence?”
Put another way, “Why does the US not have a coherent energy policy?”
However, exploring such a wide question would require using an approach of broad
historical analysis in which many important factors that lie in the details could be
missed. Instead of such an approach, this thesis explores a small part of the wider
neglected issue of oil dependence – the role of corporations in helping to maintain
the oil-dependent status quo – and, in doing so, provides an account of some of the
details that could be incorporated in a broader historical analysis. Moreover, focusing
on the influence of corporations as individual political actors is particularly necessary
as insufficient attention has been paid to the subject.
In light of these issues, this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two serves to
review the US interest group literature and makes the argument that the
contemporary interest group literature has failed to offer a full account of corporate
power that could be usefully deployed in understanding the role of corporations in
US oil dependence policy. Contemporary US interest group theory is characterised
as only exploring actions within the political arena, as simply understanding
corporations as rich organised interests, and as limiting its focus to individual
mechanisms of influence and so consequently lacking a central explanatory
framework. Thus, in exploring the interest group literature chapter two serves to
highlight the substantial gap within this literature that the thesis partially fills. It
partially fills this gap by providing a theoretically-grounded analytical framework of
corporations as political actors that is based upon three different forms of power,
which can be used to understand both how different mechanisms of influence
interact and how business actors can be powerful.
Chapter three outlines and constructs this framework in several steps. First, the
chapter briefly explains how corporate power has been understood in the political
economy literature and several mechanisms of influence highlighted by this literature.
Second, the chapter outlines the community power debates (Dahl (1957), Bachrach
and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974)) and explains a contemporary offshoot of this
debate that divides power into its visible, hidden and invisible forms (Gaventa, 2006,
VeneKlasen et al., 2007). Third, several mechanisms of influence identified in the
interest group literature and some mechanisms from international political economy
literature are organised and explained in the context of visible, hidden and invisible
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power. Also, the tobacco industry is used to provide examples of such mechanisms
working within a national context because it is the only industry to have undergone
significant academic scrutiny of its actions, which was able to occur due to the
release of documents as part of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (Proctor,
2012 p.15). In addition, the structure of the analytical framework is, and some of the
mechanisms of influence highlighted in the third chapter are, informed by some of
the empirical findings of this study, in line with this research’s use of an iterative-
parallel emergent research design and the focus of such a design on the interplay
between data and theory.
Chapter four, the methodology chapter, explains and justifies the use of an iterative-
parallel emergent research design as the overall approach of this study. Also in the
fourth chapter the decisions to use case studies based upon both elite interviews
and documentary evidence are justified. Additionally, chapter four explains the
selection of the case studies and the process of gathering the data, as well as
discussing some of the limitations and tradeoffs of this research.
Chapters five and six document the two case studies of policies intended to
ameliorate US oil dependence – CAFE standards and the FreedomCAR partnership
– with the investigations guided by the following interlinked research questions.
To what extent were corporate interests influential in US oil-dependence policy
evolution under Bush?
1. Through what methods did the influence of corporate interests work?
a. What methods did corporations themselves use to represent their
interests?
2. Were corporations influential and, if so, why?
3. What was the impact of the inclusion of corporate interests in the policy-
evolution process?
These case study chapters are organised chronologically so that the evolution of
policy can be demonstrated. Chapter seven – the discussion chapter – uses the
case studies to answer the research questions directly, and is structured so that it
answers each sequentially. In addition, chapter seven serves to highlight both the
analytical limitations, and the academic contribution, of this research. Chapter eight
concludes this thesis by tying chapters three, five, six and seven to the motivating
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question and the wider issues of oil dependence discussed above; the influence of
corporations is discussed in the context of long-standing, persistent and entrenched
US oil dependence.
The main findings of this thesis are that the interests of the automobile corporations
were heavily involved in the policy evolution of both CAFE and FreedomCAR. The
influence of these corporations worked through many mechanisms – from
marketplace decisions to supportive ideological environments – and it enabled them
to fundamentally alter both government policy and the operation of society in their
interest. In light of this finding, this thesis concludes that corporate power being used
to protect a profitable (but wasteful) status quo goes some way to explaining why the
US has never adopted a coherent energy policy and why the US is so dependent
upon oil.
In summary, the structure of this thesis starts by explaining the issue of oil
dependence as the background to the study. It moves on to explore interest group
theory and, finding this literature deficient, then constructs an analytical framework
for understanding corporate power from a broader array of literature. This framework
is then applied to two case studies in order to understand how, why and to what
extent corporations were powerful. The findings of these case studies, as well as
being used to answer the research questions and explore the power of corporations,
are finally used to inform a partial answer to the motivating question.
There are four original academic contributions of this thesis. First, it provides an
analytical framework for understanding the power of a corporation working as a
political actor. The utility of the framework is such that it could be applied and
adapted in further studies of business influence and, to aid such a move, is
presented in a generic, widely-applicable form in chapter seven. Second, in applying
the framework, this thesis provides two original policy case studies of recent events,
which are based upon original data gathered during fieldwork in Washington D.C.
and Ann Arbor, Michigan. One of these case studies – the FreedomCAR Partnership
– is particularly original due to the little attention is has garnered in the decade since
its inception. Third, the thesis demonstrates the validity of a holistic focus upon policy
evolution, rather than policy making, for understanding questions of power and
influence. Following from its criticism of contemporary US interest group theory, this
thesis makes the case that the focus of enquiry needs to return to broader analysis
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of “who governs?” – or Held and McGrew’s (2003 p.8) “Who rules, in whose interests,
by what mechanisms and for what purposes?” – than is currently carried out in US
interest group literature. Fourth, this thesis shows how corporate power in domestic
politics is connected to the international consequences of US oil dependence and
the world problems that such dependence exacerbates; the thesis highlights
interlinkages between domestic policy and international problems that have been
largely ignored in explorations of oil dependence. Thus, the contributions of this
thesis are to provide analytical and methodological insight into how to study
corporate power, to use original empirical material to document particular instances
of corporate power, and to link major real world problems to documented instances
of corporate power.
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Chapter 2 – Interest Groups, Corporations and
American Government
“If the business of Washington is business, the business of American politics
scholarship is anything but. Individual companies are represented in American politics in
large numbers. They are doing something, and we ought to learn what and why.”
David Hart (2004 p.47)
Questions of how interest groups work, how democratic government and interest
groups interact, and the influence or impact of interest groups, have been asked for
decades within mainstream US political science, and by many important figures in
the discipline (i.e. David Truman (1951), E. E. Schattschneider (1960), Robert Dahl
(1961) and Theodore Lowi (1969)). From asking these questions, a rich, mainstream
and historically-significant body of literature has developed that attempts to
understand the role and impact of interest groups on American democracy. Within
this literature, business generally, and corporations specifically, are seen as a form
of interest group that is in constant competition with other groups and subject to
some degree of countervailing power within the political arena (Vogel, 1996). In this
respect, the interest group literature provides various accounts of many of the
mechanisms of influence which corporations utilise.
However, in treating corporations as an interest group, this literature misunderstands
the nature of the corporation, does not recognise the differences between an interest
group and a corporation, and does not account for many mechanisms of influence
open to corporations (Hart, 2004). This problem is compounded by the fact that,
while initial studies on interest groups were centrally concerned with the question of
“Who governs?” and were involved in conceptual debates about the operation of
power and influence in society, recent scholarship has operated with a restricted
scope as to the mechanisms of influence and ignored conceptual debates
surrounding power (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998 pp.58-62). Ignoring the
complexity of the concept of power has been particularly debilitating for this literature
as influence and power rarely work in a direct, mono-causal fashion.
Instead of exploring power within society, the interest group literature has
increasingly focused upon the minutiae of single parts of the policy process using
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primarily quantitative methods, (Hojnacki et al., 2012) which has produced a “gaggle
of models” (Lowery and Gray, 2004 p.168) that offer different explanations of political
phenomena. Consequently, there is no central explanatory framework covering how
interest groups are influential or how they could influence policy. As such, lacking
both a specific focus on corporations and any broad framework for understanding
influence, the contemporary interest group literature’s approach and assumptions
are limited in their usefulness for understanding the broader operation of power
generally, and corporate power specifically.
The purpose of this chapter, then, is two-fold. First, this chapter provides an
overview of the interest group literature and how these groups interact with
government so as to draw out and discuss some of the mechanisms of influence
used by organised interests that have been identified in this literature. This overview
also provides important background information about the US government that is
drawn upon in the case study chapters. Second, this chapter (in conjunction with the
following chapter) demonstrates and explains why the mechanisms of influence
identified by the literature only tell part of the story of corporate power and, because
of this partial story, would lead to a crucial mischaracterisation of the American
system.
As such, this chapter first discusses the basic operation of American government
and the policy-making environments that corporations and other organised interests
operate within. The subsequent section defines organised interests broadly and
explains the methods by which they operate to influence the American government.
The chapter then moves onto a theoretical discussion of the relationship between
interest groups and the US federal government, drawing on both pluralism and
multiple elitism in order to fully contextualise the most recent dominant paradigm in
interest group theory – neopluralism – so as to allow an explanation of why it has not,
and possibly cannot, provide a full understanding of corporate power.
American Government
Formal power within the American system is held by many actors and operates on
many different levels; a situation that is protected by an entrenched and codified
constitution. At the federal level, the Constitution separates powers between the
executive, the legislature and the judiciary, which are headed by the President,
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Congress and the Supreme Court respectively. The President – elected on a four-
year term for a maximum of two terms – is the only office directly elected by a nation-
wide constituency7, and is the head of state, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces and the main figurehead for the entire political system. However, while the
national figurehead, the President does not have formal legislative powers. Instead,
the direct policymaking abilities of the President lie in government departments and
executive agencies (such as the Department of Transport, and the National Highway
Traffic and Safety Administration), the President’s capacity to reassign appropriated
funding, and the President’s authority over the US bureaucracy. Furthermore, the
President is also capable of issuing executive orders, which are intended to be
clarifications of existing laws, but have, on a number of occasions8, been much more
law-like.
Instead, the constitution places the power to craft law with Congress. Congress,
however, is bicameral, consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate,
with the Senate being the upper house. Power inside Congress, then, is dispersed
and subject to negotiation and compromise between the two houses (Koger, 2010).
Negotiation can be difficult as Representatives and Senators tend to have different
constituency interests owing to their different constituencies; the 435
Representatives in the House are elected from broadly population-proportionate
districts whereas Senators are elected by a state-wide constituency, with 2 Senators
coming from each of the 50 states. So, for instance, the representation of the
interests of a low-population state would be proportionally greater in the Senate, than
in the House. For example, Wyoming has one Representative (0.22% of the House
total), but two Senators (2% of the Senate total).
Negotiation and compromise are also impeded by the different terms that Senators
and Representatives serve. Representatives are elected on a two year basis,
whereas Senators are elected on a six-year basis, with one third of the Senate up for
election every two years. Representatives, then, are incentivised by their desire for
re-election to pay closer attention to shifts in public opinion and to take a shorter-
term view with regards to political payoffs (Erikson and Wright, 2008). Moreover,
7 The Vice-President is indirectly elected by a nation-wide constituency.
8 Some notable examples include Executive Order 9066, 10925 and 12291, which respectively
allowed the internment of Japanese-Americans during WW2, affirmative action with government
contractors, and the use of cost-benefit analysis in major government regulations (Mayer, 1999).
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there are pockets of power within both houses in the form of committees, which can
further complicate relations within and between the houses (Sinclair, 1986 p.37).
Committees and sub-committees that have a specific policy remit (Science, Energy,
Armed Services, etc), within which they examine and amend legislation, can hold
hearings on contemporary issues and, if legislation is favoured by the committee,
pass the legislation on for further debate. Equally, if not favoured by the committee, a
legislative idea can be seriously impeded. As such, significant amounts of power to
frame issues and to set the agenda in particular issue areas have traditionally been
vested in the members of a corresponding committee (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987).
These differences, as well as differences in House and Senate rules, have
traditionally resulted in bodies – and individuals as part of the bodies – who
functioned and acted in different ways. As the decision-making processes of the
Senate emphasised bipartisan consensus and House decisions were frequently a
reflection of the will of the dominant party (Baker, 1995 p.67), Senators were seen as
more open to compromise and negotiation rather than ideological posturing. As one
former Senator noted “in the Senate reason prevails more, logic prevails more, and
personal and close friendships are more important than they are in the House” (as
quoted in Baker, 1995 p.84). However, recent research (Poole and Rosenthal, 2011
p.7, Gailmard and Jenkins, 2007 p.698) has suggested that the Senate has become
more ideologically divided and begun to reflect more of the will of the dominant party,
particularly since 2000.
While policy making within Congress is subject to negotiation and compromise,
policies have to go through further negotiation and compromise between the
President and Congress (Mann and Ornstein, 2008). The President can veto, or
threaten to veto, legislation, which can, in turn, be overridden by a two-thirds majority
in both houses. Congress also has the power of the purse, whereby using the
appropriations process Congress withholds, or places stipulations, on the use of
funds. When the executive and legislature are unable to negotiate a joint political
programme of compromise, and instead resort to blocking each other using their
respective powers, the system reaches a point of gridlock, which most commonly
occurs when the executive and legislature are controlled by different political parties.
The co-operation and working of the executive and legislature, then, is dynamic,
context sensitive and historically contingent. However, the actions of the executive
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and legislature are limited by the Constitution, which is protected by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court, and the subordinate courts, work to ensure legislation
passed by either the executive or legislature is in line with the constitution; the
judiciary is intended to work as a corrective that ensures the separation of powers is
maintained. The judiciary worked in this respect in INS vs Chadha, which deemed
the one-house veto, which Congress had been incorporating into legislation since
the Watergate scandal, unconstitutional as it violated the concept of bicameralism
(Fisher, 2005).
On the other hand, while the Supreme Court is intended to restore the constitutional
balance, it has also, at times, re-interpreted the constitution, sought to apply
constitutional precepts to modern-day problems and generally updated laws in line
with the personal views of the justices. This judicial activism can be seen in Brown v.
Board of Education, which desegregated schools, and Roe v. Wade, which allowed
abortion. As such, the judiciary, in both its activist and restraining roles, offers
another political arena that can impact upon policy making (Barnum, 1985).
The process of policy making, then, is highly interactive, with numerous bodies
capable of contributing (or blocking, as the case may be) during policy evolution.
This interactivity is further increased by the openness of the system – supported by
the societal belief in democracy – and the desire to open government up to public
scrutiny, as seen in the Freedom of Information Act 1966, and the many re-iterations
of the act that have followed. Moreover, while there are many prominent figures in
the US system, not least the President, who are assumed to be powerful, the
capacity of these figures to achieve their political goals is limited, contingent and
subject to change with variations in the political landscape. The most important point
for organised interests from this discussion is that there are multiple avenues of
power and many opportunities for gaining access to the system. In turn, there are
also many tactics that can be utilised by interest groups to gain access to different
parts of the system.
Interest Groups
The seminal definition of an interest group is “any group that, on the basis of one or
more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the
establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied
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by the shared attitudes” (Truman, 1951 p.33). For instance, a group supportive of
greater government provision of mental health services would constitute an interest
group under this definition as it is making a claim upon all groups in society
(taxpayers) to support a form of behaviour (provision for those with mental health
issues) based on a shared belief (that society should provide care for those afflicted
with mental health problems). However, this definition does not explicate the very
political nature of organised interests – that these groups, formed on the basis of
shared attitudes, seek to influence government policy (Berry and Wilcox, 2007 p.5).
Furthermore, Truman’s definition appears to refer primarily to “ideal-typical voluntary
association of citizens” interest groups and not other groups that are often included
in the term (Hart, 2004 p.48). Interest groups, as used in the literature, does refer to
ideal-typical voluntary associations of citizens, but also refers to intergovernmental
groups (such as states), trade associations, corporations and unions (Wright, 1996
pp.22-30). This grouping of divergent actors is a problem as there are differing levels
of legal restrictions placed upon the activities of various groups. Moreover, the
capacities and resources with which these groups attempt to influence policy are not
the same across all types of group. In fact, this problem of focusing on citizen groups
and then considering other organisations within the same framework is prevalent in
much of the theory that attempts to understand the roles of these groups in US
democracy (Lindblom, 1977 p.356). In light of this situation, the phrase “organised
interests” is preferred as it focuses less on the “group” element, with the term
“interest group” used to refer to the body of literature that implicitly focuses on ideal-
typical voluntary groups (Cigler, 1991 pp.102-103).
Organised interests, then, can be thought of as political organisations that exist
outside of government, but that seek to influence government through non-violent
means and do not seek political office (Wright, 1996 p.22). Further to being outside
of government, these organisations represent, as Schattschneider (1960 p.23) states,
“interests shared by only a few people or a fraction of the community; they exclude
others and may be adverse to them.” An organised interest, unlike a political party,
only represents (and tries to appeal to) a relatively small constituency based on
narrow political preferences. Hence, while there are only two major political parties in
the US, there were 13,776 organised interests registered as operating on the federal
level in 2006 (Schlozman, 2010 p.443). As such, the array of preferences
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represented by organised interests is exceedingly diverse in the US political system;
from environmentalists like the Sierra Club, through the anti-abortion National Right
to Life Committee to the pro-gun-rights National Rifle Association. Similarly, the
actions that organised interests take are diverse and there are many different
mechanisms of influence through which these organised interests try to alter, and
become intimately involved in, policy making
In the interest group literature, two main categories of influence mechanisms have
been identified – lobbying and financial contributions – through which organised
interests seek to change policy. Turning first to lobbying, it can be further divided into
outside and inside methods, although outside/inside is more of a continuum than a
straightforward dividing line (Brown and Waltzer, 2004 p.545). Both types of lobbying
can be used powerfully, although outside lobbying is usually considered to be the
less effective but more widely available type (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998 pp.164-
165). Kollman (1998 p.3) defines outside lobbying as “attempts by interest group
leaders to mobilize citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or
pressure public officials inside the policymaking community.” Thus, outside lobbying
refers to indirect pressure on policymakers brought to bear through a number of
different tactics that mobilise public opinion. Outside lobbying tactics can be divided
by the level of the indirectness of communication to policymakers, although such a
division should not be understood as necessarily reflective of the effectiveness of the
tactics (Birnbaum, 1985 p.138). The least indirect are grassroots tactics, such as
protesting and letter-writing campaigns, as they seek to communicate citizen
mobilisation on an organised interest issue directly to policymakers. Letter-writing
campaigns (which, in their more modern form, also include e-mailing and faxing), in
particular, have been seen as an effective tool of persuading legislators of the
strength of mass opinion and of showing where the interests of a legislator’s
constituents lie (Kollman, 1998 p.5, Goldstein, 1999 pp.15-17).
Grassroots tactics are followed in their levels of directness by efforts to communicate
the position of the interest groups to fellow citizens through advocacy advertising
campaigns. Advocacy campaigns traditionally involved radio advertising, poster
campaigns and television advertising, but are also beginning to utilise new forms of
communication represented by e-mail and the rise of social networking (Magleby,
2010 pp.309-310). The point of advocacy campaigns is to persuade citizens that the
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political viewpoint of the organised interest is correct and thus motivate citizens to
utilise their political power (voting, campaigning, sending letters) in support of the
organised interests’ preferences. A specific form of advocacy campaigning involves
candidate-focused advocacy; where an interest group expresses its support (or not,
as the case may be) through advertising for a particular candidate. This expression
of support is done with the hope that it will alter the voting intentions of citizens who
share similar views to that of the interest group and, so, candidate-advocacy
campaigns are utilised in order to help or hinder the candidate’s chances of election
(Walker, 1991 p.109, Kollman, 1998 p. 35).
Finally, the most indirect method of outside lobbying is the communication of
organised interest preferences to the media – through direct contact with media staff,
the holding of press conferences and the presentation of research to the media – as
it involves using the press as an intermediary to communicate to the citizenry
(Nownes and Freeman, 1998 p.91). While, unlike advocacy campaigns, the media
may not report the message of the organised interest accurately, successful media
repetition can raise the profile of a particular issue so that policymakers have to
confront the increasingly-salient issue (Browne, 1995 p.11). Also, the use of the
mass media in such a manner can offer a powerful way of putting forward a different
“frame” of a policy problem that may have lasting effects on how a problem is
perceived and, thus, what solutions are viewed as apt and tenable (Richardson,
2000 p.1008).
In contrast, inside lobbying, which has attracted far more academic attention and is
where the term “lobbying” came from in the first place – when interested groups
would congregate in the lobbies of the legislature in order to talk to legislators when
they were leaving or entering (Berry and Wilcox, 2007 p.6) – is the direct
communication between organised interests and relevant policymakers in order to
effect change in policy (Nownes and Freeman, 1998 pp.101-102). Inside lobbying
can occur at all three constituent parts of the federal government; the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary.
The most commonly-cited examples of insider lobbying by organised interests
concern lobbying at legislative level. Legislative lobbying can involve giving
testimony at Congressional hearings, meeting legislators or helping to draft
legislation. Similarly, lobbying at the executive level involves contacting executive
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agency personnel, testifying at executive agency hearings and presenting research
to executive agencies (Kollman, 1998 p.35). While executive agency lobbying has
attracted less academic and press scrutiny because it operates behind closed doors
(Lord, 2000 p.78), both legislative and executive lobbying are considered “classic”
forms of lobbying that are pursued by well-resourced and well-connected groups
(Nownes and Freeman, 1998 p.87).
The type of insider lobbying that has generated the least level of scholarly scrutiny is
lobbying at the judicial level (Epstein and Rowland, 1995 p.275). Lobbying at the
judicial level involves organised interests challenging enacted policy in the courts or
seeking to have the courts recognise that certain actions are in violation of already
established laws (ibid. p.278). The most noteworthy examples of organised interests
that have often sought to influence policy through litigation are the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of
Coloured People (NAACP), who both started litigation when they suspected that US
law violated constitutionally-protected civil liberties (Zackin, 2008). Lobbying through
the judiciary can be a particularly effective means of influencing policy in the US
because of the insulation of the judiciary from the other parts of the government
through the separation of powers. Unlike in many other countries, the separation of
powers in the US allows the judiciary to dissent (in line with the constitution) from the
views of the government and the practices the government allows/does not prohibit
(Shughart, 1997 pp.958-959).
The use of these inside lobbying tactics is partially determined by the level of
“access” that an organised interest has. As Nownes and Freeman point out (1998
p.98) “it is a truism, for example, that groups without money, "connections," or
access must resort to outside strategies such as protesting or "using" the media.” So,
those with little access will, should they wish to attempt to influence policy, have to
resort to outside lobbying. However, those with access are able to (and do) utilise
both inside and outside methods of lobbying (Kollman, 1998 pp.51-54). Yet access is
difficult to conceptualise and measure as it commonly operates behind the scenes;
as Wright (1996 p.76) notes “the concept of access is one of the most ubiquitous,
and also one of the most ambiguous, in all of the lobbying literature.” The ambiguity
in the concept of access is caused by the concepts of influence and access not
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being “fully separable” (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986 p.165). For instance, Truman
(1951 p.264) views access as central to influence, noting that;
“power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group, or its
leaders, without access to one or more key points of decision in the
government. Access, therefore, becomes the facilitating intermediate
objective of political interest groups. The development and improvement of
such access is a common denominator of the tactics of all of them.”
Access, then, can be thought of as the ability of an actor to represent their views in
closed or invited political spaces (Cornwall, 2002) where there are fewer competitors
and closer relationships with political actors are possible. Through admission to
important decision-making places (or contact with important decision makers) an
actor would have greater opportunities for communicating their interests, or
information that works in their interest, than other actors working primarily in open
political spaces where participation is unrestricted (but not where decisions are
ultimately made). Markers that could indicate access are, for example, the degree to
which an organised interest can directly contact policymakers, how much the
organised interest’s information is viewed as trustworthy, and invitations to speak at
Congressional hearings (Nownes and Freeman, 1998 p.98).
Organised interests can gain access by possessing a similar ideological outlook as a
policymaker, through networking and through the provision of sound information (i.e.
the cultivation of information trustworthiness) (Wright, 1996 p.78). Access can also
be the product of interpersonal relations between the staffs of the government and
organised interests, or their lobbyists. One possible way in which organised interests
attempt to secure, or improve, access and another avenue of potential organised-
interest influence beyond lobbying, is through contributions to the electoral campaign
of an individual politician or a party. The purpose of contributions, as Austen-Smith
(1987 p.123) notes, is “either to affect the election outcome or to obtain influence
over legislative decision-making by the successful candidate (or both).” So
contributions from organised interests are either motivated by wanting to support a
candidate representative of the organised interests’ preferences, or by an attempt to
purchase access and make the candidate more supportive of the organised interests’
position. Because of the similarities between attempts to purchase access and
outright corruption (Corrado et al., 1997 p.36), there are a number of legal
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restrictions that, as they changed during the timeframe of this study, complicate the
discussion of campaign finance.
These restrictions have emerged through repeated legislative attempts over the past
century to limit or control the contributions that organised interests can make, with
the Tillman Act of 1907 – which unsuccessfully attempted to bar corporations and
national banks from campaign contributions – being the first piece of campaign
finance reform legislation (ibid p.36). However, the most important piece of
legislation was the 1972 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) as it established
rules that, despite some alterations by the Supreme Court and an amendment to the
legislation in 1974 that established the Federal Election Commission (FEC), were not
subject to major reform until 2002 and are still relevant to the post-2002 system
(Berry and Wilcox, 2007 pp.79-80).9
FECA originally established a comprehensive system of campaign finance that
limited contributions from individuals and groups, provided greater public financing of
candidates and increased contribution transparency (Ansolabehere et al., 2003
p.106). One of the enduring limitations that FECA established is the rule that
contributions can either go through individuals or through Political Action Committees
(PACs). Originally, individual contributions were limited to $1,000 per candidate per
election, an annual total limit of $25,000 on all contributions and, as a sublimit of the
latter restriction, $5,000 to any single PAC (Sorauf, 1992 p.9). In 2008, towards the
end of the timeframe of this study, these limits were set at $2,300, $54,10010 and
$5,000 respectively (Federal Election Commission, 2010).
By allowing contributions to go through PACs, FECA rules established PACs as a
major force in electoral fundraising (Wright, 1996 p.121). So, while PACs were
originally set up in the 1940s (in order for unions and corporations to bypass a law
that did not allow them to contribute directly to election campaigns), FECA was
responsible for establishing them as a feature of American politics. However, while
legalising them, FECA brought scrutiny to the contributions of PACs as it required
9 The 2002 reforms (the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act) had some of its major provisions
overturned by the Supreme Court in 2010 and so the current system of campaign finance is very
different from that described here. However, these recent changes fall outside the timeframe of this
study and so have not been discussed (but see Kang, 2010 for details).
10 Since FECA’s inception annual limits were replaced with biennial limits, meaning that an individual
can use their entire two-year allocation of $108,200 within one year. For the sake of direct comparison
between 1974 and 2008 half of the total biennial limit, $54,100, is used above.
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PACs to report all financial activities to the FEC and, in a requirement that is still in
place, limited the contribution a PAC could make to $5,000 per candidate per
election (Berry and Wilcox, 2007 p.78). Corporate PACs are also restricted to raising
money only from stockholders and individuals at managerial level, and union PACs,
likewise, are limited to only raising money from members. The result of these
restrictions is that broad-based groups with many members (particularly unions) can
raise the most money and can most effectively utilise PACs, whereas corporations
are more restricted.
However, the campaign finance system established by FECA has been altered by
Supreme Court rulings (particularly Buckley vs Valeo11) and practices adopted by
political actors (Conway et al., 2002 p.135). The use of “soft” money – money
donated to a political party, instead of a candidate, which could be used for general
party-building activities (such as get-the-vote-out campaigns or advertising
campaigns) but not for the election of a particular candidate – was adopted and
quickly came to be a significant source of funds for political parties; with soft money
accounting for $224 million of a total $669 million that the Democrats raised in 1998
(Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr, 2000 p.605). Soft money allowed groups and
individuals to bypass FECA restrictions, with the money subject to FECA restrictions
being “hard” money (Sorauf, 1992 p.260). Alongside soft money, PACs also adopted
the tactic of “bundling” their contributions to individual candidates with the
contributions of many of the individual members of a PAC; who, utilising their
personal allowance, can give their $2,300 candidate contribution alongside the
contribution of the PAC. The result of bundling is that some PACs can actually give
far in excess of the limit and be recognised as the contributor of the funds but also
avoid official sanction (Berry and Wilcox, 2007 p.78).
FECA’s major provisions, and the loopholes that were being exploited, were altered
by the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). Motivated by concerns about
the rise in the use of soft money funds and the increasing use of candidate advocacy
campaigns by organised interests, the BCRA sought to consolidate the channels
through which money could be donated and restrict the groups allowed to air
11 Buckley vs Valeo struck down two key parts of FECA 1974. It held that spending money to
influence elections was protected under free speech amendments and so removed provisions limiting
total campaign expenditures, “independent” expenditures and contributions by candidates to their own
campaigns.
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candidate-advocacy campaigns (ibid. p.113). The most important aspect of the
BCRA is that it banned “soft” money donations and banned union and corporate
candidate-advocacy campaigns within sixty days of a general election and thirty days
of a primary (Boatright et al., 2006 p.113).
However, like FECA before it, the intentions of BCRA have been thwarted by the
Supreme Court declaring parts unconstitutional and through the exploitation of
loopholes in the campaign finance system. The ban on soft money has resulted in
finances being directed to 52712 groups to run non-coordinated advocacy campaigns
(ibid. p.124). The advantage for organised interests of 527 groups, such as Swift
Boat Veterans for Truth and MoveOn.org, is that they are not subject to FEC
oversight or restrictions on their spending or on the financial contributions made to
them. The restriction on advocacy campaigns was further weakened in 2007 in the
FEC vs Wisconsin Right to Life where the Supreme Court ruled that third party issue
ads, which did not promote a candidate or party, could be run with union or corporate
funds within sixty days of a general election and thirty days of a primary (Ortiz, 2008
p.147). As such, while there has been a change in the organisational structure of
campaign finance, the content remains much the same since FECA.
Campaign contributions, inside lobbying and outside lobbying all represent typical,
non-exclusive methods by which organised interests seek to influence policy.
However, while it is relatively simple to determine what these groups do, there is a
big debate as to what the consequences of their actions are. As such, the next
section will investigate the ways in which the relationship between the state and
interest groups has been theorised; the ways in which organised interest actions
have been understood to alter government policy. In doing so, it will discuss the
three major paradigms in interest group theory – pluralism, economic multiple elitism
and neopluralism.13
12 So named because of the sections of the tax code that give them tax-exempt status.
13 These labels come from McFarland (2007, 2010). However, “economic” has been added to the
second body of work to help distinguish it from the positions of theorists such as Schattschneider who
McFarland (2010, p.42) includes with later authors such as Olson and Lowi, in spite of the significant
differences in their approach and tenor. This nomenclature is in line with Lowery and Gray (2004,
p.165) who label this second body of work the “economic perspective” because of its focus on
traditional issues of economic inquiry – transaction and exchange.
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Interest Group Theory
Interest groups have been a subject of theoretical study, and a cause for concern
about the capacity for the US system to institute change, since the inception of the
country. James Madison, the principal author of the US constitution and the fourth
President of the United States, wrote about how to guard against “factions” in the
ninth and tenth Federalist Papers; which preceded the writing of the constitution of
the United States. By factions, Madison was referring to groups of citizens united by
common opinions, interests and passions (Epstein, 1984 p.59). Factions naturally
arise as forming differences of opinion is “sown into the nature of man” and, in a
society with liberty, factional differences can be expressed (Madison, 2010). The
danger of these groups becoming powerful, or, as Madison puts it,
“the mischief of faction”, is that it results in a situation in that “governments are
too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties,
and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority” (ibid.).
Madison identifies two ways of dealing with mischief of factions – to remove its
causes or to ameliorate its effects. He rejects two possible means by which the
causes of faction can be removed – by ensuring that all citizens hold the same views
or through the destruction of liberty – on the grounds they are either impossible or a
cure that is worse than the illness. He instead argues that a republic is the best form
of government to deal with the mischief of faction in that elected representatives will
have “enlightened views and virtuous sentiments” that put them above factional
interests and in that there would be checks and balances which create obstacles to
the “accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority” (ibid.).
Madison also thought that the “mischief of faction” could be cured in a country as
large as the United States, because, with the sheer number of factions that could be
formed and the natural competition between these factions, no one faction could
come to dominate a federal government with checks and balances (Berry and Wilcox,
2007 p.3). So, while Madison was concerned about the possibility of faction
overriding democracy, he saw that factional interests were necessary in a free
society and that the soon-to-be American system could cope with the potential
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mischief of factions. It was thus Madison’s view that effective representative
government and factions were compatible (ibid. p.4).
The largely positive view of factions expounded by Madison influenced later, post-
war interest group scholars and state theorists, particularly pluralists such as David
Truman (1951), Robert Dahl (1961) and Nelson Polsby (1963). Dahl and Polsby’s
work, which attempted to understand the distribution of political power by looking at
the politics of New Haven, 14 was particularly influential; with Dahl’s account, in
particular, coming to be seen as the seminal pluralist work. Motivated by questions of
whether the unequal distribution of wealth had led to a an unequal distribution of
political power (Dahl, 1961 p.1), Dahl saw New Haven as having become a
polyarchy during the two centuries previous to the study. Where there was previously
a patrician class of the wealthy, Dahl argued, the power of this group had been
eroded over time and by the 1950s a number of contending groups vied for power
(ibid. p.11).
For Dahl, this view of interest competition was further strengthened by there being
many different types of power resources available and, while these contending
groups will have an inequality of power resources between them, no group will have
overriding power, no power resource would always be effective and virtually no
individual would be entirely without power resources (ibid. p.228). Furthermore,
should the preferences of one group be threatened by the preferences of another,
then the threatened group will utilise its resources and thus work as a countervailing
power (Truman, 1951 p.87). As such, no one group was able to dominate the
decision-making process and, instead of group domination, politics was a case of
compromise. This viewpoint, as is made clearer in Polsby’s work (Jordan, 1990
p.289), was an argument made in direct opposition to the view of authors such as C.
Wright Mills (1956), who saw America as ruled by a single elite.
While the views of the pluralists were nuanced, and their conclusions guarded, the
strength of their argument, and the purpose of it, have often been overstated. For
example, the arguments of the above authors are summarised by Carole Greenwald
(1977 p.17) as
14 The New Haven dataset was originally designed for the making of a trilogy of books. The third book
of the trilogy, Raymond Wolfinger’s The Politics of Progress (1973) completed the set.
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“pluralist theory assumes that within the public arena there will be
countervailing centres of power within the governmental institutions and
among outsiders. Competition is implicit in the notion that groups, as
surrogates for individuals, will produce products representing the diversity of
opinions that might have been possible in the individual decision days of
democratic Athens.”
However, the pluralist view of democracy wasn’t as rose tinted as Greenwald
suggests. Dahl viewed New Haven not as an example of a modern democratic
Athens but of a “democratic system, warts and all” (op. cit. p.311); hence the use of
the term pluralist to describe the system, instead of democratic. This point is easier
to understand in the context of what pluralism was reacting against; pluralism
rejected an emerging class-based view that power rested with a single power elite
and that, because it meant the non-representation of the majority of people, US
democracy was nothing more than a sham (Jordan, 1990 pp.287-289). Hence,
pluralism was defending America’s democratic credentials, but did recognise that the
system suffered a number of problems. Nevertheless, the pluralist view, of the US
state being largely democratic because of the countervailing power of opposing
interest groups, was the dominant research paradigm of interest group theory until
the late 1960s and remains an influential view of how the system works with the US
public (McFarland, 1987 p.130).
However, the pluralist account came under attack for its assumptions about the
likelihood of group mobilisation when preferences are threatened; most notably from
the economist Mancur Olson (1971). In The Logic of Collective Action Olson posited
that the pursuit of collective, or group, benefits is not a rational action. Accordingly,
group participation based on the pursuit of collective benefits is beset by the free
rider problem – “when an interest group produces public goods (collective benefits),
members lose the incentive to contribute to the maintenance of the interest group,
because they will receive the benefit anyway... Because of this free-rider problem, an
interest group will lose influence and may cease to exist” (McFarland, 1987 p.131).
Hence, according to Olson, effective interest groups are unlikely to form around
collective goals such as improving air quality, universal healthcare or reducing oil
dependence. From this groundwork, Olson contradicts Madison’s view that in a
society as large as the US the domination of faction is less likely and that the
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common good will prevail. In fact, Olson (1971 p.48) argues that in larger societies
there are larger organisational costs for collective-goal interest groups and that,
consequently, citizen groups based around collective goals are less likely to form in
larger societies.
The consequence of Olson’s argument for the pluralist perspective is that there is an
inequality of motivation to organise between many potential groups (ibid. p.51).There
will therefore be an inequality of representation of different interests and preferences.
Thus, instead of the pluralist view of a number of contending interests over national
policy, there is domination of policy areas by a few narrow interests – instead of
Dahl’s pluralistic push and pull of interests and power diffused among interests, it is
“rule by multiple elites, each in its own policy area” (McFarland, 2010 p.41).
Following this argument, and the assumptions taken from economics that inform his
account, Olson’s view on interest groups has been termed economic multiple elite
theory.
Economic multiple elite theory was hugely influential within the interest group
literature and its insights came to form the dominant paradigm in the literature for the
late 1960s and early 1970s, thereby replacing pluralism (McFarland, 2007 p.45). At
the same time as Olson, but working from a political science perspective, Theodore
Lowi put forward a historical and normative multiple elite theory that attempted to
account for the societal and political impact of interest groups. In Lowi’s (1967 p.13)
view, “Congressmen are guided in their votes, Presidents in their programs, and
administrators in their discretion, by whatever organized interests they have taken for
themselves as the most legitimate”. Building his historical account of how this
situation had come to pass, Lowi (1969) argues that American society’s 19th Century
version of liberalism had, during the 1930s and the beginnings of FDR’s New Deal,
been replaced with “interest group liberalism”. Interest group liberalism is marked by
a move away from the concept of a limited state and by the rapid expansion in the
responsibilities (and size) of the state. In turn, this expansion necessitated the
delegation of authority from the democratically-elected institutions (on state and
federal level) to the bureaucracy (Lowi, 1969 p.18).
Interest group liberalism was also marked by a public belief in pluralism and the
belief, inherent in the pluralist view, that there will be a natural balance of interests
groups (ibid. pp.71-72). The result of the combination of this belief and the
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delegation of authority was that policy was being made in a democratic vacuum that
positively invited interest groups to be involved (ibid. p.86). Furthermore, because
Lowi thought that only private (rather than public) goals would motivate groups, only
a relatively small section of interests would end up being represented in the policy
process. As such, Lowi agreed with Olson that interest groups could control areas of
particular concern to themselves and could deflect the implementation of policies
that work against their interests (McFarland, 2010 p.47). The result was that, despite
its best intentions, society was unable to achieve its goals and the state had become
a “gigantic prehistoric beast, all power and no efficacy” (Lowi, 1969 p.x).
Olson and Lowi’s general theoretical models motivated further, more specific,
models of dominant elites in small policy areas. One example of these models was
the concept of regulatory capture, of which Stigler was the most noted proponent.
Stigler (1975 p.118) argued that “every industry or occupation that has enough
political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry [to the marketplace]”
through executive agencies working as regulatory bodies. Building on the work of
Olson, Stigler argues that the existence of a powerful regulatory body provides large
incentives for powerful economic interests (and small incentives for everyone else) to
seek to shape the operation of these bodies so that they are in line with the
economic interests’ preferences (Laffont and Tirole, 1991 p.1090). Thus regulatory
agencies will, instead of attempting to ensure that collective interests are met,
operate to distort the object of their regulation in favour of the private interests that
have captured them. So, for a classic example, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which was set up in order to check and regulate the railways, was
accused of regulatory capture after it allowed railway lines to set artificially high
prices and it excluded potential new competitors through restrictive permit
regulations (Rothenberg, 1994). In this case, the railway line companies operated as
an elite within a small area of policy directly related to the maintenance of their
position and wealth.
However, while multiple elite theory and ideas of regulatory capture became the
dominant paradigm of the late 1960s and early 1970s, by the 1980s a third wave of
theorists had begun to dispute the empirical applicability of Olson’s argument and
sought to rebalance the view of the relative levels of power and influence of the state
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and interest groups (McFarland, 2007). This school of neopluralists15 (or “political
process theorists”) tried to rescue the pluralist argument in light of the contributions
of multiple elite theorists with arguments that stood closer to the optimism of
pluralism than the pessimism of multiple elitism. Neopluralists, drawing upon
empirical, often quantitative, case studies of certain issues areas, argued that the
policy-making process was far more complex, and involves more actors, than implied
by multiple elitism (for examples, see Gray and Lowery, 1996, Baumgartner and
Leech, 2001, Kingdon, 1995). The neopluralist research paradigm, then, has sought
to build models of the policy-making process that stress complexity, unintended
causes and multiple variables (Lowery and Gray, 2004 p.167).
One of the major contributions to neopluralist thought was made by Hugh Heclo
(1978). In contrast to Stigler’s idea of regulatory capture, Heclo argued that the
policy environment was expansive, dynamic and unstable and so unlikely to be
dominated by a single actor (Heclo, 1978 p.105). Macro issues in the wider political
environment were in part responsible for this instability, but also, instead of only
economic actors having a stake in policy, Heclo argued, there is a large number of
interested expert actors – academics, regulatory staff, interested politicians and
think-tanks – who add to the instability by also seeking to influence policy for reasons
that lie outside purely material self-interest (ibid. p.102). Altogether, the existence of
these actors, alongside economically self-interested actors, means that policy areas
can be characterised as operating pluralistically, where they are surrounded by open,
unstable and informal networks mostly made up of experts who all seek to influence
the shaping of policy (Waarden, 1992 p.30). Policy, then, is the outcome of the
negotiations between these interested actors responding to changes in the wider
political environment (Sabatier, 1988 p.130).
Other neopluralist research has sought specifically to address Olson’s view that,
following rational incentives, collective-good-motivated groups would not emerge and
so private-good groups would dominate. Walker (1983 pp.399-400) argued that
collective action groups could (and do) emerge through the support of a patron – in
the form of a wealthy individual, a charitable foundation or a government agency –
who would provide the necessary start-up finances and support to a “political
15 As used by McFarland (2007, 2010). Martin Smith (1990) uses the term “reformed pluralism” to
refer to roughly the same group of authors and, confusingly, uses neopluralism to refer to authors
such as Lowi and Lindblom.
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entrepreneur”. This funding is important as “large amounts of capital are needed to
form most interest groups” hence “the key to success in these efforts usually is the
ability of group organizers to secure both start-up funds and reliable sources of
continuing financial support and thus to counteract some of the organisational
burdens posed by the collective action problem” (ibid. p.403). In contrast to Walker’s
view of the importance of patrons, Nownes and Neeley (1996 p.119) put forward the
idea that an “aggressive, independent” political entrepreneur is the main way that the
collective action problem is overcome by interest groups. These political
entrepreneurs, often motivated by belief or personal experience, “bear the costs –
monetary or otherwise – of organizing meetings, creating an incentive structure,
procuring support, and so on” (ibid. p.125).
Policy networks, collective action patrons and political entrepreneurs, then, allow
neopluralists to restate the pluralist view that there are forces acting in opposition to,
and checking the power of, organised economic interests and, following this point,
that elite domination is not the norm (Berry and Wilcox, 2007 p.169). However, an
important distinction from the original pluralist view is that neopluralists do not argue
that forces would roughly counteract each other and also accept that some policy
areas could be characterised by special interest domination, although elite
domination is not a state of affairs that is stable and is always open to a changing
political environment and to challenge by new groups (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993
p.13).
Alongside neopluralist work on the operation of groups, neopluralists have also
stressed the capacity for change, inherent instability or complexity in other parts of
the policy-making process. For example, Cohen et al. (1972) and Kingdon (1995)
characterise the selection of policies as a “garbage can” from which previously
discarded ideas are recycled. For these authors, bureaucracy works as organised
anarchy where “imposing a rational explanation on organizational behavior can only
distort what is really going on. Choices often just happen, with no clear connection to
what participants want. They arise from dynamic organizational processes that are
complex, highly contextual, and unpredictable, driven more by accident and timing
than individual intention” (Bendor, 2002 p.171).
Similarly, Baumgartner and Jones (1993 pp.12-15) characterise American politics as
working on a system of punctuated equilibria; whereby a policy area is largely stable
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before a dramatic burst of policy activity that makes many changes and results in a
new equilibria being established. One of the main reasons for a period of policy
change is due to “waves of popular enthusiasm surrounding a given issue”
(Baumgartner et al., 2009 p.83) fuelled by media attention to that issue, changing the
established agenda of policymakers. So, instead of elite domination creating policy
stagnation, the American system is “continually swept by policy change, change that
alternates between incremental drift and rapid alteration of existing arrangements”
(ibid. p.236).
As we can see from these various accounts, neopluralism gives a far more nuanced
account of the interaction between the state and special interests than either
pluralism or economic multiple elitism (McFarland, 2010 p.56). In other words,
neopluralism has advanced knowledge by seeking to escape the determinism that
characterised earlier paradigms by stressing the possibilities of change within the
relationship between government and interest groups and by reasserting the pluralist
argument about the push and pull of interest group politics (Burbank, 2005 p.165).
Neopluralism also moved away from the “theory rich and data poor” accounts of
economic multiple elitism (Arnold, 1982 p.97) and towards more empirical accounts
of the relationship between interest groups, society and government. In doing so,
neopluralist work has explored some mechanisms of influence used by organised
interests such as think-tanks, campaign contributions and lobbying.
However, neopluralist literature has several problems that lead to it being a weak
framework for understanding the influence of corporations on policy evolution. First,
neopluralist work contains many hidden assumptions about what is important and
how business relates to politics. Most notably for a study of corporate power,
neopluralist work generally maintains a focus on “ideal-typical voluntary associations
of citizens” (Hart, 2004 p.48)16 and on actions in the political arena; primarily the
legislative branch. Yet corporations are not voluntary associations of citizens – they
do not have to fundraise, for instance – and when taking political action are not
limited to the political arena; as Schattschneider (1960 p.40) noted “it is probably a
16 Writing in 1976, Dahl and Lindblom note this problem in their original pluralist work: “In our
discussion of pluralism we made another error – and it is a continuing error in social science – in
regarding businessmen and business groups as playing the same interest-group role as other groups
in polyarchal systems, though more powerfully. Businessmen play a distinctive role in polyarchal
politics that is qualitatively different from that of any interest group. It is also much more powerful than
an interest-group role” (Dahl and Lindlom, 1976, p.xl).
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mistake to assume that pressure politics is the typical or even the most important
relation between government and business.” By reducing the area of study to the
political arena and pressure politics, the power of interest groups is overstated (as it
is one of the few domains they can operate in), while many powers of corporations
are missed.
Second, while the neopluralist literature covered above does try to characterise large
parts of the policy-making process, a significant degree of neopluralist work is
separate from the bigger picture. Instead, as part of neopluralism’s move to be “data-
rich” by adopting quantitative modelling, neopluralist interest group research has
been limited to the small parts of the policy-making process for which quantitative
data is available. For example, a number of studies, since the information became
readily available in the 1970s, have looked at the influence of business by exploring
how PAC contributions influence Congressional votes (see Wright, 1990, Stratmann,
2002, Grenzke, 1989). These studies constitute “looking under the lamp-
post”17(Milyo et al., 2000 p.76) as they use readily available information that, while
comprehensive in the available datasets, does not really aid them in an exploration
of influence generally, and business influence in particular. Work exploring PAC
contributions has often been theoretically crude, commonly involving the “easy
assumption” (Werner and Wilson, 2010 p.266) that the role of these contributions is
to buy votes and that business is empowered through vote buying (Hall and Wayman,
1990, Hansen and Mitchell, 2000 p.891). 18 Moreover, PAC contributions are
particularly limited measures for understanding corporate power in that they naturally
underestimate the degree of corporate involvement because, as discussed above,
corporations are subject to strict PAC contribution limits.
While some neopluralists themselves have seen the PAC contributions literature,
and neopluralist work more generally, in a pessimistic light (Berry, 1994,
Baumgartner and Leech, 1998 ch.9, Lowery and Gray, 2004) more recent literature
(2000 onwards) on the political influence of organised interests, which has moved
17 The phrase, which suggests that investigation is concentrated on areas that are the most easily
observable rather than the most pertinent, comes from a joke – “A drunk loses the keys to his house
and is looking for them under a lamp-post. A policeman comes over and asks what he’s doing. “I’m
looking for my keys,” responds the drunk. Then, pointing across the road, he continues “I lost them
over there.” The policeman looks puzzled and asks, “Then why are you looking for them all the way
over here?” “Because the light is so much better.””
18 Baumgartner and Leech (1998, p.186) remark, when considering PAC contribution studies, that
“data that come for free are often worth exactly their cost.”
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away from just exploring PAC contributions, has not moved significantly away from
the problems recognised earlier. So, PAC contributions are now studied alongside
lobbying expenditure and soft money donations (e.g. Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001,
Ansolabehere et al., 2002, Richter et al., 2009) mainly due to the data now being
available (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000 p.892). Since lobbying accounts for
significantly greater levels of corporate finance including lobbying is a significant step
forward in understanding corporate power. However, focusing just on the observable
use of material resources (Leech et al., 2007 p.4) by corporations and the impacts of
these resources, this literature retains many of the problems in measuring influence
that the PAC studies suffered from (Hillman et al., 2004 p.852). While there are
some pieces of work that move beyond this focus and explore more diverse methods
of influence (e.g. Smith, 2007, Kimball et al., 2012), these remain the exception,
rather than the rule.
More importantly, the main research questions for this recent literature specifically on
business influence are not “how influential are certain mechanisms?”, “to what extent
are corporations powerful?” or “Who governs?” 19 Instead, reflecting “the never
ending pursuit of Olson’s ghost” (Brasher and Lowery, 2006 p.18), the recent
literature has again focused its attention on collective action issues and the question
“what motivates firms to associate with political institutions and participate in political
processes?” (Mathur and Singh, 2011 p.254). So, for instance, Hansen et al. (2005
p.164) clearly displays the two key characteristics of the more recent literature in that
they quantitatively explore why some corporations are politically active and others
are not, and consider political activity to involve a corporation reporting spending
money on a PAC, on lobbying or by giving soft money donations to political parties.
Third, the quantitative approach of neopluralist work and the particular research
questions neopluralist scholars have chosen to focus upon has also made the
literature overlook other mechanisms of influence and struggle to judge the relative
importance of studied mechanisms (Lowery and Gray, 2004 p.168). The neopluralist
approach only examines a few pre-defined avenues of influence where quantitative
data is possible and, as a body of literature that builds off of the work of others within
the field, takes these methods of influence to be the only methods worth exploring;
19 The more restricted scope of this literature can be seen in the first line of Baumgartner et al.
(2009)’s Lobbying and Policy Change which reads “Who wins in Washington?”
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the sheer weight of the quantitative work on PACs and lobbying has encouraged
further research in that direction and, consequently, crowded out the exploration of
more complex and multi-dimensional workings of power. Indeed, many intangible
variables – such as political ideas or personal beliefs – cannot be factored into the
large-n neopluralist studies which, in response to the pessimistic accounts of the
field, are getting even larger (Hojnacki et al., 2012 p.393).
By reducing the object of study to limited methods of influence (that are, in turn,
based on narrow conceptions of power and politics), researchers are in danger of
developing tunnel vision and rendering their work only capable of discussing the
existence or non-existence of certain mechanisms, but not the importance of such
mechanisms. Hence, neopluralism lacks a cohesive central explanatory framework
for the successes/failures of powerful interests and the relative importance of
different mechanisms of influence (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998 p.175, Petracca,
1992 p.348) which could be used to guide a study of corporate power. Simply put, by
producing a “gaggle of models” (Lowery and Gray, 2004 p.168) that do not operate
from a shared theoretical outlook (Hojnacki et al., 2012 p.380) or deal with
substantive conceptual questions about power, neopluralist interest group theory
does not offer a guide for understanding how organised interests – not least
corporate ones – influence politics.
Conclusion
This chapter both provided important background information on the operation of
organised interests and the American government, and explored the main literature
that seeks to characterise the relationship between organised interests and the
American government. In reviewing the interest group literature, it was found that,
while initially emerging as a field that explored wide questions of power and
government, the interest group literature is currently dominated by a research
agenda that is limited in the scope of actions it considers, limited in its appreciation
of the differences of corporations to other organised interests and characterised by a
plethora of competing models concerning details of the policymaking process that do
not shed light on bigger questions of power, influence and who governs in society.
As such, this chapter has argued that interest group theory – particularly
neopluralism – is unsuitable for an exploration of corporate power.
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However, while there are problems with the current dominant research paradigm,
interest group theory does highlight many of the mechanisms used by corporations
(lobbying, campaign contributions, think-tanks, etc) and touches upon many issues
of corporate power while not fully exploring them. In light of this situation, the
following chapter presents an analytical framework for understanding corporate
power and its mechanisms in the US. This framework both draws upon some
neopluralist insights and returns to conceptual questions originally posed by interest
group theorists.
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Chapter 3 – Corporate Power: A Framework
As chapter two demonstrated, interest group theory provides an insufficient
analytical framework for understanding the influence of corporations on US national
policy evolution due, in the main, to a weak conception of power, a lack of a central
explanatory framework and an examination of a limited number of mechanisms of
influence. Interest group theory does, however, offer some insights into how
corporations (and organised interests more generally) are able to influence the policy
making arena.
As such, there is a large gap in the interest group literature as regards understanding
the power of corporations in the US. Because of the importance of the issue,
however, in this gap has developed a common understanding of corporate power as
the product of campaign contributions, lobbying and interpersonal connections; as
Werner and Wilson (2010 p.266) note there exists an “easy assumption, so often
made by journalists and activists, that campaign contributions purchase
Congressional votes”. This common understanding of corporate power, which has
developed in tandem with increased public hostility to big business (Berry and Wilcox,
2007), requires viewing Washington D.C. as a cesspit of corruption and cronyism –
the best democracy money can buy – with corporate victories all but assured.
This chapter challenges such a view, arguing that corporate power is complex, multi-
faceted and contingent. In order to do so, this chapter combines mechanisms of
corporate influence identified by interest group theorists and by political economists
with a framework for understanding different forms of power. The purpose of such an
exercise is to produce a clear, comprehensive and robust understanding of corporate
power that reconciles material and ideational forms of power and that can help to
explain the many mechanisms of influence used by corporations to alter US oil
dependence policies. Such a framework is crucially important for the thesis as, as
Hacker and Pierson (2002 p.279) state, “a central task for studies of business power
is to specify the ways in which influence is exerted in the political process”. In
creating a framework, this chapter returns to many of the conceptual and empirical
questions that motivated early interest group research and offers an original
conceptualisation of corporate power in the US.
Laying the foundations of this synthesised framework, this chapter starts by giving a
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general overview of the political economy literature, its many views on corporate
power and the most advanced attempt to create a framework of corporate power.
Using the works of Lukes and Gaventa, this chapter moves on to defining a three
dimensional view of power and explaining how the concept of power is understood in
this thesis. With these two components in place alongside the interest group
literature, mechanisms of corporate influence are then combined with the three
dimensional concept of power, to produce a framework of corporate power that is
used as the foundation for the focus of the empirical chapters and which, in the
discussion chapter, is built upon and strengthened using the empirical findings.
The Political Economy of Corporate Power
Like early interest group theory20, the central thrust of a great deal of earlier political
economy literature is to understand who is powerful and how they are powerful.
Specifically, authors have tried to analyse how capitalism and democracy work
together. Three main bodies of literature can be identified: power elite (e.g. Wright
Mills, 1956, Domhoff, 1990, Useem, 1986), neo-Gramscian (e.g. Cox, 1983, Gill and
Law, 1989, Overbeek and van der Pijl, 1993) and structuralist (e.g. Lindblom, 1982,
Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1988, Block, 1977). These three literatures respectively
focus upon the personal interlinkages between business and political elites, the
construction of ideas and values that support business interests, and how business
is empowered in politics by the role that business plays within the market. All three
offer different and useful insights that are drawn on below in the framework. However,
this literature does not itself provide a framework for understanding how corporations
can influence individual policies while working as political actors, but largely how
business as a class of actor is structurally powerful in relation to the state (Coen et
al., 2010 p.26); it operates at a higher level of abstraction, heavily focuses on
structures (Bell, 2012 p.661) rather than actors, and does not deal with influence on
specific policy. The research emphasis “is on the way power resides in particular
enduring institutional arrangements, rather than being dependent on control over
separate decisions” (Moran, 2009 p.7).
These classic debates over the origin of business power within states have been
20 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, as many of the theorists – particularly C. Wright Mills and Charles
Lindblom – were very much engaged in American interest group debates.
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largely absent in recent years. For instance, Hacker and Pierson (2002 p.277) state
that “with the growing interest in ‘the state’ and institutions, the debate over business
power essentially ended” and Culpepper (2011) argues that “the study of business
power is currently more neglected than it has been for the last half century”. This
neglect was caused by many of the primary political economy research questions
shifting to understanding (neoliberal) globalisation and the role of the nation-state
within a global economy; “that is – the dominant research questions pertain to the
nature and impact of globalisation, and have largely been formulated for the
purposes of pushing forward the theorisation of globalisation” (Phillips, 2005 p.339).
This political economy literature has covered various issues that speak to questions
about business power in the US, but do not directly answer them, nor necessarily
seek to do so (Ougaard, 2008 p.387).
So, for instance, the literature on global governance explores the role of various
actors in determining the rules, norms and institutions according to which the global
economy is run (e.g. Wilkinson, 2005, Scholte, 2002, Collin et al., 2002, Strange,
1994). Within this broad literature, questions of the role of transnational corporations
in contributing to global rules, norms and institutions are asked and the issue of
corporate power is discussed in relation to a wide range of subjects. Similarly,
literature on the regulatory state concerns the evolving relationship between the
market, the state and other actors, particularly in the provision of goods (e.g. Majone,
1999, Moran, 2002, Gilardi, 2009, Moran, 2010). In its consideration of business
power, this literature discusses matters such as the rise of private regulation, self-
regulation and “wiki” regulation (Grabosky, 2012, Wolf, 2010, Levi-Faur, 2013) within
the context of a more co-operative relationship between business and government
than in previous “command and control” system. In both of these governance and
regulatory state literatures, then, corporations feature as important parts of the
discussion and provide points that are drawn upon below, but do not offer a clear
analytical guide for the study of corporate influence on particular policies as the
focus is on how the international system, or the state, is governed.
Yet within the shift to studying globalisation and its impact, two streams of political
economy literature more directly considering the power of business have evolved
from the earlier debates and have continued to ask questions about business power,
but in a global, rather than national, context. The first stream of literature, combining
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power elite and neo-Gramscian approaches, understands business power as the
product of a ruling transnational capitalist class and an ideological hegemony (in the
form of neoliberalism) underpinning the rule of this class (e.g. Carroll, 2010, Sklair,
2000, Heemskerk et al., 2012, Robinson, 2005). The focus of this literature is on
investigating how and why states across the world rule in the interests of capital; how
the dominant class maintain their power and unequal status within democratic
systems without constant recourse to violence. As such, this literature retains the
focus on structures and explaining the broad picture but not potential corporate
control over individual decisions.
The second literature, while informed by it, is less of a direct descendant of the
questions motivating the older literature, and has been shaped by exploring the fight
against both climate change science and policy by corporate actors. It is within this
embryonic political economy literature that the power of corporations working as
individual actors, or as industry-specific coalitions, is the focus of attention (e.g.
Underhill and Zhang, 2008, Clapp and Swanston, 2009, Dauvergne and Lister, 2010,
Meckling, 2011). As such, it is this stream of literature that most directly engages
with understanding the corporation working as a political actor and influencing
individual decisions.
The most notable and relevant work in this stream is that of Fuchs (2005, 2007), who
presents a broad tripartite framework of “institutional”, “structural” and “discursive”
corporate power, which is largely drawn from Levy and Egan’s (2000) attempt to
order the three strands of older political economy literature identified above as
different lens for the analysis of corporate power. Institutional power, which actually
draws more from American interest group literature, primarily refers to lobbying and
campaign contributions and is measured through outcome success in the political
arena (Fuchs, 2007 p.57). Structural power refers to mechanisms such as capital
mobility and private regulatory roles, and is understood to work as setting the
agenda from which government policy is made (ibid. ch.5). Finally, discursive power
refers to the perceived legitimacy of actors, attempts to improve this legitimacy and
the framing of topics (ibid. ch.6).
While this framework has come furthest to giving an analytical framework of
corporate power, there are several conceptual problems stemming from the
framework’s genesis as a review and classification of divergent literatures; in
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particular many of its weaknesses come from assumptions adopted from interest
group theory. First, Fuchs’ understanding of structural power, which is a term that
normally refers to the important structural position of business resulting in politicians
having to pay attention to the business without action on the part of the business,
includes such mechanisms as public-private partnerships and participation in rule
making (i.e. active work by the corporations) that could more easily be seen as a
form of instrumental (or direct) power (Ougaard, 2008 pp.399-400). Without these
mechanisms, Fuchs’ structural power appears a much hollower category in terms of
the mechanisms of influence it includes. Second, perhaps explaining the
inconsistency in structural power, Fuchs’ framework only considers corporations as
political actors in so far as they are “participants in the political process”. This
definition, which also exists in the interest group literature, limits politics to the
political arena, rather than influence on society. While this point is expanded on
below, Néron (2010 p.337) briefly makes the counterpoint: “if politics is about the
immense question “who must do what for whom?”, then there is no doubt today that
businesses are successful political actors”.
Third, the understanding of discursive power is more focused on observable action
and political communication, rather than deeper structural notions of hegemony or
the third face of power. In doing so, the distinction between instrumental and
discursive power is severely weakened, as “it is hard to imagine any kind of lobbying
or other kind of instrumental power except the direct use of force that doesn't have
an ideational and discursive component” (Ougaard, 2008 p.401). Combined, these
three issues render Fuchs’ framework insufficiently coherent for an exploration of the
case studies; it a useful starting point that is drawn upon in the thesis but is not the
fundamental basis of this research. Additionally, the political economy literature (of
which Fuchs is a part) tries to understand corporate power in a
global/transnational/international context; the research questions are about who is
powerful and how they are powerful in international political arenas. So, this literature
highlights certain mechanisms of influence – such as the political leverage
corporations have due to decisions over foreign direct investment (Jensen et al.,
2012 pp.4-5) – that make little sense in the context of national politics in the most
powerful country in the world.
So, in the main, the political economy literature is very strong at discussing many
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mechanisms of business power while debating related topics. Yet the problem with
the literature for the thesis is that individual corporations are rarely understood (or
researched) as political actors effecting specific policies; how the corporate elite can
maintain their economic and political position (for example) is considered, but not the
mechanisms by which corporations can influence particular policies. In contrast, the
interest group literature seeks to explain the influence of organised interests
(including business) working as actors on policy, but limits the mechanisms of
influence. There is thus a gap between the two literatures, into which the work of
Fuchs, and others inspired by corporate actions in regards to climate change, has
recently stepped. Yet, by bridging the gap with a framework based upon divergent
literatures there is a degree of conceptual unevenness; the framework is a bricolage,
rather than a synthesis. What is lacking from the framework, and from the literature
on corporate power more generally, is a strong theoretical grounding in the concept
of power that can help locate different mechanisms of influence. As such, it is to the
question of power which this thesis now turns.
Power
Starting with Dahl, a central question of interest group theory was “what is power?”
as an answer to this question would allow a determination of who governs and who
is powerful in the political arena. Dahl’s (1957 pp.202-203) answer to this question
was “my intuitive view of power, then, is this: A has power over B to the extent that
he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. This view of power
(later called the first face of power) is a useful starting point for understanding how
one individual or group has power over another individual or group. However, Dahl’s
research agenda coming from his intuitive view of power focused only on observable
conflict; on the successes or failures of actors involved in key issue areas (which in
1950s New Haven, he identified as urban redevelopment, public education, and
nomination for local office) in the political arena (Dahl, 1961 p.175).
Dahl’s position was criticised by Bachrach and Baratz, who argued his focus on “key”
issue areas was working after power had been exercised to remove issues from the
policy-making agenda (McFarland, 2007 p.60). Thus, following Dahl’s established
format, Bachrach and Baratz (1962 p.948) added that
“power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or
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reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the
scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues
which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in
doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore
any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of
preferences."
This “second face of power” was intended to complement Dahl’s research agenda,
broadening the focus of research to include non-issues and the mechanisms that
render issues non-issues. However, for the second face of power it is important “to
distinguish the deliberately engineered suppression of an issue from its unintended
de facto exclusion” (Bernhagen, 2002 p.9) so that the absence of an issue from the
political agenda is not assumed to be down to power, when it could be due to such
issues as irrelevance, absurdity or lack of interest. The most notable application of
this idea of power was Crenson’s (1971) exploration of air pollution in several US
cities.
While warning that power is one of Gallie’s (1955) “essentially contested concepts”,
Lukes introduced the third face of power. Utilising the insights of Gramsci, and others,
Lukes developed an account of power that concerned ideological hegemony and
existed alongside both the first and second faces of power. Lukes (1974 p.23), again
following Dahl’s format, puts it thus:
“A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to
do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or
determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to
get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to
secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?”
Research into the third dimension thus has to examine control over the political
agenda, the “real” and subjective interests of people and attempts at indoctrination.
By this point the divergence between interest group theory and power theory was
complete and the issue of power had moved into political theory; how power was
conceived by Lukes was not generating an empirical research agenda in US interest
group theory, unlike with the previous two forms of power (McFarland, 2007 p.62,
Wanna, 1991). The interest group literature, as seen in the previous chapter, was
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also moving from the descriptive accounts, which informed Dahl and his
contemporaries, to “tightly circumscribed and statistically advanced investigations of
group power” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998 p.187) that, instead of engaging with
questions of power, “simply ignored the problem” (ibid.) of measuring power and
influence. While the US interest group literature paid little attention to the third face of
power, John Gaventa, one of Lukes’ PhD students, utilised Lukes’ framework to
study power and quiescence in Appalachian mining communities (Gaventa, 1980).
Yet, methodological issues concerning the empirical detection of real interests
(Hyland, 1995 pp.205-207), as separate to perceived or surface interests, dogged
Lukes’ account of power and, in spite of Gaventa’s efforts, an empirical third face
literature did not develop (Shapiro, 2006).
Following the faces of power debates, the power debate in political science then,
with the work of the French social theorists such as Bourdieu, Lefebvre and Foucault,
shifted its focus to a contextual, shifting and discourse-centred understanding of
power. These writers introduced innovative ways of understanding power and the
role of ideas in shaping power. For instance, Bourdieu introduced the concept of
“habitus”, which is the “dialectic of the internalization of the externality and the
externalization of the internality” (Bourdieu, 1977 p.72) and, rather than accepting
one over the other, reflects the constant interplay between agency and structure in
power relations. Likewise, Foucault conceives of power as intimately linked with
knowledge – to the extent he uses the term power/knowledge – and that
power/knowledge can be coercive in that it limits “thinking space” by legitimating
certain ways of thinking and certain forms of discourse (Foucault, 1980 pp.111-114).
However, Foucault, and other post-structuralists, worked “in an excessively rhetorical
style entirely free of methodological rigour” (Lukes, 2005 p.61) that has subsequently
led to “obscurantist” works that favour jargon over clarity.
While both the post-structuralist account of power and the two-faced account of
power are still very much dominant in political science, Gaventa and others at
University of Sussex have recently developed a framework for understanding power
called the “powercube” (http://www.powercube.net/). Primarily, the powercube was
made for the field of development studies, and is intended to provide a framework for
power analysis by academics and activists in the context of an increasingly inter-
connected world in order to provide the capacity for resistance. As such, it considers
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the forms of power (which are based upon the three faces of power), the spaces that
power operates in and the levels at which it operates at. These different aspects of
power are visually represented in the form of a cube, which serves to highlight how
these aspects are not separate, but interlocking and mutually-reinforcing (fig 3-1).
Figure 3-1: The Power Cube
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2012)
The spaces of power refer to the arenas for action and participation by interested
groups, and are closely linked to the idea of access discussed in the previous
chapter. Gaventa’s conception of the powercube sees the spaces as divided into
claimed, invited and closed spaces (Oxfam, 2011). Claimed spaces refer to the
spaces that non-powerful actors make to air grievances outside of formal, already-
existing spaces of power. However, the relevance of claimed spaces to this thesis,
which examines the actions of powerful actors, is limited and, as such, claimed
spaces do not feature in the deployment of the powercube in the thesis. Invited
spaces are spaces where the opportunity for participation is subject to the invitation
of a powerful body or agent, such as Congressional hearings, or the meetings that
support regulatory body rulemakings. Closed spaces are those where decisions are
made behind closed doors, with little oversight from the public or others. Both invited
and closed spaces (and the spaces that have features of both these classifications)
are important to, and will be covered by, this thesis as the degree of access to such
spaces is an important facilitator of influence and, as such, can be considered to be
one of the primary indicators of the power of an organised interest (Dye et al., 2011
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p.172).
The levels of power refer to the politico-geographic location that decisions are being
made at. The powercube divides the levels into local, national and global, although
also mentions other levels such as the household or personal level. This study is
primarily of national policy-making, as the motivating research problem (oil
dependence) exists, alongside the potential tools to solve or ameliorate oil
dependence, at the national level. The other levels of power are engaged with to the
extent that the other levels (state- and global-level) impact upon, and interact with,
the national level. For example, in the case of both CAFE standards and hydrogen,
the state of California was heavily involved and so policy evolution actions there are
included.
These elements of the powercube, while important in general terms, are not
particularly salient to this thesis. In fact, the weighting of them in the powercube
reflects the intended use of the powercube as an emancipatory tool for
disempowered groups (Gaventa, 2006 p.25), rather than an analytical tool for
understanding powerful groups; it favours power to – understood as the capacity to
achieve change, which is a forward-looking concept – instead of power over – the
capacity to control. Such an approach is problematic for the goals of the powercube,
since powerful actors often determine the capacity of other actors to achieve change.
In other words, understanding power over is a prerequisite for any emancipatory
project but is de-emphasised by the powercube, thereby weakening its emancipatory
power.
As such, with the limited usefulness of some of the spaces and levels of power for
this research project, the first point of analysis for this thesis, and the focus, is the
forms of power. The forms of power, in the powercube’s conceptualisation of them,
do not rely on Dahl’s formulation of “A has power over B” and are more cognizant of
the application of the theory in research. In particular the third/invisible face has been
reformulated so that it largely avoids the issue of real and false consciousness that
dogged Lukes’ account. 21 As such, the powercube’s conceptualisation of the
faces/forms of power is worth exploring. Visible power is power that operates openly
and conspicuously. In US politics, visible power works in policy-making arenas, and
21 In recent years, Lukes (2005, p.145) has moved to an adoption of a non-essentialist and multiple
account of real interests in response to earlier criticisms.
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in a transparent, clear and obvious manner. The detection of visible power involves
exploring who participates, whose interests prevail and who is vested with formal
authority. Like in Dahl’s work, the focus is on decisions and who is making them.
Hidden power moves beyond the open actions, exploring the manipulations that
occur behind the scenes. As with visible power, hidden power has the capacity to be
observed, although the possibility of unimpeded observation is much lower. Hidden
power is operating when “alternative choices are limited, less powerful people and
their concerns are excluded, and the rules of the game are set to be biased against
certain people and issues” (Powercube.net, 2012a), or, as Schattschneider (1960
p.71) argued, when “some issues are organized into politics while others are
organized out”. Hidden power, then, can work to exclude the interests of weak actors
from, and include powerful actor interests in, formal or informal decision-making
procedures, and is detected through the exploration of decision-making mechanisms,
elite interpersonal relations and the indirect representation of interests by seemingly-
impartial secondary actors.
Finally, invisible power moves beyond actions to the power of ideas and thoughts. It
comes in the form of the legitimating discourses that support the powerful, that
discourages minor actions against the interests of the powerful, and tries to exclude
the possibility of serious action against their interests entirely. Invisible power, then,
is similar to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, where “political leadership [is] based on
the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization
of the world view of the ruling class” (Bates, 1975 p.325) and Marx and Engel’s
(2002) view that “the ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of the ruling
class”.
The mechanisms that facilitate invisible power are many and varied. As VeneKlasen
et al. (2007 p.48) state “schools, the media, and religious and political leaders,
among other influential forces, shape values and norms that prevent change.” In
some dictatorships these mechanisms have been used to create cults of personality
that cement the concrete power of repressive coercion with ideational attraction.
Equally, many (enemy/disapproved/“rogue”) states are accused of using propaganda
to manipulate and brainwash their citizens. In western states, the news media have
been highlighted as one of the main mechanisms for inculcating values and
intentionally screening information so that some issues or events (say 9/11) get more
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attention than others (such as civilian deaths in the Iraq war) (Herman and Chomsky,
1988). Working in such a manner, political actors can manipulate the public (and
other political actors) and rely on established arguments to offer a convincing
argument for a certain policy that deceives others as to the outcomes of the policy.
However, “‘invisible power’ need not be limited to intentional acts of ‘thought control’
by the powerful, but can also be seen as self-reproducing social processes in which
the thinking and behaviour of the powerful and powerless alike are conditioned by
pervasive norms” (Powercube.net, 2012b). Limiting the exploration of invisible power
to only intentional acts would likely entail omitting significant amounts of invisible
power, as once an idea becomes established by conscious action, its survival and
success at empowering can be reliant only on unconscious repetition rather than
continued attempts to push the idea (Lindblom, 1977 p.206, Hayward and Lukes,
2008).22
Moreover, unconscious repetition of ideas is often embedded in, enabled by, and
works through, language itself. Dominant meanings of words/concepts do become
established – through both active machinations and passive replications – which
shape societal perception and ideas. The result of dominant meanings is that some
arguments become self-evident and certain actions become legitimate; ideological
bias is introduced into language and is internalised. For instance, terms such as
“freedom” can become laden with an ideological baggage that limits the debate to a
few similar conceptions of the idea. At the same time as certain actions are
legitimised, other actions are delegitimised, with some arguments coming to seem as
if detached from “reality”. For example, the British 1819 Cotton Factories Regulation
Act, which banned children under the age of nine from working in cotton factories,
was objected to on the grounds that it restricted the free market and the freedom of
people (Blaug, 1958).23 However, modern-day free market advocates, while calling
for freeing the market, would not even consider campaigning for the deregulation of
child labour (Chang, 2010 p.23). The difference is that the dominant conception of
the free market has changed, thus changing what actions are seen as legitimate and
what associations are made; employing children under the age of nine is no longer
22 It can be reasonably difficult to analytically separate deception through invocation of certain beliefs
and genuine belief in dominant discourses.
23 Opponents of the bill also argued that “shortening the time of labour, as proposed in the Bill, would
promote indolence and profligacy, in affording [work-people] time to go to the public houses at night,
and to be otherwise disorderly” (Anon, 1819)
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considered to be legitimate in most of the world (International Labour Organisation,
2013), or even a matter to do with the freedom of the market.
In this sense, the complete victory of invisible power of one actor would be the
calcification of thought; people, including the powerful, would always have to think
within certain trammels. However, there will always be contending discourses and
ideas that sustain opposition to the dominant discourse, although the extent of
opposition will be contingent on a number of factors. So, instead of the calcification
of thought, invisible power generally works to channel thought along the lines of
particular discursive currents, to focus attention on one aspect rather than another,
and to explain the current order as both natural and legitimate; invisible power seeks
to create a set of common sense “notions or theses with which one argues but over
which there is no argument” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001 p.1). Even for both
those more taken with different (but not opposing) discursive currents and for those
who reject the main aspects of the dominant discourse, their view of what is possible
is still conditioned by the existence of the discourse. The detection of invisible power,
then, involves exploring the language used by prominent figures, the assumptions
used by policymakers that are considered so self-evident as to not require
explanation and the repetition of arguments by various actors and the media; when
looking at powerful actors it involves the exploration of how “loud” the actors can be
(unlike in Gaventa, 1980, where the silence of powerless actors was explored)
Moreover, while the origins of invisible power may not be traceable or observable
(Fuchs, 2005 p.23), who is empowered, and who continues to be empowered, by the
dominant discourse is observable without recourse to imputing real interests or real
consciousness (e.g. Lukes, 2005 p.148). Invisible power, then, is somewhat of a
misnomer. Invisible power is not invisible, as it is can be identified in a number of
ways. The main distinction between it and other forms of power is that it is less
concrete, less wieldable, and can sustain itself far beyond the actions that created it.
There are three main advantages of this conceptualisation of the forms of power,
then, over other approaches. The first advantage is that the powercube offers the
insights of the community power debates without relying on the terminology that
evolved as part and parcel of those debates; the formulation “A has power over B”,
which gives a very agent-centred idea of power, is dropped. Losing the formulation
allows the powercube’s formulation of invisible power to be more comprehensive by
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including structural elements more readily (Gaventa, 2006 p.29). The original
formulation also encouraged a view of power as something that only exists when
being exercised, rather than as a capacity that may not ever need to be exercised to
achieve its goals (Lukes, 2005, p.12); as Crenson (1971 p.177) notes “the mere
reputation for power, unsupported by acts of power, can be sufficient to
restrict…decisionmaking”. As such, in this regard the powercube is more
conceptually coherent and so better suited for exploring questions of power than the
three dimensions of power.
The second advantage is that, in being designed for activists and utilising a visual
representation, the powercube is clear, concise and easily explicable while covering
the difficult and multi-faceted issue of power. In contrast, post-structuralist analysis
often relies on an abstract, impenetrable and obscurant exposition of power which
favours abstract fluidity – in line with a subjectivist notion of reality – over analytical
clarity (Lukes, 2005 pp.88-107). The advantage of the powercube for the thesis, then,
is that it operates as a clear framework that can guide the analysis of a complex and
messy issue, such as corporate power, rather than operating as an indeterminate
and shifting framework guiding analysis of a complex and messy issue.
The third advantage is that, not only does it allow an exploration of the intangible
elements of power, the powercube also forces the investigator to keep in mind the
material and concrete machinations of an actor or organisation; analysis of material
factors is not subsumed by analysis of the ideational factors, or vice versa (Shapiro,
2007 p.20). Unlike in both interest group theory, and in post-structuralist analysis, no
single form of power comes to dominate due to the framework of analysis allowing
both material and ideational factors, and their interplay, to be explored. Instead, the
importance of the different forms can be judged according to the available data.
Understanding Corporations using the Forms of Power
The following sections utilise, draw upon and synthesise a number of literatures that
have captured elements of corporate power so as to provide an analytical framework
that can be applied and discussed in the case study chapters. The first literature,
while its weaknesses were highlighted in the previous chapter, is neopluralist interest
group theory, as neopluralists have covered many of the (more directly observable)
mechanisms of influence. The second literature is, loosely defined, the outliers of
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mainstream interest group literature that have shed light on some of the more hidden
and closed off elements of corporate power. The third is the political economy
literature that, as mentioned above, has engaged with questions of corporate power
in a variety of ways. Finally, there is also a literature (mainly from academics in the
discipline of public health) on the tobacco industry that, utilising a mass of internal
documents released following court order, presents the most complete account of
the political manoeuvres of a group of corporations in one industry and can highlight
how many of the identified mechanisms have previously been used. These four
literatures have been synthesised and are expressed as operating in the terms of the
Gaventa’s forms of power below.
Applying Gaventa’s tripartite understanding of power to the mechanisms of corporate
power highlighted in the literature has two main advantages. First, it breaks the
concept of power down, allowing the analytical subdivision of power so as to
increase the understanding of individual constitutive elements and how different
elements fit together; it facilitates an understanding of the power of corporations as
multifaceted, rather than monolithic (see, for an example of a monolithic view of
corporate power, Suarez-Villa, 2012), and allows an analysis of how different
influence mechanisms co-operate. Second, by highlighting how corporations have
previously influenced policy evolution (and business-state relations) it lays the
groundwork that the case studies build upon, and that further empirical research
could utilise.
Visible Power
The most noted elements of corporate visible power are lobbying and campaign
contributions, which were covered in the previous chapter. In addition to these
mechanisms of influence, further corporate visible power, either in the form of direct
private authority or significant command resources, primarily stems from the public
functions that corporations perform within a market-based society (Galbraith, 1972
ch.5). As Lindblom (1977 p.171) notes, businesses continually make decisions that
affect “a nation’s industrial technology, the pattern of work organisation, location of
industry, market structure, resource allocation, and, of course, executive
compensation and status” while working, and making decisions with “broad
discretion” (ibid. p.171), outside the political arena; within capitalist societies, a
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system of diffuse private authority exists alongside the state. In determining a broad
range of societal issues, business decisions are political. Strange (1994 p.25) makes
a similar point, saying that there are
“corporations or state enterprises that have set up their own hierarchies of
authority and chains of command in which decisions are taken that are
essentially political more than economic. I do as the company president or the
managing director says, not because I shall gain economically, but because
he has the authority to command me, a middle manager or a shopfloor worker.
Mine is not to reason why – just as if he were the general and I am a private
soldier.”
However, it should be noted that the vast majority of business decisions, while
political, have little noticeable impact; the decisions of a small business will have little
direct impact on the broader constitution of society and national politics. Instead,
decisions that are widely applied – which can occur either in the context of high-level
decisions in a major corporate hierarchy or through the widespread adoption of a
decision by many actors – can fundamentally change society and how it operates.
Put another way, while all businesses make political decisions, size does matter and
the largest businesses will tend to make the most influential political decisions with
the largest ramifications (Beder, 2010 p.497).
This political power of corporations can be seen in the decision to add lead to
gasoline. In the 1920s, a coalition of General Motors, DuPont Chemicals and
Standard Oil of New Jersey (now ExxonMobil) decided that, in order to stop the
accidental auto-ignition of gasoline that had been damaging engines (Rosner and
Markowitz, 1985 p.354), gasoline should be blended with lead. This decision became
standard practice across the world, and is still practiced in some developing
countries. The addition of lead to gasoline, while increasing engine durability, did
however lead to the majority of the world’s population being regularly, consistently
and knowingly24 exposed to a “neurotoxin that causes renal damage, neurological
dysfunction, anaemia, and, at high doses, death” (Lovei, 1998 p.1). Recent research
has even suggested that the exposure to lead in preschool children that resulted
24 Knowledge of lead toxicity had been strongly established in the 1920s. However, chronic lead
poisoning by lead particulate matter had not been established. For an account of the (somewhat
corporate) politics surrounding the science of lead intoxication in the 1920s see Lewis (1985).
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from lead’s use in gasoline was responsible for high crime and murder rates (due to
lead’s impairment of neurological function) within the Western world during the post-
war period and that the end of its use resulted in a significant decline in the crime
and murder rates (Nevin, 2007).
In this example, decisions made by a small number of corporations fundamentally
affected the running of society, but, according to dominant understandings of politics,
would have only be considered political when the action resulted in the issue
manifesting itself within the political system. As such, the understanding of politics
contained within the interest group literature (and in the work of Fuchs) fails to
consider important issues that determine “who gets what, when and how” (Lasswell,
1968). Moreover, this understanding of politics is premised upon a (liberal) idea of
the proper and legitimate role of the state and market, with the view that the
decisions of the state are political and the decisions within the market are not.
This market/state division has important consequences for democratic systems.
Most obviously, it means that there is no direct political accountability for a vast array
of societal choices, as these decisions are rendered non-political (Néron, 2010
p.343). Moreover, political accountability is distorted because, with decisions made
by private actors being non-accountable, accountability for negative outcomes often
falls to politicians, sometimes rationalised on the grounds of their failure to act or
affect change. In particular, politicians are often held accountable for local economic
conditions by the electorate; the health of the economy is one of the main factors by
which the success of a politician is judged by his constituents (Przeworski and
Wallerstein, 1988 p.12).
This distorted accountability, particularly regarding economic conditions, further
empowers business. Since politicians in a market society cannot force or command
business to employ people, they must induce action through incentive and attraction;
they must create a “business-friendly” environment. Politicians are compelled to act
in such a manner as, due to the distorted accountability system, politicians could
face removal from office if the economic conditions worsen. Equally, politicians also
have a disincentive from acting in ways perceived to actively harm business and, by
extension, growth and employment (Lindblom, 1982 p.329).
One of the methods of inducing corporations to provide good economic conditions is
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to talk directly and openly to the corporations; including them in policy discussions as
relevant “stakeholders” who can help the politicians achieve either specific (i.e.
bringing a new technology to market) or general goals (improving economic
conditions). Unlike other such stakeholders, corporations, through their hierarchical
management systems, are able to speak directly and precisely and so are able to
negotiate with politicians in order to secure the best deal for themselves. Hence, for
example, United Airlines was able to extract massive concessions out of a series of
different cities by playing the cities off each other when negotiating the location of a
new airline hub (Kantor and Savitch, 1993 pp.230-231).
A particular form of this structural power mechanism is highlighted in the political
economy literature that focuses upon trade politics (e.g. Schiller, 1999, McGillivray,
2004, Grossman and Helpman, 2005) and distributive politics more broadly (e.g.
Rundquist and Carsey, 2002, Lowry and Potoski, 2004, Carroll and Kim, 2010). This
literature highlights how a local politician will seek to ensure the financial well-being
of their constituency and, in this respect, will pay attention to corporations who are
major employers in their constituency. As McGillivray (2004 p.15) notes “an industry
that is concentrated in [a] electoral district is probably such an important employer in
that district that its representative cannot afford to ignore the industry’s demands”.
Thus, the structural power of corporations can work more effectively on a politician
with a smaller constituency, such as a Representative, than a nationwide
constituency, such as the President.
Increasingly since the 1980s neoliberal revolution, as both the governance and
regulatory state literatures note, corporate private authority has been extended by
states into areas traditionally seen to be the domain of the state (Wilkinson, 2005
pp.2-5). As Drache (2001 p.6) points out "Governments everywhere continue to
privatize, deregulate, and out-source the business of government to business." One
of the most pertinent ways for this thesis in which states have increased private
authority is through public-private partnerships (PPP), and the active recruitment of
corporate actors for involvement in governing – although the extent to which
corporations have power in these situations is largely dependent upon the legal form
of the particular PPP, which tends to vary in different national contexts (Mörth, 2009,
Greve, 2010 p.568).
One aspect that enhances the power of corporations to realise their interests through
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negotiation with states and politicians in establishing new facilities or during the
creation of PPPs is the endurance of their management structures. While politicians
may come and go (or be shifted from areas of interest to a corporation), and whose
decisions are accountable to the electorate, individual business managers are
subject only to company stockholders and can endure well beyond the tenure of
most politicians. Because of such endurance, corporations can take a longer-term
view of their political interests (particularly if the political views are held by major
company stockholders), waiting or compromising in a hostile environment and
pushing forward in a supportive one; because of their longer lasting power,
corporations can commit to short-term promises with the view to act against these
promises (or simply forget them) when circumstances change – to endlessly defer
substantive societal change by engaging in a form of “creative compliance” (Moran,
2002 p.400). For instance, executives within the tobacco industry repeatedly made
claims that their companies would “stop business tomorrow” if they “had any thought
or knowledge that in any way we were selling a product harmful to consumers” while
attempting to supress scientific knowledge that proved just that (Proctor, 2012 p.331).
Finally, one of the most important elements of corporate visible power is their
financial resources, which are a by-product of corporate public function within the
economic sphere. These financial resources have two consequences for politics.
First, they free corporations from the restraints most interest groups face in that a
corporation does not need to alter its position to court funding; corporations can act
as entirely self-interested political actors. Second, having these financial sources of
support enables the use of a variety of lobbying tactics within the political arena; as
Lowery et al. (2005 pp.47-49) note, corporations
“have far higher profit margins than others and certainly more resources than
citizens’ organizations. These profits represent slack resources that can
support organized interests. Instead of merely joining a single professional
association, for example, a wealthier firm may join several as well as deciding
to invest in direct lobbying on its own behalf. Indeed, this explanation is so
plausible that the mere fact of having financial resources constitutes a
smoking gun for many popular works on bias in interest representation.”
Financial resources, then, both support and intersect with many other forms of
corporate power.
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Hidden Power
The hidden power of corporations refers to those actions taken behind-the-scenes
and the means of keeping these actions behind-the-scenes. It differs, then, from
manifestations of visible power that happen in closed spaces; these mechanisms
work in a way that requires secrecy, or is necessarily covert rather than being
incidentally so. Corporate hidden power also includes “non-issues” and the methods
by which corporations have tried to organise issues both in and out of politics, which
have been identified in the US interest group literature and were utilised by the
tobacco industry.
One main aspect of hidden corporate power is the, intentionally-cultivated or not,
interpersonal relations between corporate executives and members of the political
establishment (Carroll and Carson, 2003 pp.30-32). C. Wright Mills (1956 p.12)
conceived of the interpersonal relations established through attendance of elite
universities, through membership of certain clubs, and through other such exclusive
institutional settings where those in elite positions, or heading for elite positions have
the opportunity to meet each other, as creating a power elite. For example, George
W. Bush, as the grandson of a Senator; the son of a former President, Vice-
President and CIA head; and Yale and Havard alumnus would likely have many
contacts within the political and business world due to his background (Schneider,
1968 pp.17-18). As Domhoff (2005) argues:
“Members of the upper class live in exclusive suburban neighborhoods,
expensive downtown co-ops, and large country estates…They attend a
system of private schools that extends from pre-school to the university level;
the best known of these schools are the "day" and "boarding" prep schools
that take the place of public high schools in the education of most upper-class
teenagers. Adult members of the upper class socialize in expensive country
clubs, downtown luncheon clubs, hunting clubs, and garden clubs. These
various social institutions are important in creating "social cohesion" and a
sense of in-group ‘we-ness.’”
However, the connections do not need to be so comprehensive so as to constitute a
power elite. Connections can be forged as a result of power (and thus enhance
power), instead of prior to power, as former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay’s twenty year
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courtship of the Bush family attests (Bryce, 2004 ch.12).
In a similar manner, the tobacco industry followed a policy of actively attempting to
create good connections between it and media commentators. As one internal
document reveals, when urging European arms of Phillip Morris to create a network
of friendly journalists, “one successful approach we have employed is our work with
the National Journalism Center in Washington, D.C. NJC conducts on-going intern
programs for college students and recent college graduates and also assists their
graduates to obtain jobs in major media organizations” (Hines, 1994). The payoff for
creating such a network was “favorable articles/commentaries in major publications
such as the Wall Street Journal, National Review that reach millions of the public
through the numerous syndicated columnists that are in our network” who “can be
accessed for numerous issues” (ibid.).
Moreover, interpersonal relations can be developed through the “revolving door”; a
term used to refer to the continual movement of personnel between policymaking
jobs and lobbying or business jobs, and vice versa (Johnson, 1983 p.95). While the
influence of the revolving door occurs covertly, Blaines i Vidal, Draca and Fons-
Rosen (2010), utilising data from the Centre for Responsive Politics, found that
revolving-door lobbyists’ revenue is affected by the status of their former bosses;
most notably in the case of lobbyists who have professional connections with a US
Senator suffering a 21 percent drop in revenue once the Senator leaves office. While
these findings do not necessarily mean that the connected lobbyist is more able to
influence their old employers, it does suggest that actors within the political arena
perceive these lobbyists to be more influential. The revolving door is also widely
used, with 53% of former members of the 111th Congress (2009-2011) working in
lobbying positions less than two years after losing office (Center for Responsive
Politics, 2012).
Businesses benefit from the revolving door not only because they employ/formerly
employed those who have passed through the revolving door, but also because they
have the necessary financial resources to hire lobbying firms with issue-relevant
revolving door personnel. While this benefit also extends to other interest groups that
have sufficient resources, the majority of these interest groups need to both rally
support and ensure the happiness of current supporters and thus, when using their
financial resources in such a manner, must adopt positions that can attract and
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retain support within the constituencies of their particular issue area (Holyoke, 2011
p.29). Corporations, in contrast, can access revolving door personnel to push only
their narrow interests.
Another of the main hidden powers of corporations is their capacity to disseminate
their message through a variety of sources, often adding a glaze of impartiality to
their message; as Lindblom (1977) says “corporations employ all possible methods,
overt and covert. The source of their communications is usually obscure…only a
small part of [their message] comes explicitly from a business source”. This message
dissemination has occurred primarily through the media, who have been both willing
participants in corporate message dissemination, and (as the tobacco example on
the previous page shows) co-opted into dissemination in several ways (Gill, 2000
p.136).
Willing participation comes from the media increasingly being owned by a small
group of corporations. There are currently five major companies – Comcast (which
owns NBC and Universal, among others), Disney (ABC, ESPN, Pixar), TimeWarner
(CNN, HBO, Time), News Corp (Fox News, 20th Century, Wall Street Journal), and
National Amusements (Viacom and CBS) – who own the vast majority of television
channels, print media outlets and film studios (Bettig and Hall, 2012 p.3). The US
media, then, largely consists of a small group of corporations, and so media
communications can thus be understood as primarily corporate communications in
and of themselves (Hasen, 1998, Herman and Chomsky, 1988 pp.6-9). This
ownership, while not guaranteeing political conformity, – see the difference between
CNN and Fox News – does limit the extent of political opinions that are, or are ever
likely to be, expressed. Simply put, acting in their own self-interest, corporations will
not campaign for regulations that could damage their interests. Individual reporters
may do so for a while, but are unlikely to have good long-term employment
prospects. The media, then, is generally pro-corporate because it is owned by
corporations. From this point, however, it cannot be inferred that all corporations will
get good coverage – many individual companies have faced very negative media
coverage over defects in their products, for instance (Blasco et al., 2012) – but that
the general interest of a media company is not to challenge corporate interests as a
whole.
Co-option of the media by other non-media corporations occurs at two levels – the
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managerial level and the individual level. At the managerial level, business
executives within media companies must maintain profitability. Since media
companies rely on advertising, primarily from large businesses, they must ensure
that the businesses that advertise with them continue to do so, which gives these
corporations an avenue for pressure. For instance, in 1969, when the New York
Times announced it would no longer publish cigarette ads without a health caution,
the American Tobacco Company published a series of full page ads in other
newspapers and magazines attacking the move – claiming that “anticigarette theory
is a bum rap” (Proctor, 2012 p.375). While they did add the health caution in 1969
“America’s “newspaper of record” continued to print cigarette ads until 1999” even
while being “repeatedly urged to refuse tobacco adverting” during the 1970s and
1980s, which the New York Times refused to do because it would set a “dangerous
precedent” (ibid. p.385). Paying greater attention to advertiser pressure than the
New York Times did in this example could result in either self-censorship, where the
media organisation does not put out negative information for fear of losing
advertising revenue, or threats that result in negative information not being released.
At the individual level, corporate ownership, reliance on advertising revenue,
technological change and external economic pressures have resulted in a news
media that has a requirement for increased content, but employs fewer people to
create that content. Such a situation has forced journalists and other media workers
to reduce the time spent on articles by reducing the investigation and research that
goes into an article. Instead, the news industry has moved to engaging in
“churnalism” (Freedman, 2009) – the uncritical repetition of pre-packaged media
material. As such, in recent years journalism has become to be a form of “creative
cannibalization” (Fenton, 2011) with the reproduction of material “gathered
overwhelming from public relations and news agency sources” (Freedman, 2009
p.41). Through public relations agencies, then, corporations can feed their views into
the churnalism machine for wide dissemination with a glaze of impartiality.
Furthermore, (and another possible source of churnalism) corporations have utilised
think-tanks to produce research that promotes certain viewpoints so that the
research can be disseminated through the media, thereby bestowing the corporate
position with some kind of scientific legitimacy and without any connection to the
business backers tainting the reception of the research (Jacques et al., 2008 pp.364-
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365). As Smith (2000 p.193) notes “because of their independence, [think-tank
analysts called on by the media] are likely more persuasive advocates of
probusiness policies than are spokespersons who explicitly represent corporations,
trade associations, or peak associations” and, as such, think-tank advocacy is a
“critical source of business power”. For instance, the tobacco industry utilised a
number of think-tanks to both cast doubt on the science underlying nicotine addiction
and to change the agenda about second-hand smoke from the banning of indoor
smoking (which could have impacted on sales) to ensuring better ventilation
(Hirschhorn and Bialous, 2001, Saloojee and Dagli, 2000).
Additionally, conservative/right-wing think-tanks – the Heritage Foundation, the
American Enterprise Institute, the CATO Institute – have worked to provide general
ammunition and help for pro-business and pro-corporate positions, while accepting
funds in return. The Heritage Foundation, for instance,
“serves as a meeting place for conservatives, with daily lectures, debates and
briefings. Corporate representatives meet with government decisionmakers
through the Washington Policy Roundtable… A resource bank of scholars and
policy experts around the nation has been compiled to provide the media and
congressional hearings with conservative commentary” (Peschek, 1987 p.33)
In this respect, the Heritage Foundation was described by Newt Gingrich as “the
most far-reaching conservative organisation in the country in the war of ideas” (as
quoted in Rich, 2005 p.1). The benefit, then, of funding organisation, such as
Heritage, is that they provide ideological ammunition and interpersonal networks.
Corporate funding of think-tanks has also accumulated ancillary benefits in that
these think-tanks have become viewed as good sources of information and turned
into increasingly influential actors in their own right; with think-tanks even being
invited to Congressional hearings and other important political venues, alongside
having developed their own connections to the media (Smith, 2000 p.172).
With corporate use of think-tanks and influence on the media, there is an overlap
between hidden and invisible power. In the short-term, and particularly with media
pieces, corporations are attempting to alter the agenda, to re-direct attention and to
organise concerns both into, and out of, politics. In the long-term, and particularly
with general funding of free market think-tanks, corporations are establishing
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legitimating discourses that empower them. Moreover, this overlap between hidden
and invisible power helps demonstrate how these two forms of power can interact.
Hidden power can, over-time, create invisible power; the continual altering of the
agenda can mould people’s perspectives and perception of what is achievable,
desirable or acceptable according to the dominant discourse. Equally, invisible
power can determine the success of the use of hidden power; agenda manipulations
that cut against the dominant discourse cannot rely on common-sense assumptions
to ease the passage of the argument.
Similar to the use of think-tanks, but directed to a wider audience, astroturf groups –
artificial “grassroots” movements (Kollman, 1998 p.64) – have proved an effective
way for corporations to communicate their message through a third party.
Astroturfing works by mimicking outside lobbying tactics in order to make it appear
that a certain policy has grassroots support/opposition, when in actuality, it is the
work of a PR firm. For example, after gaining the consent of the person being written
on behalf of, astroturf letter-writing campaigns have utilised different writing styles
and different types of paper in order to make the letter appear as if it was personally
written and not the equivalent of a signature on a petition – with letters written on
behalf of old ladies being written with “little kitty cat stationery” (Lyon and Maxwell,
2004 p.563). In a similar manner the tobacco industry created several astroturf
groups, such as the Fair Cigarette Tax Campaign (funded by Phillip Morris), to
project the illusion that there was widespread public opposition to “anti-tobacco”
measures (Proctor, 2012 p.140). These tactics are not new, and can be traced to
back to the 1930s, when Carl Byoir created front groups such as the National
Consumers’ Tax Council, the Emergency Consumers’ Tax Council and Property
Owners Inc to oppose new legislation that would have taxed chain stores (Miller and
Dinan, 2008 pp.20-21).
One final point to consider in this section on hidden power is corporate confidentiality.
One of the major reasons that corporations are able to use hidden power tactics
such as astroturf groups and think-tanks is the right to corporate confidentiality and
their capacity to operate behind closed doors (Nadel, 1975 p.15). These two issues
leave information about the workings of these major organisations in the dark,
impeding analysis of corporate activities and comprehension of the scope of these
activities. So, when the tobacco industry was forced to provide its private documents
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by court order the many machinations and manipulations of the industry were
revealed that previously had been covered by the corporation’s right to confidentiality.
With the exception of the tobacco industry, corporate privacy is also somewhat
asymmetric in the policy formulation and implementation processes as parts of the
government (and interest group communication with government) can be subject to
requests under the Freedom of Information Act, which corporations can slip out of
due to a clause in the act that protects trade secrets and financial information
(Department of Justice, 2009). This asymmetry means there is a disparity in the
power to control information, and thus to be held to account, between government
and corporations.
Invisible Power
“Ultimately…the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming
consequence to the whole organisation of society; it means no less than the running
of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social
relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system”
Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944] p.60)
Underlying the mechanisms of influence mentioned above is a discourse of business
legitimacy that facilitates business visible and hidden power. As Dahl (still then in his
pluralist phase) noted in New Haven
“the goals of businessmen are legitimised by a system of beliefs widely
shared throughout the community. Among other things, this system of beliefs
gives legitimacy to business itself as an essential institution in American
Society” (Dahl, 1961 p.76).
This system of beliefs supports the ability of corporations to make productive
decisions without democratic oversight, to be viewed as a legal person and to make
political communications. It constitutes, as Lindblom (1977) termed it, the “privileged
position of business” in society and serves to protect the rights afforded to business.
However, in recent years greater invisible power has accrued to corporations beyond
their privileged position. As Moran (2009 pp.149-150) notes
“in the last couple of decades, we have seen a determined attempt to recreate
a Gramscian hegemony: to establish as an instinctively accepted fact of life
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that the market is the naturally best way to allocate resources and that
empowerment and enrichment of a corporate elite inside the biggest
enterprises is simply a necessity if the market order is to prosper.”
Commonly termed the “neoliberal revolution” (Duménil and Lévy, 2004), this
determined attempt has been very successful in establishing neoliberal values as
dominant discursive currents in the US. While the term “neoliberalism” is often
pejoratively used without clear definition (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009), it can be
seen as a political project motivated by a broad body of economic thought –
promoted by the likes of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and Ludwig von Mises –
that holds that a lassiez-faire market is desirable as it is the most effective way to
organise society. More specifically, neoliberalism is associated with policies of
deregulation, privatisation, lower taxes, reducing the power of unions and a reduction
in the size of the state.25 Yet neoliberalism is more than just a political ideology of the
economic. Neoliberalism is entwined with many moral and political values as well. As
Harvey (2005 p.5) argues,
“For any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to
be advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our
desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit. If
successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in common
sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question. The founding
figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of human dignity and
individual freedom as fundamental, as “the central values of civilisation”. In so
doing they chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and seductive ideals.
These values, they held, were threatened not only by fascism, dictatorships,
and communism, but by all forms of state intervention and substituted
collective judgements for those of individuals free to choose.”
So, neoliberalism is not only a positive political theory but also a normative one that
has tied itself, successfully, to other major discursive currents in US society. In
championing the market, the reduction of the state and deregulation in such a
manner, neoliberalism has worked well to enhance the private authority of
25 In practice, neoliberalism has, and individuals associated with the neoliberal political project have,
not worked to assiduously stick to neoliberal principles. Hence, Gamble (1994) characterises
Thatcherism as a combination of “the free market and the strong state”.
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corporations by withdrawing government control from the market.
In addition to being based upon seductive ideas, neoliberalism has, and proponents
of it have, pushed the view that neoliberal economic ideas are scientific, objective
and empirically-grounded. Yet, as Chang (2010 p.32) points out, this viewpoint is an
“ideological cloak” whereby they “pretend that their politics is not really political, but
rather is an objective economic truth, while other people’s politics is political.
However, they are as politically motivated as their opponents.” Equally, Aune (2002
p.168) argues that “the ideological rhetoric of “the market” refuses to recognise itself
as rhetoric”. The tactic of neoliberals presenting their views as objective places
opponents in a double bind; either they can reject neoliberal assumptions and be
derided as not understanding reality, or they can seek to justify their policies using
the neoliberal framework, in which case they have ceded the ground of the debate
and limited themselves to variations on a neoliberal theme. It is in this manner that
the use of this ideological cloak has been very important in advancing neoliberalism
and it has helped establish the idea that there is no alternative to the neoliberal
project; it is simply proven to work and benefit society.
As we saw above, this narrative was advanced by think-tanks and the media. It was
also taken up by the political parties and increasingly became the grounds on which
politics was fought. Smith (2007 p.15) notes that starting in the 1970s “Republicans
repeatedly highlighted [their economic plans] on the expectation that a jobs-and-
growth message would resonate with the electorate. Furthermore…Democrats did
not cede the economic terrain but instead paralleled Republicans in shifting the
discussion of jobs, incomes, and growth to the forefront of their rhetoric…In the day-
to-day course of governing, American politics became more, not less, oriented
around the economy and the issues that define it”. This orientation around economic
concerns has come at the expense of political concerns; as Radice (1999 p.21)
notes “the state has become increasingly structured around an agenda that
intrinsically excludes or subordinates [non-economic] concerns”.26
The ascendancy of neoliberal discourse, and the structuring of the state around
economic concerns, has benefited corporations in several ways. Neoliberalism
26 Writing in 1972 (p.7), Galbraith presciently wrote that “I am concerned to suggest the general lines
of emancipation. Otherwise we will allow economic goals to have an undue monopoly of our lives and
at the expense of other and more valuable concerns.”
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helped establish ideas of the free market, of efficiency, of growth, of consumer
choice and of economic democracy that corporations could use or naturally
benefitted from (Fuchs, 2005 p.29). So, for instance, the free market, which is the
idea that economic actors should be free to pursue their own self-interest as such
actions will ultimately improve society, benefits corporations as it works as an
automatic shield against new government regulation: as interference in corporate
affairs is viewed to harm societal welfare.
In addition to the free market working as an automatic shield, the idea of the free
market can also be invoked by corporations; the discourse can be used by actors for
generally anti-regulatory purposes. However, while it generally operates in this anti-
regulatory manner, the free market can be deployed flexibly. This flexibility is due to
the free market being ephemeral; lacking any definition as to where it stops and
when it has been achieved, it is instead something that is defined in such a way so
as society is always working towards it. When a market appears free it is because
government restrictions, such as on the sale of people, political votes or university
places, are not noticed because the regulations are agreed with and so-well
established as to appear natural. As such, the free market is in the eye of the
beholder (Chang, 2010 p.25), which can be seen in arguments over the 1819 Cotton
Factories Regulation Act discussed above and in the fact that intellectual property
rights – historically considered as a restriction of free trade (Sell, 2003 p.6) – have
become a well-established component of the neoliberal free market.
Underlying and supporting the idea of the free market is the idea of market efficiency.
As Hayek (1978 pp.63-64) says the free market ensures “a more efficient allocation
of societal resources than any design could achieve”: put simply, the market is freer,
and working more efficiently (for the benefit of all), when the government regulates
less. The argument that markets do things more “efficiently” enshrines a distorted
concept of efficiency as the main ordering factor for economic and political decisions.
In fact, in neoliberalism efficiency, understood as “resources being used where they
are valued most highly” (Aune, 2002 p.21), is favoured over other normative
principles that have provided the foundations for many democratic debates. Equality,
morality, justice, dignity, etc can all provide important considerations that conflict with
the goal of efficiency. For instance, it may be the most “efficient” to factory farm
animals but it is not necessarily something that society would desire. However, if
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many societal decisions such as these are left to the market (i.e. are not regulated
on for fear of harming efficiency), these principles are insulated from political
(democratic) control.
Like the free market, efficiency is an equally flexible (or empty) term that provides
intellectual fodder for neoliberalism. While neoliberalism valorises efficiency,
efficiency is never a goal in and of itself; instead it is the feature of a process of
achieving a goal. For instance, if a state aims to improve the efficiency of health care
delivery the end goal – the purpose – is to improve health care, perhaps at cheaper
cost or at better value for already spent money; the purpose is not efficiency in and
of itself, but efficiency for something. To say the free market is the most efficient
allocation of societal resources is to overlook debates as to the purpose of society –
what goals are resources being used for? Thus, the neoliberal use of “efficiency” is
empty of real content because efficiency is never an actual end goal in itself, but the
characteristic of a system achieving its goals (Colander, 2004). The focus on
efficiency, then, plays an important part in making neoliberalism appear as a non-
ideological position as the debate over the goals that are being achieved efficiently is
obscured.
Related to neoliberalism and its constituent ideas is the idea of a gross domestic
product (GDP) growth economy (Daly, 2007 p.246). Ensuring GDP growth became a
feature of political debate in the post-war years (Dickinson, 2012) as it was seen as
synonymous with creating new jobs and ensuring the continued well-being of the
country. Thus it was already a constant point of political debate prior to neoliberalism,
but, under neoliberalism, became even more significant still. Yet major problems
come with the idea of a GDP growth economy and ordering politics around the
maximisation of GDP. GDP is a rather limited aggregate measure of the value of the
formal exchange of goods and services within an economy – it measures how much
money changes hands. As such, it does not include many aspects that are important
to societal well-being. This point was well known from its inception with the inventor
of GDP – Simon Kuznets – warning, during his announcement of its invention to the
Senate, not to confuse GDP growth with progress as “the welfare of a nation
can...scarcely be inferred from a measure of national income” (Faris, 2009).
GDP departs from societal welfare on a number of key points, such as in not
accounting for crime, recycling, second-hand sales, changes in quality, increases in
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leisure time, environmental damage, the destruction or consumption of resources,
voluntary work and many other issues that affect the happiness, material wealth and
overall welfare of society (Jackson, 2009 ch. 8). Moreover, it does account for – and
thus sees growth in these areas as, in the aggregate, positive – health care costs,
long daily commutes, the replacement of easily-broken goods, the destruction of
renewable resources and many other things negatively associated with societal
welfare. Put more eloquently, by Robert Kennedy in 1968, GDP “counts napalm and
the cost of a nuclear warhead, and armored cars for police who fight riots in our
streets…it does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages;
the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials” (Faris,
2009). In fact, as it is a measure of throughput, an increase in GDP can potentially
be accompanied by declining “wealth” when capital is drawn down while producing
limited-life goods, as non-monetary, or non-monetisable, resources are expended in
the production of new temporary goods.
In this manner, the importance attached to GDP growth by neoliberalism works to
limit political debate because it establishes other values as in conflict with the well-
being of society (understood through GDP growth) – i.e. environmental (health,
safety, etc) regulations are viewed through the lens of restricting growth and
therefore harming society, rather than being judged on their actual contribution to
societal well-being (Daly, 2007 p.10). Because GDP only measures a simulacrum of
the welfare of society that mistakes throughput as “wealth creation”, and since
corporations are geared towards throughput and to the use of natural capital,
corporations are empowered by this political focus on GDP growth. A GDP-growth
understanding of the corporate contribution to society only illuminates the positive –
the production of materials for everyday life and the employment of millions – leaving
the negative – resource depletion, pollution and decreased biodiversity – in the
shadows (Wanna, 1991). Hence, corporations are enabled to paint their actions as
for the good of society, even when their actions have negative consequences. For
instance, the tobacco industry sought to undermine arguments about the negative
health consequences of smoking by making a situation whereby “to question
cigarettes was to undermine the economic well-being of the nation” (Proctor, 2012
p.328); effectively putting the cart before the horse by arguing that societal well-
being is preserved because the economy is preserved, rather than arguing directly
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about societal well-being.
One final element of neoliberalism, which can be seen in the Harvey quote above, is
its use of seductive values. These values underpin one of the strongest anti-
regulatory arguments deployed by corporations, which is that consumers and the
market should be free to choose and, subsequently through the many purchasing
decisions of consumers, that the market is an accurate reflection of consumer choice.
Hence, as people “vote” with their money, the market works akin to a democracy. As
Milton Friedman (1962 p.15) argued, the market “is, in political terms, a system of
proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were, for the color of the tie he
wants and get it.” In Friedman’s view, then, demand conditions supply.
Working in the political arena, the extension of Friedman’s view is that government
regulations are a restriction on (economic) democracy and an individual’s right to
choose (Marcuse, 1964 p.4). The choice argument, then, can work as an anti-
regulatory shield in order to preserve corporate autonomy in the economic realm.
The tobacco industry deployed this argument with such success that the ACLU (with
the help of hundreds of thousands of dollars of donations from the tobacco industry)
sought to protect the freedom of smokers to smoke in the early 1990s, but not the
freedom of non-smokers not to inhale second-hand smoke (Proctor, 2012 p.390).
Moreover, the choice argument works to absolve corporations of responsibility for
their production decisions since it creates the idea of the corporation as a non-actor;
as an unconscious mechanism for the satisfaction of consumer preferences and, as
such, beholden to their interests rather than having interests of its own (Galbraith,
1972 pp.213-220). However, there are four main reasons that suggest this view of
the relationship between a corporation and the market is flawed and that this
characterisation simply serves ideological ends.27 The first reason is that, at an
aggregate level, the market mechanism is a crude communication tool incapable of
delivering detailed preference information from buyer to seller (Lindblom, 2001 p.67).
For example, a single Ford Focus has numerous attributes – colour, styling,
performance, size – and a consumer, liking one or a combination of these factors,
could purchase it for any of these reasons. However, the very act of purchasing only
gives the seller the information that the consumer prefers such a particular package
27 See also Galbraith (1972) for a discussion of the idea of consumer sovereignty and the necessity of
economic planning within advanced capitalist systems.
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of attributes put forward, but not, crucially, information about which attributes. This
point has two consequences. First, sellers have only a limited capacity to make
substantive changes to complex products in response to the market as the
information about desired changes is not communicated. Second, if the capacity of
buyers to influence the market is reduced, sellers must have a greater role in market
decisions and cannot be assumed to be simply reacting to consumer demand.
This more active relationship between corporations and customers is further
enhanced through advertising, and the continual stream of positive information that
corporations put out about themselves and their products. Advertising “appears to be
clear evidence that market elites want to manipulate mass (sic.) rather than simply
respond to the preferences signalled by purchases” (Lindblom, 2001 p.70). Most
importantly, communication through advertising is not matched by even vaguely
similar levels of communication from citizen groups or by groups with opposing views;
the communication is unilateral, constant and one-sided (Lindblom, 2001 p.212). It is
because of this unilateralism that Edward Bernays, one of the pioneers of the PR
industry, (Bernays, 2005 [1928] p.9), wrote “the conscious and intelligent
manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the masses is an important
element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of
society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our
country.”
The second reason to doubt the account of the corporation’s relationship to the
market and the consumer is that corporations can make a whole host of decisions
that are not noticeable to the end consumer. As Lindblom (2001 p.66) notes
“In market systems, buyers control only the most conspicuous features of
what market elites offer. You and I choose the shape and softness we desire
in a mattress. But we have only weak or no market control at all, aside from
an occasional boycott, over elite decisions on many of the attributes of the
mattress not visible to us—its flammability, for example.”
Equally, issues to do with the production process or employee welfare are rarely, if
ever, subject to control by the consumer.
Moreover, to a large extent, consumers will demand that which they have already
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had and what is considered “normal”. That is to say that, in a historical sense28,
supply also conditions demand since people want what has previously been supplied
to them. Considering that, as was seen above, consumers only control the most
conspicuous aspects of products, sellers (particularly corporations as they are major
sellers and have, for the most part, existed for a significant amount of time) have the
power to gradually shift the market and to alter demand over time. For instance,
since the 1940s the agricultural system has shifted towards factory farming of
chickens, which has both significantly lowered the welfare of the animals (a hidden
attribute of the end product that is not naturally amenable to market pressures) and
lowered the cost of chicken meat (Nierenberg and Mastny, 2005 p.15). Supply of
low-cost chicken meat has normalised low-cost, poor-welfare meat to the extent that
consumers expect chicken meat to cost little, and are unwilling to pay more (i.e. to
return to a historically normal price) for higher-welfare meat (Van Loo et al., 2011).
Over a much-longer term, with many generations being raised on factory farmed
meat, there is also the possibility of factory farming coming to be seen as inevitable
and necessary.
Also, to some extent, consumers cannot demand that which has never been offered,
it is only once a product is offered that demand begins to grow. If this point is
accepted, then it is possible that demand for a certain product (say pizza) could exist
because other preferred options (fish and chips, perhaps) are not available. To
suggest, then, that the market offers consumers power and control, and that the
market is therefore a reflection of consumer choice, is incorrect as market choice is
bounded by conditions of supply which, to a degree, are controlled by people and
organisations that make production decisions.
The third reason is that choices that cannot be provided by the market, because they
concern resources not privately owned, are unavailable in a market system and so
cannot considered as part of “economic democracy”. Consumers are not offered the
choice of having clean air or having non-polluted natural resources, they are only
offered products that can be individually owned. The appeal to leave choices to be
made through the market, then, would tend towards seeing private, individual goods
over collective goods, thereby cementing the tragedy of the commons in “acceptable”
28 One of the appealing aspects of Friedman’s view is that it applies well in a simple static model
where preferences can be taken as a given. However, in a more dynamic, even intergenerational,
model the influence of supply on demand becomes more apparent.
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political actions. Moreover, as choices are left to the market, and supply slowly
conditions demand towards certain choices, it can often be difficult to legislate to
reverse these choices as the choices have become normalised over time. In this
respect, the idea of economic democracy can be seen to be displacing political
democracy.
The final reason is that, even if it is held that consumer preferences are
endogenously created, corporations can still influence the market decisions
consumers make by exploiting limited consumer knowledge of how to satisfy certain
hidden or intangible preferences – such as build quality, safety, healthiness or brand
prestige. How to realise these consumer preferences is not at all conspicuous and so
can be subject to diversion through advertising and the provision of misleading
information. For instance, the tobacco industry spent a great deal of time and money
designing packages that “communicate the impression of lower tar or milder
cigarettes, while preserving perceived taste and “satisfaction”” (Wakefield et al.,
2002) so that women and younger smokers would not be turned off of cigarettes.
Combined, these four reasons suggest that the neoliberal view of consumer choice
and market democracy is a corporate-empowering fiction.
At the same time, the influence of neoliberal views, particularly of consumer
democracy, has had created an ancillary benefit whereby corporations are viewed as
experts in market affairs. As Fuchs (2005 p.22) notes
“the increasing emphasis on efficiency, competitiveness, and growth rather
than equity, full employment, and the availability and accessibility of public
services, for instance, in the last three decades of the 20th century, has turned
business into the politico-economic expert”
Thus corporations, and their representatives, are seen as the primary source of
information as to the market situation, consumer desires and the future direction of
the market. Such a situation enhances both access to policy-making spaces (since
politicians wish to have expert input) and the legitimacy of corporate utterances
regarding economic issues.
In addition to neoliberalism and its various facets, corporations are empowered by a
“sound science” discourse. Like neoliberalism, sound science utilises an ideological
cloak of objectivity. It is a term that has grown increasingly popular in political debate
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and appears relatively uncontroversial at first sight (Mooney, 2004); as McGarity
(2003 p.898) notes
“talk of science raises the expectation that decisions will be determined by
objective criteria, solid empirical data and rational analysis. Nearly everyone
believes that society is better off when governmental interventions into private
market arrangements to protect health, safety and the environment are driven
by sound science, rather than unfounded emotions”.
Yet, the term sound science is fundamentally paradoxical since it suggests
deferment to others, or to a body of knowledge, but necessarily involves a judgement
into what counts as “sound”; it simultaneously implies both a value judgement and a
lack of value judgements. It also implies that there is always an established scientific
consensus to inform policy, whereas “uncertainty in science, which is the norm not
the exception, does not mean the science is flawed, nor do disagreements among
scientists mean that one of the parties is wrong or is using “junk science” (Michaels,
2005 p.S5).
Use of this paradoxical phrase, however, has allowed both corporations and
government to utilise policy-driven science (rather than having science-driven policy)
to legitimate their positions and thus empowered them to push forward their agendas.
Working in this manner, the tobacco industry pushed the sound science discourse as
a cover – claiming there was no scientific consensus – while seeking to combat
studies that linked smoking to cancer. For instance, Phillip Morris and other tobacco
corporations engaged in a strategy, nicknamed the White Coat project, of recruiting
scientists to do research that could later be called on in court. These pro-tobacco
scientists then “disseminated their results through industry-sponsored, non–peer-
reviewed publications that simply summarized industry-sponsored and industry-
organized conferences” (Friedman et al., 2005 p.S17-S18).
In fact, the tobacco industry, in many and various hidden power moves, was largely
responsible for establishing the “sound science” discourse. In 1993, PR firm APCO
Associates, with a $320,000 half year budget from Phillip Morris, founded The
Advancement for Sound Science Coalition (Ong and Glantz, 2001 p.1749). This
coalition took on a number of issues, such as foods, plastics and chemicals, so as to
disguise its anti-second-hand-smoke agenda (and thus avoid being denied access
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due to people viewing it as heavily partisan) and to broaden its base of support. This
coalition sought to create doubt about second hand smoke’s health risks, to
manufacture an alternative “scientific” discourse and to require ever higher levels of
evidence from their opponents (ibid.).
Likewise, a number of industries – with ExxonMobil one of the worst offenders –
have sought to contest the science underlying climate change and funded various
astroturf groups, think-tanks (most notably the Competitive Enterprise Institute),
academics and conferences that have sought to paint climate change as “just a
theory” (Greenpeace, 2010). Like The Advancement for Sound Science coalition, the
Science and Public Policy Institute has sought to advance an alternative scientific
discourse and discredit other views as being produced by people motivated by
concerns other than science. The mission of this institute states that it
“support[s] the advancement of sensible public policies for energy and the
environment rooted in rational science and economics. Only through science
and factual information, separating reality from rhetoric, can legislators
develop beneficial policies without unintended consequences that might
threaten the life, liberty, and prosperity of the citizenry" (Science and Public
Policy Institute, 2012).
Sound science, then, works as an example of the merging of hidden and invisible
power when ideas are being deployed. Over a number of years, and through the use
of think-tanks and the media, tobacco corporations seeking to shape the agenda in
the short term have played a major role in creating a discourse that manipulates
perceptions in the long term. Yet, like with neoliberal economic discourse, “sound
science” does not stand separate from other societal values but has been entwined
in them. In this case, sound science is linked with ideas of technology, progress and
rationality, as we can see from the Science and Public Policy Institute’s mission. In
building on established discourses, the discourses that empower corporations have
managed to avoid significant scrutiny and appear benign, unobjectable and non-
ideological. Avoiding scrutiny has also allowed easier replication of this discourse
beyond its original sources; the ideas have become powerful memes (Ratkiewicz et
al., 2011) within society and have, consequently, altered the public perception of
good and bad political viewpoints.
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Both the sound science and the neoliberal economic discourses are extremely
powerful in disciplining thought as each seeks to portray itself as objective 29 ,
impartial and non-political. These narratives stifle, instead of enhance, debate by
providing simple answers to complex, value-laden questions. Their domination
occurs to the extent that the World Social Forum has to make the basic point (which
is its slogan) that “Another World Is Possible”. Likewise, they are doctrines that,
while hiding their inherent ideological values, attempt to lay the groundwork for how
issues are evaluated and judged – does a policy make “economic sense”? Does it
give consumers freedom? Is the policy based on “sound science”? A failure to
adhere to these values allows opposition actors to be dismissed as thinking in a
manner detached from reality; the discourses “serve to coordinate ideas and goals
with those exacted by the prevailing system, to enclose them in the system, and to
repel those which are irreconcilable with the system” (Marcuse, 1964 pp.13-14).
While these discourses, particularly the economic discourses, cannot solely be
traced to the actions of corporations, corporations are very much empowered by
them, in both positive and negative ways. In a positive way, the neoliberal economic
discourse makes corporations appear as societally-beneficial organisations who
provide consumers freedom and choice in a form of economic democracy, and the
sound science discourse promotes the idea of corporations as technologically-
cutting-edge, as rational and objective, and the idea of their employees as impartial
experts. In a negative way, the neoliberal economic discourse can work as a shield
against regulation (in the form of regulations being portrayed as “anti-growth” or
against “consumer freedom), and the sound science discourse can work to
undermine genuine scientific consensus within the public sphere through attacking
the established evidence base as unsound.
Applying the Framework – From Policy Making to Policy Evolution
Inquiries from mainstream interest group theorists have tended to focus on policy
making – that is, the formulation of policy (Sidney, 2007 p.79). Such an approach
would be inappropriate for applying the framework of power outlined above as
decisions outside of the policy arena, non-decisions and unrealised conflict would all
29 Indeed, Ayn Rand (1957), at the harder end of such economic ideas, called her philosophy
“objectivism”.
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be excluded from the analysis and only a small part of power would be considered.
As such, applying the above framework requires exploring policy evolution – the
history of the policy, the historical outcomes of the policy, actions within the political
arena, other (perhaps opposed) actors, other potential policies, actions within the
market, the implementation of the policy and the realised (or potential) outcomes of a
policy. Such a body of evidence is necessary because many of the mechanisms of
influence work over the long term, rather than the short term, and work prior to, after
and outside of political-arena decision making.
On a more fine-grained level of analysis, throughout policy evolution the
mechanisms of influence identified above (and shown in figure 3-2) can be
investigated to see if they are being utilised so as to see if power is operating in a
significant manner. Thus, exploring the role of corporate visible power in a policy
area entails investigating the role of private authority in the form of market decisions,
the direct representation of interests by local politicians, direct negotiations with the
government (such as in the form of public-private partnerships) and the use of
financial resources. Hidden power requires exploring interpersonal relationships
(particularly in the form of the revolving door), procedural bias, material put out by
think-tanks and the media, the work of astroturf groups and the policies that were not
adopted. Finally, invisible power is investigated through examining the discourses
(such as neoliberalism and sound science) used by corporations and various other
political actors, how important these discourses were, how these discourses limit
what is seen as legitimate, weaknesses in the discursive account, and the non-
discussion of the “common sense” assumptions or values that these discourses rely
on.
Figure 3-2: Simplified forms of power framework for the exploration of corporate power
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Exploring the existence and operation of these mechanisms of influence helps to
answer the research questions on the working of corporate influence, what methods
they used, and why, if they were, the corporations were influential. However, it does
not answer the underpinning question of “To what extent were they influential?” This
question is a relative, contextual and evaluative question that is primarily based upon
the extent to which actors are able to satisfy their interests, perhaps (but not
necessarily) in opposition to other interests; it is based upon an analysis of the
impact of corporate influence. In applying this framework, then, it is necessary to
explore and define the interests of an actor so that the extent to which their interests
are realised can be assessed. But, for such evaluation, the context in which actors
attempt to satisfy their interests – which studying policy evolution provides – is
crucial as power is relational rather than absolute; an actor may be more powerful
but achieve modest interest satisfaction in an area where other actors have
mobilised, in comparison to an area where they achieve complete interest
satisfaction against no mobilisation (Dur, 2008 p.561).
Conclusion
Corporations are more powerful than is recognised in interest group theory due to
the mechanisms of corporate influence being more diverse and broader than that
which has been studied in the interest group literature. This chapter has sought to
capture the diversity and breadth of corporate power by developing, from a wide
range of literature, a framework that reflects the actions and discourses that have
been deployed by, and for, corporate actors. The analytical framework, drawing on
Gaventa’s forms of power, highlighted the different faces of corporate power and
explored the manifestations of this power in the current system – examining
mechanisms of influence such as astroturf groups, economic discourses, production
decisions and interpersonal relationships.
The purpose of this theoretical framework is to allow an exploration of the research
questions in the case studies, which it does by detailing how and why corporations
have been influential in the past; using past mechanisms of influence as markers to
look for in the empirical chapters. Exploring such issues re-centres the substantive
question about democracy that initially motivated interest group research, namely:
“who governs?” More specifically, this research sheds light on Held and McGrew’s
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(2003, p.8) more detailed, but less historic, version of the question – “Who rules, in
whose interests, by what mechanisms and for what purposes?” Asking these
questions in a US context are vitally important as it purports to be the foremost
democratic nation on earth.
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Chapter 4 – Methodology
This research utilised a case study approach primarily based on qualitative data
gathered from both semi-structured elite interviews and primary and secondary
documentary sources. This chapter discusses and justifies the choice of research
design, explaining its strengths, weaknesses and evolution, and discusses the
research design with reference to the literature in chapter two. It also discusses the
practical issues experienced during data collection, before finally summarising the
research design and justification.
Overall Research Design
As mentioned in the introduction, this research is based upon an iterative-parallel
emerging design (Verschuren, 2001 p.396). Whilst similar to a static-linear deductive
design where theory informs the origins of study design, an iterative-parallel
emerging design also allows theory to be modified in light of emerging themes from
the data during research. Such an approach was necessary due to the relative
scarcity of the literature on corporate power and a lack of an integrated analytical
framework for approaching the issue of corporate power. The research design
allowed the analytical framework to both be validated and modified during the data
collection and allowed rival ideas from the literature to be explored. As such, the
analytical framework has been revised in light of the data, although many of the
ideas present in the initial framework remain.
This approach has several advantages. First, it encourages greater exploration of
new ideas that can emerge during data collection (ibid. p.396). In this way, it actively
reflects Gilbert’s (1993 p.20) point that “in the case of doing research [induction and
deduction] often get intertwined” and new ideas often do get followed. In contrast to
a (rigidly followed) static linear design – where theory defines what data is collected,
data is collected and then it is analysed – an iterative-parallel emerging design
allows interplay between the sections of research and a gradual evolution of the final
research design and direction (Creswell, 2003 p.13). An iterative-parallel design,
then, merges into an inductive-deductive cycle of reasoning, in that it explores others’
previous analytical positions to guide data collection, but, in the process of data
collection, modifies initial analytical positions.
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Second, an iterative-parallel emerging design encourages a holistic, rather than
reductionist, examination of issues. The advantage of a holistic approach is that it
encourages reflection on the importance of issues relative to other issues rather than
accepting the implicit ordering of issues present in the literature. So, for example,
PAC contributions may not be as an important factor in corporate influence as a
different issue, such as the revolving door, but PAC contributions may appear more
important due to the greater level of literature focus on PAC contributions. Holism,
however, avoids losing sight of the bigger picture and can give insight into the
context within which certain mechanisms are effective and the situations in which
they are not.
Third, an iterative-parallel emerging design complements semi-structured interviews
as both require reflection and modification on the basis of new information, and both
allow exploration of emerging understandings and complexity (Guba and Lincoln,
1989 p.153). Thus, the emphasis in both design and method is on being theory-
informed but data-driven and, for the researcher, to utilise “complex reasoning that is
multi-faceted, iterative, and simultaneous” (Creswell, 2003 p.20). Most importantly,
the emphasis is on exploration of issues and following emerging themes, and so
avoiding the possibility of a theoretical straitjacket.
Iterative-Parallel Emerging Design
The initial analytical framework of this research used many of the ideas that are part
of the final framework. Most notably, the initial framework included Lukes’ three
dimensions of power, which would, with the discovery of Gaventa’s (2006) reworking,
become the organising principle of the framework and the analysis based upon this
framework. As figure 4-1 shows, however, the three dimensions of power were not
the initial organising principle. This connection was not made at the time due to
some of the enduring weaknesses of Lukes’ account (particularly the divining of real
interests) and because the literatures discussed in the previous chapters had little
natural synthesis; referring only to the political economy work, Wilks (2013 p.2)
characterises the literature of corporate power as “a few oases in an arid landscape”.
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(Colours indicate links to literatures)
The majority of the changes to the framework occurred during fieldwork, with three
particular facts becoming apparent during fieldwork that substantially altered the
content of the framework. First, as figure 4-2 shows, local politician representation of
corporations was occurring to a large extent, which was interpreted as a particular
manifestation of structural power. Second, countervailing forces were not as
important as the interest group literature held and, while still requiring attention as an
important element in determining power, did not fit in the newer framework organised
around different forms of the power of corporations. Third, the oil and gas industry,
who were assumed to be playing a large part in oil dependence policies, were found
to be more interested in policies they felt more directly reflected their medium-term
financial interests. So, while not represented in either of the figures, the idea of
corporate power became less general (such as in Lindblom (1977) or Strange (1994))
and more specific.
Additionally, during the processes of fieldwork and of writing, new ideas and new
theories were encountered that provided important insights and that allowed a
greater ordering and synthesis of the framework to be achieved. In particular,
Gaventa’s conception of the faces of power removed the problems inherent in Lukes’
account and provided an account of hidden power that was broader and fit better
with the mechanisms of influence provided by the different literatures.
Figure 4-1: Exploratory Framework
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Figure 4-2: Literature used in the synthesised framework.
(Colours indicate links to literature)
Case Study Method
The main body of the data for this thesis comes in the form of case studies of oil
dependence policy evolution. Policy evolution, as the previous chapter explained, is
much broader than policy making and involves exploring the history, the formulation,
the implementation, the outcomes of policy and how these different sections interact
with each other, rather than just focusing on the formulation or implementation
stages. So, a policy evolution case study involves investigating the historical context,
formulation, implementation and outcomes of a particular policy, and the interaction
between these different stages. The rationale behind a general case study approach
is that it involves examining specific instances of a more general phenomenon in
order to gain understanding of the general phenomenon (Ruddin, 2006). It works,
then, in contrast to large-n studies, which seek to understand the general in order to
gain an understanding of the specific. A case study approach was adopted by this
research for two main reasons.
First, case studies can give an account of a wider phenomenon that is “sensitive to
complexity” (Ragin, 1989 p.viii) as they draw upon rich and deep sets of data. Case
studies, then, suit this research as the subject matter of this thesis involves complex
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(and sometimes covert) interactions between numerous bodies. In fact, the highly
contextual nature of a case study approach has great utility in exploring some of the
issues that have previously been covered by large-n studies; they can work to check
theoretical insights developed on analysis of broader, yet shallower, data. As such,
the case study approach can complement a lot of contemporary interest group
theory as this literature was developed largely from large-n studies. For instance,
Smith’s (2000, 2007) insights into the role of think-tanks for business power can be
explored in the richer and deeper datasets of case studies and explored alongside
other mechanisms of influence.
Second, case studies fit well with an iterative-parallel research design. As
Verschuren (2003 p.137) argues, case studies are “holistic in nature, following an
iterative-parallel way of preceding...and aimed at description and explanation of
complex and entangled group attributes, patterns, structures or processes”. Case
studies are necessary for this research because of the complexity of attributing
influence and the wide array of mechanisms of influence that can be in operation at
any one time. The danger in using a shallower data set while approaching this
research would be that influence is wrongly attributed to observable or easily
noticeable causes, when the actual causes lay below the surface of the data. As
such, case studies “are more suited to how and why questions which can be
explanatory in nature” (Easton, 2010 p.119).
A further element of this research’s case study approach is that it uses two cases. A
dual case study design was adopted because it strikes a balance between
robustness of findings and sensitivity of analysis – between depth and breadth. So,
in contrast, a single case study design has limited robustness and generalisability in
its research findings due to the singularity of the area covered (Yin, 2009 p.53); it is
impossible from one case to make any claims as whether what has been observed is
the rule or the exception. Likewise, the potential weaknesses of utilising a greater
number of cases is that, in having to “cover both the phenomenon of interest and its
context” (ibid. p.56), the process of data collection overshadows data analysis or that,
in order to logistically cope with a greater amount of data, depth of data collection is
sacrificed.
However, while there are many advantages of the dual-case case study approach,
like all approaches it does have certain inherent limitations that have to be
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considered and mitigated. One of the main criticisms is that case studies, in aiming
to portray complexity, can be too descriptive in content and, as such, lack analytical
insight (Weick, 1979 p.38); that the focus is on describing a situation rather than
critically analyzing it. Such an issue can be overcome by “invest[ing] in theory” (ibid.
p.38) and ensuring that the empirical sections are well-linked to theoretical
discussions. Hence, this thesis has both a theoretical chapter preceding the cases
studies and a discussion chapter following the case studies, which work together to
first explain the theoretical underpinnings of the research and then, after the case
studies, tie the empirical content to the theory. The purpose of these chapters, then,
is to anchor the case studies to theory in order to avoid a lack of analysis.
A further criticism, which also works against qualitative approaches more widely, is
that the conclusions from case studies, by looking at very specific examples, are
unsuitable for wider generalisations – that the scope of the data is too narrow (Ragin,
1989 p.ix). However, while case studies may be limited in their capacity to generate
empirical or statistical generalisations, case studies can allow the generation of
analytical generalisations (Yin, 2009 pp.31-33). That is to say, that this thesis cannot
generalise about how all corporations do act or have acted, but can provide an idea
of what their actions would be. Moreover, as mentioned above, all studies suffer from
issues of scope as, for logistical reasons, there is inevitable trade-off between
breadth and depth of data used; alternative research designs, particularly large-n
studies, must first identify variables before data collection leading to a reduction of
the depth (and exploratory potential) of the research.
Data Collection
Data collection fieldwork took place over a three month period beginning in April
2011. The majority of the period was spent in Washington D.C. and the minority in
Ann Arbor, Michigan. As a whole, there were three main types of data collected:
interviews, documents and statistics. Together, these three types of data represent a
broad base of information that benefits from the strengths of each data source. The
weaknesses of each data source, which are discussed below, are mitigated in the
case studies by the use of the other data sources to corroborate the information from
a given data source. This process of corroboration between data sources, which is
called data triangulation, not only allows cross-source fact checking, but also
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“provides multiple measures of the same phenomenon” (Yin, 2009 pp.116-117). As
such, data triangulation greatly increases the perspectives from which the object of
study can be viewed, with the essential point of data triangulation being that, when
sources of data used together, the base of information is greater than the sum of its
parts (ibid. p.117).
Elite Interviews
Elite interviews are where the researcher interviews “someone in a position of
authority, or especially expert or authoritative, people who are capable of giving
answers with insight and a comprehensive grasp of what it is you are researching”
(Gillham, 2000 p.63). Their role in this thesis was to produce primary data (Blaikie,
2000 p.183) that allowed insight into the role of corporations and organised interests
in the policy evolution process in the two case studies, and to gain insider insights
into the political processes that drive policy evolution. As such, in each of the
interviews there were certain key points relating to the research questions that were
discussed. However, the intention was not to produce survey-like data with the exact
same questions asked of each participant. Instead, in order to allow “a fluid and
flexible structure, and to allow researcher and interviewee(s) to develop unexpected
themes” (Mason, 2002 p.62), these interviews were semi-structured and tailored to
specific interviewees.
In total, 18 recorded elite interviews took place, supplemented by unrecorded
informal chats and professional conference attendance. Interviewees were mainly
contacted via e-mail in the first instance. Almost all participants were asked if they
would be able to recommend other potential interviewees in an effort to gain further
participants by “snowballing”. Interviewees ranged from government officials
(NHTSA, Department of Energy, Congressional Staffers), business executives
(ConocoPhillips, GM, Chrysler) to think-tank/lobbying organisation staff (Public
Citizen, American Petroleum Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute). Several of
these interviewees, particularly those in think-tanks, had previous experience of
being government officials in relevant areas and were able to give insight into
several roles. Furthermore, conference attendance (particularly the Energy
Information Administration’s annual conference) was useful for meeting those
working outside of the intensely political climate of Washington D.C. and,
subsequently, for hearing less circumspect opinions. Conference attendance also
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allowed a wider pool of interviewees to be contacted than a pure snowballing
approach can generate, as there is the potential for a snowballing approach leading
to only gathering information from one side of a small policy circle (King and
Horrocks, 2009 p.34).
The main strengths of using elite interviews are that the researcher is able to probe
unexpected issues, can clarify interpretations of other information/issues and can
encounter previously undocumented information (Devine, 2002 p.199); the
researcher is able to explore a situation with help from those familiar to the situation.
In contrast, the main weaknesses of using interview data are that interviewees could
be motivated for personal vindication to under- or over-represent the role of certain
groups and processes, and that the people who were obtainable were not
necessarily the best sources of information on the topic (ibid. pp.205-206). In
addition, as this research was studying events that happened in the (recent) past,
there are issues of poor recall, or of the post hoc colouring, of events by interviewees.
While some degree of these problems is unavoidable, these weaknesses can be
mitigated, and were mitigated in this research, in three ways. First, interviewees
were made to understand that they will be anonymised and that some of their
responses can be “off the record” (Dexter, 2006 p.102). Anonymisation reduces the
incentive for misrepresentation of events for personal vindication because the
interviewee effectively has an audience of one; no one apart from the interviewer will
know the source. Second, the obtainability of elites and their fit with the research
goals and aims can be subject to some level of verification through the documentary
record. Those people particularly expert, or important, within an area tend to show
up in published articles, in Congressional testimony and in newspaper reports. The
documentary record, then, can help guide the researcher to important potential
interviewees. Third, as a part of the data triangulation mentioned above, interviewee
responses can be measured against the other sources of information that this
research project draws upon. For instance, an account provided by one interviewee
can be crosschecked in other interviews (ibid. p.106). Such a procedure helps to
reduce the analytical influence of post hoc colouring, and over- and under-
representation on the basis of personal vindication, by diluting the position in the
dataset of a single interview where these problems have occurred.
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Documents
Documents form the bulk of secondary data employed by this thesis. This category
includes primary and secondary sources, as well as academic/technical literature.
The main primary sources were policy documents (particularly Congressional
hearings) and videos/transcripts of speeches by officials, lobbyists and industry
representatives. The main advantage of primary documents is they allow insight into
the views of major actors at the time they were created (Mason, 2002 p.108). The
majority of these resources are now available online; with each US government
department having its own website, the Whitehouse website having an archive from
the Bush Presidency, and videos and transcripts of speeches being widely available
on websites such as YouTube and CNN. The most useful web resources were the
Government Printing Office’s Federal Digital System (GPO FDSys –
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/) – which contains transcripts of unclassified Congressional
hearings – and Regulations.gov – which contains information pertaining to the
operation of federal agencies. Also useful for retrieval of bills and other official data is
the Library of Congress’ THOMAS (http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php).
The secondary sources consist of newspaper/magazine articles, websites and books.
Included with these secondary sources is “grey” literature, which is research that is
produced by think-tanks and NGOs. This information is generally of lesser value than
other sources as it involves a layer of interpretation applied to the events, but can
offer important clues, can offer direction on where to find primary sources and,
occasionally, contain invaluable nuggets of information. Moreover, when the issue
under scrutiny concerns think-tank manipulations, or media replication of arguments,
many of these sources can be counted as primary sources and as entwined in the
policy evolution of the case study.
In particular, newspaper and news magazine articles, drawn mainly from LexisNexis,
were very useful in this research. Instead of relying on later reviews of history, this
research used these resources to reconstruct events (particularly the preferences of
actors) at the time they were occurring. So, as much as was possible the use of this
data in the case studies is aligned to the chronology of events. Attention to the issue
of chronology was necessary due to the shifting positions of various actors within the
case studies over time, particularly in the CAFE case study.
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The strengths in using documents are that, as previously mentioned, they can
capture information at a particular point in time and, as the production of a document
requires reflexive thought, they can present information in a coherent and
comprehensible way. However, the possible weaknesses in this approach is that
“documents may be more or less detailed and comprehensive, they may or may not
be authentic and genuine (what they purport to be), reliable, accurate, and so on.”
(Mason, 2002 p. 110) Furthermore, documents contain a fixed amount of information
that is necessarily subject to interpretation – unlike in interviews, there is little
recourse for clarifying documentary information. These weaknesses can be
alleviated through careful source evaluation as to the purposes and interests of the
producer of the material and by crosschecking with other data sources (Moses and
Knutsen, 2007 p.119). In particular, LexisNexis date-limited media report search
function, and Archive.org’s collection of old webpages, were very useful for cross-
checking information and exploring issues that occurred in the past.
One particular weakness of using public documents, however, is that documents on
general release (such as those from Regulations.gov) have been prepared with a
“public face” – they are unlikely to contain sensitive or damaging information and are,
like vetted interviews, trammelled. In fact, transcripts of official US Congress
hearings can be deliberately edited by staffers and participants before being printed
(Yin, 2009 p.103). While this problem is an unavoidable downside of using public
documents, the problem is somewhat ameliorated by the use of interviews to
uncover concealed information and to uncover the clandestine workings of a system.
Furthermore, using public documents is instructive as they impart an understanding
of the position the publishing body wishes to project or does not view as detrimental
to its public face.
In addition, the growth of the internet meant many documents not intended for public
consumption, and so not necessarily prepared with a public face, have become
available to the public. Wikileaks is the most well-known of these sites. This research
also greatly benefitted from OpenCRS.com, which provides a searchable digital
library of Congressional Research briefings, which only had patchy availability prior
to the creation of the site.
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Statistics
The subject area of this thesis – corporate influence on oil dependence policies – is
not primarily suited to the use of the statistical method as influence, in particular, is
hard to quantify, measure or detect. As such, statistics form a relatively small part of
the data used. However, there are some datasets that were used for specific parts of
the thesis. For example, datasets covering political contributions and official lobbying
have recently been made readily accessible on websites such as OpenSecrets.org
(run by the Centre of Responsive Politics), OpenCongress.org and MAPLight.org.
These data on the lobbying attempts and financial contributions of corporations and
other organised interests assisted greatly in comparing the influence of different
groups and for checking if corporate resources are being diverted into areas that
would be expected from the documentary evidence. These websites also have their
own analysis of the data, which form part of the grey literature mentioned above.
Additionally, there are topics that have been touched upon that are subject to
extensive measurement and statistics collection. Organisations such as the US
Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS) and from the International Energy Agency (IEA) all publish statistics covering
issues such as oil consumption, vehicle miles travelled and alternative fuel
consumption. These figures were used to understand the context of oil dependence
and thus facilitate greater understanding of the potential/historical societal impact of
policies in the case studies. For example, it is impossible to assess the potential
impact of a policy that aims to reduce US annual oil consumption by 1.5 billion
gallons of oil, until the total annual oil consumption is also placed in these terms
(306.6 billion gallons). These statistics, however, had to be used with great care, as
an inherent weakness of statistics is that they measure phenomena in a narrowly-
defined manner (Carr, 1994), which can result in inappropriate statistics being
utilised.
Implementation
Case Study Selection
The wider context of both of the case studies is their temporal location within the
George W. Bush administrations (2001-2009). The Bush time period was selected
because, at the outset of this study, it was both recent and had been concluded. Its
Methodology
108
recency meant that interviewee accounts would still be relatively fresh and not
extensively coloured by hindsight. The conclusion of the period meant that new,
evolving events with uncertain outcomes did not draw increased analysis due to
increased visibility. Additionally, a further benefit of studying the Bush period
compared to earlier periods is the greater increased digitisation of information that
occurred in the period and the availability of this information sources while not on
fieldwork.
The two case studies chosen within the Bush period – Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards and the FreedomCAR partnership – were selected due
to a number of factors. For one, FreedomCAR is representative of a long line of
policies that have attempted to change the fuel mix of the USA. Hydrogen fuel cells
(HFCs) are similar to other abortive 30 technological solutions to oil dependence
before it – ethanol in the 1970s, methanol in the 1980s, LPG/CNG and electric cars
in the 1990s – in that there was significant hype about the technology when
announced, but, after a few years of stagnation, it was quickly discarded by a new
administration (Benet, 2006). At the same time, a case study of the FreedomCAR
partnership, in being forged by the recent Bush administration, covers an area that,
due to its contemporary nature, is relatively under-researched.
In contrast, CAFE standards were first introduced in 1978 and mandated annual
rises in fuel economy until 1985. However, it wasn’t until 2007 – 22 years later – that
the fleet-wide fuel economy standards set in 1985 were raised. In this manner, CAFE
standards are an interesting area for research as they constitute both an example of
action and an example of inaction. Also, the idea of raising CAFE standards enjoys a
huge amount of public support; with polling generally putting support between 75-90%
(PollingReport.com, 2010 p.608, Greene, 1998). There was thus a latent conflict
between government policy inaction and public opinion during a period spanning four
different Presidents.
Furthermore, these case studies were the strongest of other potential case studies.
Below (fig 4-3) is a synthetic schema of the potential case studies that could be
investigated with the Bush administration as the timeframe of investigation. The
30 The fate of HFC research as part of government policy is currently unclear due to continued
Congressional support for the technology. Yet, FreedomCAR’s successor – US DRIVE – has de-
emphasised HFCs.
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scheme by no means represents an exhaustive list. In fact, the examples it gives are
very much based on an understanding of oil dependence as mainly a problem of the
heavy use of private transport; it is based on the understanding of oil dependence
developed in chapter one. If we were to list the full actual or potential policy
responses to oil dependence it would be more instructive to subdivide the policies
into four categories of oil use – transport, residential/commercial, industrial, and
electricity generation – and a final one of general oil policies, which would include the
“production” and “foreign policy” boxes. Also, following chapter one’s definition of the
problem, policies involving the increased provision of public transport are not
included here.
Figure 4-3: Potential Case Studies
Potential case studies that were not selected were rejected on four different grounds.
First, the cases that did not have specific policies promoting them during the
administrations of President Bush were rejected. This restriction excludes gasoline
taxes, electric cars and hybrids from consideration. The reason for the application of
this criterion is that investigating non-adopted policy areas adds another layer of
methodological difficulty, as there are around 20,000+ bills (OpenCongress, 2009)
that did not become law under President Bush. This criterion, however, could lead to
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an under-estimation of the power of corporations; it could be the case of only looking
at cases of observable change and conflict, which ignores the role of corporations in
the maintenance of the status quo and latent conflict. As is mentioned in the
discussion, this concern could be addressed by another study.
One final point specifically about gasoline taxes that is worth noting is that, alongside
being a policy that was not enacted, gasoline taxes were rejected because there is a
high level of public opposition to them, which has resulted in a widespread view of
gasoline taxes as political suicide (Mufson, 2006). For instance, a 2006 poll by the
New York Times found 85% of people were opposed to a federal gasoline tax
increase. Although, when the question was prefaced with an argument about
gasoline taxes reducing America’s reliance on foreign oil, 55% supported a rise in
gasoline taxes and 37% were still opposed (Gallup and Newport, 2007). So, while
the public could have been persuaded on the issue, the failure to implement gasoline
taxes can be viewed as caused, to a large extent, by a perception of widespread
public opposition, rather than any specific use of corporate power during the Bush
period. Gasoline taxes are worthy of this special mention because there is a wide
consensus in the oil dependence literature supporting gasoline taxes and it is often
seen as the most straightforward and effective solution possible to US oil
dependence (for example, see Sterner, 2007, Agras and Chapman, 1999, and West
and Williams III, 2005).
Second, cases that involved significant action in political arenas other than the US
federal government were excluded. As such, conventional oil production policy was
not selected because of the large role that local and state-level decisions play in the
policy area. Likewise, non-conventional oil production was rejected because the
majority of production actually happens in Canada, with American oil shale not
utilised during the Bush administration.31 This criterion ensures that the case studies
selected reduces the number of actors potentially involved, geographically
concentrates field work and ensures the focus of this study is on the forms of power,
rather than the levels or spaces.
31 Since 2008 there have been moves towards “fracking” of oil shale to release natural gas whereas
during Bush’s reign the US was importing tar sands oil from Canada. As such, the US did not have a
significant domestic non-conventional fossil fuel programme during this study’s timeframe.
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Third, in line with the understanding of oil dependence as primarily a domestic issue,
cases concerning the foreign policy aspects of oil dependence were excluded. Not
only have the foreign policy aspects been extensively covered in the literature on oil
dependence (e.g. Klare, 2008, Bromley, 2005, Rutledge, 2005) but, while there is the
potential for interesting research in the area (especially during the administrations of
George W. Bush), case studies on these areas would have not really addressed the
motivating research question of this thesis as they would inevitably shift the focus to
international affairs and how the US tries to cope with the oil demand
allowed/created by domestic policies. As such, both oil diplomacy and oil wars were
rejected as case studies.
Fourth, cases that potentially involved particularist organised interests (i.e. not
general to oil dependence) were excluded. Thus, ethanol policy, which heavily
involves lobbying by agribusiness rather than auto corporations, was also excluded.
The purpose of this criterion is to reduce the number of organised interests that
require study and so allow a more detailed picture of the selected corporations (and
related actors) to be built up. So, instead of looking at a case that has organised
interests specific to it, the cases selected involve actors generally involved in oil-
dependence policy evolution.
As such, not only are the two selected case studies strong case studies in their own
right, there are also good reasons not to select other potential cases. In addition,
these two cases together present a stronger research agenda as there is an
interesting level of dissonance between the two policy areas in regards to
corporations; HFCs policy was heavily supported by automobile (and oil)
corporations, whereas CAFE standards have long been opposed by the same
corporations. These cases, then, have the potential to highlight different ways in
which corporations can influence policy evolution, various forms of corporate power
and the different (and sometimes contradictory) tactics used by corporations when
opposing one policy yet supporting another.
In these regards, the two selected cases both represent revelatory/paradigmatic
cases. The cases are revelatory in that they explore issues, areas and interlinkages
that have generated very little empirically-deep literature (Gerring, 2007 p.41, Yin,
2009 p.43) and so offer the opportunity to uncover previously undocumented events
and relationships. Yet they are also paradigmatic cases in that they are “cases that
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highlight more general characteristics of the societies in question” (Flyvbjerg, 2006
p.232); if certain mechanisms of influence work for automobile corporations in the
case studies, they will likely work (or be attempted) in other policy areas with other
corporations too.
Research Issues
In the main, the problems experienced during research were primarily associated
with access. The first access issue experienced was a failure to translate the
research into widely-used policy terms. While, as chapter one explains, oil
dependence is an issue of domestic transport, usage of the term in policy circles is
highly likely to result in directions to foreign policy or natural resource policymakers.
If, however, “transportation policy” or “research policy” were the terms used relevant
directions were more likely to be given, particularly when trying to negotiate access
through intermediaries.
The second, and more significant, issue was simply getting through to the relevant
people. In particular, Congressional staffers proved rather elusive – few responding
(to 200+ e-mails) and none agreeing to meet until the last month in Washington D.C.
Some useful methods that appeared to work were contacting relevant people who
already had a PhD (and so were sympathetic) and, for staffers, attempting to contact
people outside of the Congressional working week (Tuesday-Thursday). Other
tactics that had mixed results during this research project (although might have
greater success in projects that are in less technical policy areas) were attending
relevant conferences and, subsequent to the conference, contacting individuals from
relevant organisations on the conference mailing lists. The hydrogen case study, in
particular, revealed a lot of people who appeared relevant, but were not. Phone calls
to organisations also met with mixed success, although calls to Congressional
offices began to meet with more success once correct policy terms were used and
the Congressional working week was avoided.
The final issue with access that was experienced was lawyer-blocking. In particular,
the requirement to sign ethical consent forms (see Appendix A for an example),
while seeming to encourage some interviewees as they felt anonymisation was
being taken seriously, proved a hindrance on some occasions, particularly with
members of the business community. For example, one successful snowball with the
Methodology
113
FreedomCAR partnership was abruptly stopped once put into contact with someone
from a supermajor oil company who, subsequent to taking advice from his
company’s legal team, declined to be interviewed because of the ethical
requirements.
Beyond issues with access, the research unavoidably has problems with unequal
availability of sources and the operation of influence in spaces not open to public
scrutiny. Essentially, corporate decision-making occurs in a space not open to the
researcher and, as such, has to be imputed from their public words and actions.
There is thus a much greater degree of interpretation, and sensitivity to analysis,
required when exploring the role of corporations and determining the influence of
backroom decisions.
Summary
This chapter outlined and justified the methodological focus of this study and the
overall research design: a primarily qualitative and small-n case study approach that
seeks to understand and explain data holistically and with reference to the analytical
framework developed in the previous chapter. This qualitative study examines two
cases, utilises three main types of data and analyses the data at three points of
policy evolution before linking the cases back to the main research problem and the
overarching research questions. Put another way, in an attempt to understand the
role of corporations in the persistence of US oil dependence, this study investigates
CAFE standards and HFC research policy through the use of elite interviews,
documents and statistics, so as to allow analysis of the evolution of policy at the
formulation, outcome and implementation stages. Such an approach is divergent
from the majority of the interest group literature and so is based upon an iterative-
parallel emergent design as it offers the flexibility to respond to, and incorporate,
unexpected findings into a wider outlook.
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Chapter 5 – CAFE: A Tired Debate
“Raising CAFE standards is the single most significant step we could take as a
Nation to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, improve our national security,
protect our environment and our economy, and assist our consumers.”
Senator Boehlert (R-NY) (Boehlert, 2001 p.8)
Fuel economy standards, which are designed to limit the consumption of fuel by
requiring manufacturers to produce more fuel-efficient cars, have been utilised
worldwide in order to decrease oil consumption (An and Sauer, 2004). In being
designed so that manufacturers are pushed into greater fuel efficiency, fuel economy
standards lower the cost of transportation to the country, consumer and environment,
although with some costs potentially borne by manufacturers. In this regard, fuel
economy standards can form an important part of efforts to create a more
sustainable economic system. In the US, the split of the costs of the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards has resulted in broad public support (as
the public see CAFE as a way of increasing fuel economy without paying for it)
(Greene, 1998) and manufacturer opposition. So, while US fuel economy standards
were the first to be implemented in the world, political deadlock resulting from
corporate opposition has meant the standards remained the same, but began to lag
behind ever-increasing EU, Japanese and Korea standards (An and Sauer, 2004).
Despite the political deadlock and corporate opposition, CAFE remains one of the
most perennially-discussed policies to ameliorate US oil dependence (Yacobucci
and Bamberger, 2007a).
This chapter will explore corporate opposition to CAFE standards and how their
opposition shaped the policy evolution of CAFE under George W. Bush. In order to
explore these issues this chapter first details the history of CAFE standards,
examining both the original standards and the situation immediately prior to George
W. Bush’s election. The chapter then moves to exploring the process of reform of the
CAFE standards during Bush's Presidency and the role of auto-manufacturers, and
the representation of their interests, in this process. In order to fully explore these
issues, the second section is subdivided into sections on the formulation of CAFE
standards within Congress, the implementation of CAFE standards by the National
Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and, to contextualise the
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achievements of policy change, the potential of the new CAFE standards to reduce
oil dependence within society. Lastly, this chapter will conclude by drawing together
and highlighting the influence of the auto corporations in the formulation,
implementation and outcomes of CAFE standards.
Throughout the different sections of this chapter, when working in the interests of the
corporations the mechanisms of influence and forms of power highlighted in chapter
three are emphasised. So, for example, in Congressional debates the role of
politicians who have a large automaker presence in their constituency is accentuated.
Investigating the magnitude of these mechanisms helps answer the research
questions on the methods used for corporate influence, and the reasons why
corporations were influential. Equally, two other important elements receive attention
throughout this chapter – the professed interests of the automakers, and the
interests and actions of groups opposed to automaker interests – as these two
factors are important in helping assess the overarching research question on the
extent to which corporations were influential. Exploring these issues in the context of
CAFE standards is important as it can be instructive for understanding both the
continuation of US oil dependence (and the resultant problems) and Held and
McGrew’s (2003 p.3) question “Who rules, in whose interests, by what mechanisms
and for what purposes?”.
History
First introduced in 1975, the purpose of CAFE standards is to increase the fuel
efficiency of new automobiles with the long term aim (as old vehicles get replaced by
new, which results in the on-the-road fuel efficiency of the national fleet improving) to
reduce the consumption of oil by US transportation.32 While such a goal appears
relatively uncontroversial (Bamberger, 2002 p.1), CAFE standards have provoked
high-profile debates about safety, about consumer choice and about American
prosperity – all of which have served to mark CAFE standards as a long-standing
and controversial issue. This section will explore the original formulation of CAFE
standards, the outcomes of the original CAFE standards and will then explain some
of the features of the legislative battleground that surrounds CAFE.
32 Recorded Interview with Congressional Research staffer. Interview took place on 8th April 2011.
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The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
By the early 1970s, American society, which had developed in a country with vast
indigenous reserves of oil, had become complacent about energy efficiency and
wasteful in its use of oil (Kirby, 1995 p.107). As such, in 1974 the US fleet got an
average of 12.9 mpg (miles per gallon). By way of comparison, a model year (MY)
2002 Ford Focus gets 30.9 mpg (An and Sauer, 2004 p.19). The US transportation
sector, then, was wasteful and inefficient. However, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-
74 dispelled societal complacency about energy efficiency. The embargo brought the
fuel efficiency of the American automobile centre stage and resulted in the 1975
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which set the original CAFE standards
(Kirby, 1995 p.107). The standards work by requiring vehicle manufacturers to
achieve a certain sales-weighted mean of the fuel economies within their product line.
The sliding-scale penalty for manufacturer noncompliance was $5 for every 0.1 mpg
below the standard, multiplied by the number of cars the manufacturer sells that year
(Bamberger, 2002 p.6). The purpose of the standards was to force technological
innovation within the industry.
Under the EPCA automobiles were divided into passenger cars (those with a gross
vehicle weight rating of under 6,000lbs) and light trucks (with a gross vehicle weight
rating of between 6,000 and 8,500lbs). The purpose of this distinction between
passenger cars and light trucks was to ensure that small businesses that primarily
used light trucks were not inadvertently penalised (Smart, 2000 p.163). In a further
move so as to not penalise businesses, weights above the light truck category were
considered to be business-use vehicles and were totally exempt from CAFE. 33
Passenger car CAFE standards were originally set at 18.5 mpg for MY1978 and rose
to 27.5 mpg in MY1985, with the Secretary of Transport given the ability to lower the
standards to 26 mpg (Crandall, 1992). Any decision to move CAFE standards above
or below the 26-27.5 mpg band required the Secretary of Transport to issue an
amendment to Congress, which could then be subject to a (possibly
unconstitutional34) one-house veto (Fisher, 2005). In a slightly different manner,
33 Because the main purchasers of heavy goods vehicles are haulage companies – whose main
expense is fuel – heavy good vehicles exist in a market that has an incentive to be, and so tends
actually to be, more fuel efficient (McKinnon, 1999).
34 As chapter two explained, while a one-house veto exists in legislation and is a potential blocking
mechanism that Congress could utilise, in INS vs Chadha the Supreme Court declared the use of a
one-house veto unconstitutional as it violates the principle of bicameralism and so, if used, is likely to
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NHTSA, an executive agency that is part of the Department of Transport, was given
the power to reform light truck standards. As part of the EPCA, these light truck
standards had to be set by the Secretary of Transport at the “maximum feasible”
level, with feasibility determined according to four factors – technological feasibility,
economic practicability, effect of other standards on fuel economy and the need of
the nation to conserve energy. As such, reforms to passenger car standards can
only occur after Congressional action, yet light truck standards can be reformed by
executive action – allowing the President to make some reforms to CAFE standards.
However, Congress, utilising the power of the purse, can stop the President by
restricting NHTSA’s ability to use money to explore raising the CAFE standards, as it
did in the 1995-2001 period (detailed below).
One further feature of the EPCA is that it prescribes the method of determining
(passenger car) vehicle fuel efficiency. The CAFE test cycle, which measures the
fuel consumed over a series of driving procedures, works at higher speeds and with
fewer stop-starts than other test cycles around the world. While such a test cycle is
perhaps more suited to American driving, with Americans making more use of large
less-congested roads, the CAFE test cycle produces better (i.e. higher) mpg ratings
than European and Japanese equivalents. So, for comparison’s sake, if standards
were set at the same MPG level in the US as in Japan or the EU, US standards
would still be lower in reality.35 Finally, the EPCA allows manufacturers to avoid fines
by offsetting failures to meet CAFE in some years with accumulated surpluses in the
three previous years and expected/planned surpluses in three future years (termed
“CAFE credits”).
Outcomes of the Original CAFE and Pre-Bush Attempts to Reform
With oil prices high, CAFE was implemented without revision for the first few model
years. Such was its success that automakers even announced achieving a goal of
30 mpg by 1985 (Luger, 2000 p.129). However, the Reagan administration, as part
of a wider lessening of regulations, scuttled attempts to further increase CAFE (ibid.
p.127). Also, following pressure from GM and Ford who claimed that meeting the
subsequently by struck down. However, the threat of the one-house veto, possibly used as a delaying
tactic, remains.
35 For comparisons it is also necessary to ensure that the same form of gallon (UK or US) is being
utilised. The UK gallon is larger, and so it produces a higher mpg than the US gallon (more fuel
means you can drive more miles).
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standards in MY1986 would cause them and the US significant economic damage
(Moore, 1991 p.5, Kleit, 1990 p.151), the Reagan administration utilised the
Secretary of Transport’s power to decrease the standards to 26 mpg. The standards
remained at 26 mpg until MY1989/1990, which then saw a stepped return to the 27.5
mpg standard. The Reagan administration’s decision to give in to GM and Ford’s
demands to lower the standards led the Chrysler Chairman, Lee Iacocca, to declare
that “We are about to put up a tombstone: ‘Here lies America’s energy policy’” (PEW,
2012). By 1991, in spite of the actions of the Reagan administrations, the original
CAFE standards had been fully implemented and had increased the average on-the-
road fuel economy from 11.9 mpg in 1973 to 16.9 mpg in 1991 (Sivak and Tsimhoni,
2009 p.3169). Put another way, efficiency had improved at a compound rate of 2% a
year (ibid.). As such, it was estimated that the changes forced by CAFE had saved
55 billion gallons (which equates to 3.5 million barrels per day) of fuel in 1995 alone
(Greene, 1998 p.595).
Despite the successes of CAFE throughout the 1980s, the last attempt to increase
CAFE standards was met with fierce and, eventually overwhelming, resistance from
the automotive industry (Himelfarb and Perotti, 2004 p.386, Luger, 2000 p.167,
Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993 p.87). The Bryan bill, named for Senator Richard
Bryan (D-NV), got the furthest of several attempts, with bipartisan support and 33 co-
sponsors. The Bryan bill required autocompanies to increase their average fuel
economy in 1988 terms by 20% by 1996 and 40% by 2000 – meaning an increase to
around 40 mpg for some manufacturers (Moore, 1991 p.5). Furthermore, penalties
for violating CAFE would be linked to inflation, instead of continuing at the rate of $5
per 0.1 mpg as set in the EPCA.
During the debates over the Bryan bill three main anti-CAFE-specific arguments
emerged (see, for example, Moore, 1991, Burnett, 2007, Kazman, 2007) that
operated alongside more general arguments about regulations, which have
maintained an enduring appeal in the political battles over CAFE and have worked to
set the agenda of the CAFE debate. These arguments were spread and utilised by
the media, think-tanks and policymakers (see Appendix B for an example of a
newspaper article that includes all three arguments and is written by someone from a
think-tank) and, as such, work as good examples of the hidden power of
corporations to set the agenda and disseminate information in an opaque manner.
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The first argument concerns “Jevons’ Paradox”. Named after its author, William
Stanley Jevons had noticed that improvements in the efficiency of steam engines in
1865 had resulted in their greater use and an increase in the consumption of coal.
As such, Jevons’ Paradox is where increases in the efficiency of an action (i.e. a
decrease in the necessary energy input per unit of output) directly result in a
decrease in the costs associated with the action and, subsequently, result in the
action occurring more often (Alcott, 2005 p.11). The paradox, then, occurs when the
goal is to reduce the total energy use, as the decrease in costs can lead to an
increased demand for a unit of output and thus an overall rise in total energy use
(York, 2006 p.143). Proponents of this argument point to the increase of vehicle
miles travelled per capita since the introduction of CAFE in the mid-1970s and the
subsequent increase in the total amount of gasoline consumed in the US.
The second line of argument drew attention to the safety of CAFE and sought to
highlight hidden costs. The argument is that the easiest way to improve the fuel
efficiency of a car is to decrease weight, and that a decrease in weight necessarily
makes cars less safe. As such, during debates on the Bryan bill, the George H. W.
Bush administration started calling the bill the “Highway Fatality Act” and the
“National Highway Death Act” (Baron, 1998 p.24). During the Bryan debates, think-
tanks pushed the safety argument, with the original standards being estimated by a
Harvard University-Brookings Institute study to have been responsible for the death
for between 34,900 and 67,300 over 10 years, and the Bryan bill was estimated to
cause, if enacted, between 75,000 and 149,000 extra deaths over 10 years (Taylor,
1991).
The argument, in its various formulations, is built around a few basic premises. First,
that instead of installing new technology, one of the main (and cheapest) ways in
which the automakers complied with CAFE standards was to reduce the weight of
cars, which had resulted in a 500lb average reduction in the weight of cars from
1978 to 1988 (Graham, 1992 p.97). Second, based on basic physics, the occupants
of lighter cars are more likely to be injured in a crash as they have less mass to
protect them and less space to “ride-down” the deceleration (Kazman, 2007). Hence,
Bill Lovejoy, a now-former General Motors vice-President, said “When my kids were
coming of age, I made sure they had big cars to drive. It’s physics. When a large car
meets a small car in an accident, the large car wins” (Rutledge, 2005 p.125). As
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such, CAFE, by encouraging the purchase of lighter, and therefore less-safe,
vehicles, is responsible for additional road deaths than would have been the case if
CAFE was not implemented (Evans, 2002).
The third argument is that the current market situation is representative of consumer
choice and thus in, some ways, democratic. Americans, it is argued, want large cars
and Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) with high-performance attributes, as evidenced by
their purchase of them. CAFE, which favours smaller, more fuel-efficient cars, gets
characterised as Washington “force-feeding” smaller cars on an “unwilling
marketplace” (Peters, 2007). Following this line of argument, no regulation is needed
because if consumers wanted higher-MPG cars then they would purchase them and
that the marketplace would solve the issue on its own (Coalition for Vehicle Choice,
2001a). This argument is a specific use of the invisible power “choice argument”,
with the marketplace seen as so responsive to the needs of consumers that they can
control new vehicle attributes. There is also a normative element present, with the
idea that not only can the market improve overall fuel economy, but that the market
should be left to do so.
All three of these arguments were (and still are) highly influential within debates
about CAFE standards, and have been widely repeated in the media and by think-
tanks (e.g. Coon, 2001, The Washington Times, 2012, Pfotenhauer, 2002). However,
beyond the limited empirical evidence supporting these theoretical arguments
(Greene, 1998 p.595), there are well-known objections to all of these arguments,
which while well-known, have failed to undermine these arguments or stop their
continued deployment in political/policy environments. With regards to Jevons'
Paradox, vehicle technology and the role of cars in society is much mature
compared to trains in the industrial revolution in that the average American already
travels a significant number of miles in a day. This maturity of use means that most
needs are already met by existing travel and, therefore, that there is decreasing
utility in travelling further vehicle miles; there are only so many miles a person needs,
or is willing, to drive, regardless of cost. CAFE, then, does not fall under Jevons’
Paradox as a decrease in the cost of driving caused by increased efficiency is
unlikely to substantially increase driving.
While Jevons’ Paradox does not apply to CAFE, the logic underlying the paradox –
that a decrease in cost of a service incentivises increased usage – does. As such,
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there is a well-established literature on the “rebound” effect that directly undermines
the repetition of Jevons’ Paradox in the case of CAFE standards. The rebound effect
is the increase of use of energy as the result of efficiency gains bringing down costs
but, in a crucial departure from Jevons’ Paradox, does not necessarily result in
greater total consumption (i.e. the increase (or “takeback”) caused by efficiency
improvements does not necessarily outweigh the total reduction). Thus, the rebound
effect represents a reduction – estimated to be around 5-20% (Small and Van
Dender, 2007) – of the savings that CAFE would have made without its effect, but
does not mean that CAFE increased oil consumption overall.
There are four problems with the argument about CAFE, downweighting and safety
that suggest the argument is an attempt to alter the agenda of the CAFE debate. The
first is that the argument is fundamentally based upon the perspective of the person
inside the car and not the traffic system as a whole. In a collision larger cars,
following exactly the same logic as the argument’s proponents use, are more likely to
kill those outside of the vehicle due to their greater mass (Ballesteros et al., 2004).
Thus, downweighting may decrease safety for car users, but increase safety for
others (pedestrians, motorcyclists, light car drivers) on roads. Second, the argument
ignores issues of engineering on several counts. Lighter materials are not
necessarily weaker (e.g. aluminium compared to steel) and cars are not all equal in
their safety features (the addition of collapsible steering columns, reinforced roll
cages and airbags all increase safety, for instance) or in their safety design. In fact,
larger cars, such as SUVs, are at a substantially greater risk of other potential safety
problems. For instance, an SUV’s four-wheel drive gives the vehicle greater traction,
and thus greater acceleration and the appearance of greater control, in slippery
conditions. Yet, due to the greater weight of SUVs, the vehicles have longer stopping
distances meaning that (as a US auto executive put it) “many [SUV drivers] end up in
a ditch” (Bradsher, 2004 p.131). Most notably, SUVs are at a far greater risk of
rolling over when cornering at high speeds, which is common and is the type of
accident that has the greatest proportion of fatalities – rendering the feeling of safety
in an SUV “illusionary” (Gunster, 2005, Vanderheiden, 2006 p.30). Third, building on
the previous points, SUV occupants die slightly more often in accidents than car
occupants and are three times more likely to kill other drivers (Bradsher, 2004 p.459).
Fourth, the provenance of the CAFE safety argument is highly questionable, with
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corporately-funded think-tanks using this argument in their “vitriolic attack[s]” on
CAFE standards (Rutledge, 2005 p.125) and having been instrumental in its creation.
In particular, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), a think-tank whose major
funders include GM, the Alliance of Auto Manufacturers and Ford (CEI, 1998,
Achenbach, 2006), was instrumental in developing and pushing the argument. As a
1994 proposal from the CEI to the tobacco company Phillip Morris36 states
“CEI entered the CAFE debate in 1986, recognizing that economic arguments
alone were failing to win the policy debate. CEI raised the argument that
CAFE costs not only dollars but lives as well, because it restricts the
production of larger more crashworthy cars.” (CEI, 1994 p.2).
The CEI persuaded Robert Crandall, an economist at the Brookings Institute, to
research the issues (ibid.). In turn, Crandall persuaded John Graham, a professor of
Public Health at Harvard University, to co-author the Harvard-Brookings paper
mentioned previously. Professor Graham, incidentally, would later set up the Harvard
Centre for Risk Analysis and be appointed as George W. Bush’s administrator for
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.37
Announced by the CEI even prior to its actual publication (Bovee, 1988), the Journal
of Law and Economics published “The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on
Automobile Safety” in 1989. The majority of this paper concerns a quantitative
modelling of the impact of CAFE standards on vehicle weight; finding that, according
to their model, the average weight of a MY1989 vehicle would be 500lbs less than it
would have been in an unregulated market without CAFE. This 500lbs reduction,
after being plugged in to the calculations of General Motors’ Leonard Evans (1984),
is said to produce ‘a 14 per cent increase in occupant fatality risk in 1989 cars’
(Crandall and Graham, 1989 p.111). However, because this increase occurred within
36 The confidential document was released in line with the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement with
tobacco companies.
37 While in the process of being appointed administrator for Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Professor Graham faced severe criticism from many quarters (Public Citizen, 2001a). One
letter from 53 academics opposing his appointment (Public Citizen, 2001b) argued that ‘Graham’s
work has, overall, demonstrated a remarkable congruency with the interests of regulated
industries…We also have serious concerns about Professor Graham’s disregard for widely-accepted
fundraising and research norms within academia. He has solicited and accepted unrestricted funds
from corporations with a direct financial interest in particular regulatory issues addressed by his work,
without acknowledging the role of his corporate benefactors. Unlike many research scientists, he has
often operated without the guidance of restricted-funding contracts designed to minimize conflicts of
interest and to protect credibility and public trust.’
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the context of greater vehicle safety overall and a reduction of traffic fatalities since
the introduction of CAFE they argue that the reduction in fatalities ‘might have been
more dramatic had CAFE not been in effect’ (ibid. p.113). Overall, they conclude, ‘we
estimate that these 1989 model year cars will be responsible for 2,200-3,900
additional fatalities over the next ten years because of CAFE’ (ibid. p.118).
Central claims of the Crandall-Graham paper, such as “analysts have shown that the
"downsized" vehicles of the late 1970s and early 1980s are less safe in crashes than
the heavier cars they replaced” (1989 p.100), are referenced using other studies that
were funded by industry players (in this case, the single reference for the above
quote leads to a conference presentation by two people from the Insurance Industry
for Highway Safety, which is funded by the US auto insurance industry (Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety, 2013)). The CEI proposal goes on to state that
“As the only peer-reviewed study on CAFE’s safety effects, the Crandall-
Graham study came to play a major role [in the] policy debate” (CEI, 1994 p.2).
The creation of “academic” research supporting the safety argument has not only
affected the policy debate but also subsequent academic research, with
GoogleScholar putting the citations of the Crandall-Graham paper at 172. This
influence on both the policy and academic debates has also been bolstered by
others, most notably the former GM engineer and CEI consultant Leonard Evans38 –
who Public Citizen (a Ralph Nader Organisation) described as an “industry apologist”
(Public Citizen, 2005). As such, noting the dubious provenance of the argument, one
interviewee39 said the argument “is not really credible” and that "there are certain
vested interests – AAM [Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers] is one – who sees
this as a potential argument to slow down the CAFE standards."
Equally, there are many problems with the consumer choice of larger cars argument.
As was discussed in chapter three, while consumer choice obviously plays a role in
the market, it is not the only determinant of the market and, therefore, it cannot be
imputed that consumer market choice represents consumer preferences – that
consumers have “voted” freely and fairly for SUVs. The auto corporations, seeking
38 Tied very heavily into the invisible power sound science discourse, Leonard Evans set up the group
“Science Serving Society”, which campaigns against CAFE standards and “for” vehicle safety.
http://www.scienceservingsociety.com/
39 Recorded Interview with a former Auto Engineer for US and Japanese Auto Companies, 25th April
2011.
CAFE Standards: A Tired Debate
126
the higher profits that SUVs could bring, actively worked to change the market and
started producing SUVs in order to appeal to the upwardly-mobile, “yuppie”
consumers of the Reagan era (Gartman, 1994 pp.222-224). In order to promote
these vehicles they used a number of tactics to incentivise consumers to purchase
SUVs, not least advertising (Davis and Truett, 2000 p.21). Such advertising brought
in ideas of “no boundaries” (ibid. p.21) and freedom for the driver, and cost
automakers and auto dealerships $9 billion in the 1990-2001 period (Gunster, 2005
p.8). As John Hall (D-NY) observed, the car industry spent millions to “advertise such
ridiculous things as driving an SUV up to the top of a mountain and playing Frisbee
across to another mountaintop, and then showing that this four-wheeler could do that
and advertising power…power and speed.” (Hall, 2008 p.10).
With the auto corporations pushing these ideas of safety, power and speed, it is not
surprising that consumers increasingly desired SUVs. In fact, SUVs grew from
constituting 7% of total vehicle sales in 1990 to 19% in 1999 (Davis and Truett, 2000
p.2). While automaker actions undoubtedly helped establish SUV sales, over the
longer term, the presence of SUVs on the road also normalised the choice of an
SUV and lessened the requirement for active manipulation on behalf of auto
corporations; corporate pressure transformed into social pressure and widespread
social beliefs about desirable attributes and the SUV’s representation of these
attributes. As such, as the GM Styling Vice President from 1958-1977, Bill Mitchell,
said, the consumer choice argument does not work as “the truth of the matter is that
most consumers don’t know what they want…The idea of the industry as an
obedient servant to the public is bull” (as quoted in Gartman, 1994 p.214).
Therefore, each of these common arguments suffer severe weaknesses. Yet,
despite these weaknesses, these arguments have been widely deployed by think-
tanks and other groups. In particular, and actually during the debates over the Bryan
bill, the Coalition for Vehicle Choice (CVC) emerged, which fought vigorously against
the Bryan Bill using these arguments and was headed by the NHTSA Administrator
from 1983-1989, Diane Steed (Rowell, 1996 pp.84-85). One advert for the CVC saw
a larger car crushing a smaller car with a voice-over intoning “while smaller cars may
save you gas, they could cost you something far more precious” (Casper, 2000 p.99).
While claiming to be a broad-based coalition that represents millions of people, CVC
was set up by the PR firm E. Bruce Harrison on a $500,000 grant from the major
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autocompanies and the National Auto Dealers Association; it was an astroturf group
representing industry interests (Beder, 1998 p.22, Rowell, 1996 p.84).
Because of such corporate pressure, and despite all of the anti-CAFE arguments
suffering from major flaws, these three arguments were instrumental in defeating the
Bryan bill and defining the subsequent terms of the CAFE debate. When Clinton
came to power he sought to improve fuel economy, but sought to do so while on
friendly terms with the auto industry. His solution was to offer a moratorium on fuel
economy issues and a public-private partnership, the Partnership for a New
Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), that could advance technology so to produce super-
fuel-efficient vehicles (Luger, 2000 p.175). To get industry on board, Clinton also
offered them advanced access, resulting in one case of the auto industry vetoing 14
candidates for the role of Administrator of NHTSA because they were considered too
close to the consumer movement (ibid. p.176).
One further element that became apparent from the pre-Bush debates on CAFE
standards is that there was a general partisan divide over the issue of CAFE
standards, with Republicans generally opposed and Democrats generally supportive.
As such, when the Republican held majorities in both houses following 1995, the
Department of Transport (DOT) budgets came with a rider specifically prohibiting
NHTSA spending funds on research for raising the standards, thereby pre-empting
any further administration attempts to increase light truck CAFE standards with
existing powers and halting the 0.6 mpg upwards creep in light truck standards since
1990 (NHTSA, 2002a p.77016). In general, this partisan divide can be understood as
part of wider party political ideologies, with many Republicans opposed to economic
regulations in principle.
Specifically, however, the partisan divide can be understood as willingness on the
side of Republicans to adopt tactics urged by conservative think-tanks and to give in
to the demands of industry, both points which can be seen in the decision to adopt
the budget rider. With regards to think-tanks, the Heritage foundation, in a 1995
report40, had urged members to use more budget riders (specifically mentioning
CAFE standards) so as to “encourage federal agencies to act more responsibly in
40 The report contains the lines “Terminating the CAFE program would save thousands of lives.
According to economists Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution and John Graham of the
Harvard School of Public Health…”
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setting and enforcing regulations” and to “encourage the Clinton administration to
work more assiduously with Congress” (Shanahan and Wilson, 1995). Likewise,
reflecting industry pressure, Andrew Card, CEO of the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, said that “in view of the very substantial manufacturer, job, consumer
and competitive impacts of this law, we urge Congress to approve legislation that will
effectively freeze further CAFE rulemaking” (Card, 1995): the automakers, then,
were pushing for the budget rider.
While there was a continued legislative battle over the standards, substantial
changes were occurring outside of the policy arena. As mentioned above, during the
1980s and the 1990s manufacturers had started pushing SUVs. These blurred the
boundary established in the EPCA between passenger cars and light trucks by
bolting a passenger vehicle interior onto a light truck chassis; the automakers had
created a light-truck passenger vehicle. This tactic meant that private-transportation
use vehicles were subject to efficiency standards meant for small businesses. As
such, the Union of Concerned Scientists described it as a “loophole” that has
“steadily eroded or undermined the baseline for CAFE standards” (Byrne, 2003 p.2).
What occurred, then, was the transformation of the political terrain by the visible-
power marketplace decisions of the auto corporations while policy making was at a
standstill.
SUVs were heavily promoted by the industry because they had large profit margins
(15-20% of sale price) that offset their low profit (3% or less), or even loss-leading,
smaller cars (Crotty, 2000 p.368, Rutledge, 2005 p.122, Gunster, 2005 p.8). For
example, Ford’s Lincoln Navigator, with all its optional extras, is said to have
produced $15,000 profit per vehicle in 2000 (Dunn, 2006 p.209). Seeking these
profits, automakers expended significant effort pushing the “cultural buttons” –
particularly safety – of affluent American families and worked to associate SUVs with
glamour and power (Amin and Thrift, 2004 p.xiii). The consequence of this
automaker-encouraged-shift was that the number of SUVs rapidly increased, with
sales rising from 200,000 a year in 1975 to 3 million a year in 1999 (Smart, 2000,
Greene, 1998 p.601) and there was also an increase in non-CAFE 8,500lb+
passenger vehicles. The result of this shift towards SUVs is that, after continual
increases since CAFE was introduced, the on-road efficiency of the US fleet began
to decline as lower mpg SUVs displaced passenger cars for personal transportation
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needs. It also saw the major US auto manufacturers become dangerously reliant
upon the continued sale of SUVs for their financial health (Repetto, 2006 p.18),
which would become devastating for the companies in the late 2000s due to the
increasing price of oil and the financial crisis.
CAFE during the Bush Years
"Congress is debating some other ideas. And one idea is to give me a capacity to
raise CAFE standards on automobiles. I encourage them to give me that
authority...and I intend to use it wisely if Congress would give me that authority."
George W. Bush, 27th April 2006 (Whitehouse.gov, 2006)
Short Chronology
2001: Congress requests the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a
review of the feasibility of raising and reforming CAFE standards
2001: The National Energy Policy report directs the Secretary of Transport to review
CAFE, with due consideration to the forthcoming NAS study
2002: Secretary of Transport Mineta sends two letters asking Congress for the ability
to reform passenger car standards
2003: NHTSA issues new light truck standards for MY2005-2007.
2005: Energy Policy Act 2005 excludes mention of CAFE
2007: Bush announces “20 in 10” Policy
2007: Massachusetts vs Environmental Protection Agency and Center for Biological
Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rulings
2007: Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) passes, mandates CAFE
increases and reform
2008: NHTSA rulemaking on the basis of EISA 2007 delayed due to bankruptcy of
GM and Chrysler
2009: Bush leaves office without finalising new CAFE standards
Formulation
With oil prices low, and with CAFE having been in a state of virtual deadlock for the
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past decade, there appeared little chance of reform following George W. Bush’s
ascent to power in 2001; particularly as Bush decided to appoint the former CEO of
the American Automobile Manufacturers Association and a former GM Vice
President, Andrew Card, as his Chief of Staff. The chance of reform was further
lessened by the major US auto-manufacturers maintaining their long-standing
opposition to CAFE standards, with Ford favouring “market based initiatives”
because CAFE was “ineffective” (Ford, 2003), and the President of the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, Josephine Cooper, declaring in 2003 that a proposal to
modestly increase CAFE standards “threatens jobs, the economy and family vehicles”
(Byrne, 2003 p.2). A GM Vice-President, Thomas Davis (2001), set out the position
of his company using many of the arguments detailed in the section above:
“Any reform of CAFE would have to address the significant adverse
consequences of the current system, including the disparate impact on
domestic [and] foreign automakers…the adverse impact on driver and
passenger safety; the opposition to natural market forces; the negative impact
on the consumer’s choice of vehicle; the encouragement to increase driving
by reduced mile per gallon costs…CAFE cannot be fixed by simply a simple
shift in the formula. CAFE is determined primarily by what people choose to
buy, and that choice reflects consumer needs.”
Despite these arguments, increasing concerns about environmental damage,
decreasing total fuel economy and import reliance meant that potential reforms to
CAFE standards (Kerry, 2001 pp.2-4), which had been off the table because of
Congressional budget riders since 1995, returned to the political arena. Both in (the
marginally-Republican) Congress and in the executive there were moves to increase
CAFE standards using both existing powers and through passing new legislation. In
Congress, following a request from Secretary of Transport Norman Mineta41 (NHTSA,
2002b p.16868) and pressure from the Senate the DOT budget rider that stopped
NHTSA assessing light truck standards was not included in the 2001 budget. One of
the concessions given to secure the end of the budget rider was a Congressional
request that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), alongside the DOT,
“recommend, but not to promulgate” new CAFE standards in a report that had to
41 Norman Mineta was the only member of the Democratic Party to be a part of either of Bush’s
cabinets.
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consider the effects of CAFE on “vehicle safety and on effects on employment in the
automotive sector and to analyze potentially disparate effects of revised standards
across the sector” (Bamberger, 2002). While the mood towards CAFE reform was
brightening, Congress was still not willing to increase CAFE standards at the time,
with a McCain-Kerry amendment to increase CAFE rejected in the Senate (Dunn,
2006 p.199).
During Congressional debates on the McCain-Kerry amendment, opponents of
CAFE claimed it would increase fatalities by the thousands and would restrict
consumer choice, meaning they couldn’t get the vehicles – SUVs – that allow them
to enjoy their lives. For instance, in proposing an alternative amendment opposed to
CAFE, Senator Bond (R–MO) described it as
“a commonsense amendment to the energy bill that will protect jobs, safety,
consumer choice, and continue to pursue reasonable, scientifically achievable
environmental improvements. I know that some in this Chamber believe our
fellow Americans cannot be trusted to make the right choice when purchasing
a vehicle…but I do not pretend to know what is best for each of the 16 million
Americans who purchase a new vehicle every year” (Bond, 2003 p.S9891).
These arguments were supported by advertising campaigns, with the Coalition for
Vehicle Choice urging New Hampshire voters to contact their Senator to protect “the
endangered SUV and pickup” (Coalition for Vehicle Choice, 2001b). Similarly, an
advert sponsored by the US Chamber of Commerce and the National Automobile
Dealers Association shows ‘a forlorn looking man next to an SUV, a canoe strapped
to the roof and two small girls sitting on the hood. ‘We work hard all year so our
family can go fishing and camping together,’ the ad says, ‘We couldn't do it without
our SUV’’ (Lancaster, 2002).
Alongside Secretary Mineta’s request, the executive commissioned the National
Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) – headed by Vice President Cheney
(leading to its nickname the “Cheney Report”) – to report on a comprehensive
National Energy Policy. Among other recommendations, this report endorsed raising
CAFE standards. However, the Cheney report stressed that CAFE standards should
ensure they work without “negatively impacting the U.S. automotive industry”
(National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001 p.68). It also required standards
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be set with due consideration to the then-forthcoming NAS/DOT report and that they
should be set “analytically and based on sound science” (ibid. p.68) – a point which
was repeatedly emphasised by policymakers, agency officials 42 and corporate
spokesmen, most notably in Secretary Mineta’s request to Congress.
The Cheney report came under significant attack due to the opaque formulation of its
recommendations and the role of different groups in influencing its contents. A
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the Cheney report described its
creation as “centralised” and “top-down” (Government Accountability Office, 2003 p.4)
and mentioned that, from the documents they could obtain through court order, that
several industry groups – including General Motors, the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers and fossil fuel producers (ibid. p.15-16) – had numerous meetings
with the NEPDG, whereas academic experts, policy organizations, environmental
advocacy groups, and private citizens were contacted “to a more limited degree” (ibid.
p.5). The GAO report was, however, unable to determine the extent of the influence
of the groups met due to the “unwillingness” (ibid. p.5) of the Vice President to
release specific information about the NEPDG’s workings, which entailed that the
GAO’s analysis did not meet “generally accepted government auditing standards”
(ibid. p.3). Regardless of the problems with the creation of the Cheney report, its,
and Congress’, recommendation meant that the 2002 NAS43 study was pushed as
central to the Bush-era debate on CAFE standards. The report was the foundation of
“science-informed” political debate on CAFE standards during the Bush period, and
was subsequently used by NHTSA in their analysis during the implementation stage.
One of the most politically-utilised parts of the NAS study44 was the conclusion that
CAFE “probably resulted in an additional 1,300 to 2,600 traffic fatalities in 1993”
(National Academy of Sciences, 2002 p.28). However, all 12 members of the NAS
research group were not in agreement and two members (David Greene (a National
42 “Sound science” was a major theme during a recorded interview with a senior NHTSA staffer, 4th
May 2011. A media handler was present for this interview.
43 The National Academy of Sciences uses a broad definition of science, with the 2002 CAFE report
being authored (as classed by subject in highest level of education) by 3 economists, 2 chemists, 1
political scientist, 5 engineers and 1 psychologist.
44 For instance, Senator Domenici (R-NM)(2003, p.S9889) said that “I believe that the NAS report
offers us in the Senate clear guidance and expert scientific analysis as we debate fuel economy
standards. CAFE standards which cannot be met by technological improvement have killed roughly
2,000 people a year—that is almost as many as in the tragedy of September 11—because of what we
in Congress have mandated. That is a frightening number.”
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research labs engineer who was responsible for a number of academic works on
similar topics, e.g. Greene, 1998, Greene and Tishchishyna, 2000, Greene, 2005)
and Maryann Keller, who worked in automotive finance) produced a minority opinion
specifically concerning the safety implications of CAFE, arguing (National Academy
of Sciences, 2002 p.117) that
“The relationship between fuel economy and highway safety is complex,
ambiguous, poorly understood, and not measurable by any known means at
the present time. Improving fuel economy could be marginally harmful,
beneficial, or have no impact on highway safety. The conclusions of the
majority of the committee...are overly simplistic and at least partially incorrect.”
The minority opinion reflected research that had been conducted since a 1992 NAS
report, that the majority opinion had “relied heavily on” (ibid. p.24). The minority
opinion also chimed with a GAO report that had been released in 2000, but which
was left out of Congress, the NAS, and the executive’s consideration of “science”
with regards to CAFE. This GAO report (Government Accountability Office, 2000 p.5)
did not dispute that there was some relationship between weight and safety.
However it did take issue with down-weighting’s relationship to CAFE standards,
stating that
“The effect of increasing CAFE standards on vehicle safety is hard to quantify
as it depends on many variables, such as the amount of lead time given to
manufacturers, the size of the CAFE increase, and the strategies
manufacturers use to achieve fuel economy gains. In addition, there is little
current research linking CAFE increases and vehicle safety.”
Besides the safety argument, there were a number of findings of the 2002 NAS
report that laid the groundwork for CAFE policy under Bush. The report found that
the potential fuel efficiency gains from improved technology have, since 1985, been
used by manufacturers to increase performance (because consumers “clearly favour”
these attributes (National Academy of Sciences, 2002 p.111)) and that the current
state of technology was sufficient to substantially reduce fuel consumption in the 15
years following 2002. As such, the NAS report recommended (ibid. ch.6) that CAFE
is raised, but is also reformed in line with safety concerns (ibid. p.114) so that the
distinction between light truck and passenger car is changed to a sliding attribute-
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based standard. That is to say, the distinction would be changed to a scale that
works on a gradient based upon a certain vehicle characteristic “such as vehicle
weight” (ibid. p.114)(i.e. if weight was the attribute, heavier cars would need to have
a lower mpg than lighter cars, regardless of class). The study (ibid. p.69) also notes
that the 2001/2002 auto market was a “difficult environment for GM, Ford [and
Chrysler]” and, as it would make it easier for these companies to comply with new
standards, trading of CAFE credits between manufacturers should be allowed –
which would also give the manufacturers greater ability to specialise in the
production of certain vehicle classes while fuel economy increases overall.
The NAS report, which was under a five month rush to release a July 2001 pre-
publication copy (ibid. p.1), was, like the Cheney report, informed by a
disproportionate number of meetings with the automakers. The Sierra Club, the
Centre for Auto Safety (a Ralph Nader organisation), the Union of Concerned
Scientists, and the Natural Resource Defence Council all had a representative at one
of the two larger open meetings that helped create and craft the report (ibid. pp.128-
129). In contrast, ten representatives of the auto industry (and one from National
Auto Dealers Association) were present in these larger meetings and there were
seven further meetings (out of a total of eighteen) specifically with the auto-
manufacturers (ibid.). Furthermore, also present at the larger meetings were
“industry apologist” Leonard Evans, CEI’s Sam Kazman and several representatives
from the Coalition for Vehicle Choice (ibid.). So, not only were the automakers given
great access due to their privileged position, but so too were groups funded by the
auto industry and representing industry interests. Considering the balance of industry
and interest group representation, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers noted that the NAS study “confirms the automobile
industry's view of CAFE” (Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, 2001). Thus, the
production of the NAS study represents the convergence of visible (the direct
inclusion of the companies), hidden (in the inclusion of astroturf groups and of think-
tank-inspired research) and invisible power (use of the consumer choice and sound
science discourses) in a manner that further enhanced their power by ensuring their
science was viewed as sound and accepted.
Yet, in spite of the NAS report’s recommendations of raising CAFE standards,
support within Congress for making alterations to the EPCA framework for CAFE
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standards, including giving the administration greater powers to reform the standards
itself, was lukewarm; with the exception of NHTSA’s 2003 light truck rulemaking
(which utilised administrative powers already existing from the EPCA45) progress on
CAFE was stunted within this period. The NAS report’s conclusions about safety
were utilised as part of the fight against CAFE reforms, with Senator Levin (D-MI)
saying
“The National Academy of Sciences said – not the American auto industry,
not the insurance industry but the National Academy of Sciences – there
would have been between 1,300 and 2,600 fewer crash deaths in 1993 had
the average weight and size of the light-duty motor vehicle fleet in that year
been that of the mid-1970s” (Levin, 2002 p.S1749)
As such, in the debates leading up to the 2005 Energy Policy Act provisions to
increase and reform CAFE were rejected and the final bill did not change CAFE at all,
although it did increase funds to NHTSA to carry out a feasibility report of a reduction
in fuel consumption (Yacobucci and Bamberger, 2007a p.2).
In part, the opposition to CAFE reform within Congress was due to the partisan
divide on the issue and the Republican control over Congress. However, there was
also a regional basis to opposing CAFE standards as corporate visible power held
sway. Congressmen, particularly Representatives, with auto plants in their districts
were much more receptive to auto industry positions and more likely to push for the
protection of, and directly represent, auto industry interests (Dunn, 2006 p.225). For
example, Rep. Candice Miller (R-MI) said in a Hearing before the Select Committee
on Energy Independence and Global Warming that
“I principally sought a seat on this committee because I wanted to be a very
strong advocate for the domestic auto industry, obviously, in full disclosure,
being from Michigan” (Miller, 2008 p.9).
Likewise, in a 2005 hearing on the issue of CAFE Standards, Rep. Russ Carnahan
(D-MO) said that “Chrysler is an important employer to our region” and that “I urge
everyone to pay particular attention to balancing the increase of CAFE standards
45 The 2003 light truck rulemaking, while not desired by the automakers, was sufficiently modest that it
did not face significant opposition within Congress. As the House Majority whip, and leader of the
1996-2001 CAFE opposition, Rep. Tom Delay (R-TX) said about new light truck standards “I'm not
going to fall on my sword on this issue” (Eilperin, 2001).
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while keeping our American auto companies strong and viable.” (Carnahan, 2005
p.15)
This representation of auto interests, as the Rep. Miller and Rep. Carnahan quotes
show, is not clandestine and can involve actively seeking membership of important
committees with regards to auto interests/regulation. In fact, Rep. John Dingell (D-
MI), who is both the longest-serving member of the House and was ranking member
within (and from 2007-2009 Chairman of) the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, has been widely recognised as protecting the auto industry since being
elected to office in 1955 and has been seen to do so very effectively (Luger, 2000
pp.160-161). Perhaps unsurprisingly, both Ford and GM were leading contributors to
his 2004 election campaign (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011). As such, Thomas
Friedman (2008), writing at the time of the auto bailouts, wrote that
“when they do have to bury Detroit, I hope that all the current and past
representatives and senators from Michigan have to serve as pallbearers. And
no one has earned the “honor” of chief pallbearer more than the Michigan
Representative John Dingell... who is more responsible for protecting Detroit
to death than any single legislator.”
Likewise, Dingell was listed as number one in an Automotive News 10-person list of
Congressmen who were recognised as consistent supporters of auto interests
(Automotive News, 2007).
This particular avenue of influence is quite extensive. The Congressional Auto
Caucus was formed in 1983 “to exhibit a unified voice for American auto
manufacturers and their employees” (Kildee, 2011) and, as of 2009, has 37
Representatives – 19 of whom are Republican and 18 Democrats – from 18 states.
While most of the Representatives are from Rust Belt states with a large number of
manufacturing jobs, the link between auto plant location and membership of the
caucus can be seen most clearly in Rep. Lee Terry’s (R-NE) membership. The two
other Nebraskan Representatives, who have massive rural districts and do not have
auto plants in their districts, are not members of the auto caucus, whereas Terry’s
Nebraska district is urban and contains a Ford manufacturing plant. The purpose of
this caucus is to speak with a collective voice that will “repeat that what's good for
the American auto industry is good for our country” (ibid.). Likewise, the Senate,
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which only has around 25 caucuses in comparison to the House’s 200+ (Master,
2007), has its own Auto Caucus that brings together Senators from auto producing
states – with Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) and Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)
chairing the caucus during the Bush period (Levin, 2008). Seeing the interests of
their constituents and the interests of the employing corporation as one and the
same, these politicians give the corporations a great deal of access, communicating
with them and working to represent their interests.
The combination of regional auto representation and the partisan divide on the issue
meant that reformers at the federal level were not well placed to change CAFE
standards because Congress could, and did, stop any changes. However, in
California a head of steam was gathering (Dunn, 2006 p.215). California was in a
prime position to push for change as it was the only state in the 1990 Clean Air Act
that was given the power, subject to EPA approval, to set regulations regarding auto
emissions, with other states given the choice of either following federal regulations or
of adopting California’s regulations (Vogel, 1997 p.259). It also did not have
significant automotive employment, and so did not have to cope with the industry-
constituent job link. In 2003, California passed AB 1493, which required the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) to promulgate new regulations for a range of
automobile emissions including, crucially, CO2, which had not previously been
subject to Clean Air regulations (Carlson, 2009 p.1109). Because CO2 emissions
and fuel economy are linked (ibid. p.1127) California was, in effect, setting higher
fuel economy requirements. An and Sauer (2004 p.27) calculate that CARB’s
regulations were equivalent to a 35.6 mpg by 2016 fuel economy standard.
Likewise, state pressure was being exerted through the courts. The Clean Air Act
had empowered the Administrator of the EPA to regulate any air pollutant that he
determined to be detrimental to public health or welfare. In 2003, the EPA had
decided that its authority under the Clean Air Act was insufficiently clear to regulate
on CO2 or climate change and that, regardless of authority, the EPA was the wrong
body to regulate on such a matter. However, in an effort to force the EPA to regulate
CO2 emissions, several states, cities and organisations sued the EPA in
Massachusetts vs Environmental Protection Agency. The Supreme Court found in
favour of Massachusetts in 2007 ruling that the EPA had both the authority and the
legal duty to regulate CO2 emissions. In effect, then, the executive was required to
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issue standards that regulated automobile CO2 emissions and, thus, to set fuel
economy standards. The Massachusetts decision also had the knock-on effect of
strengthening California’s attempts to regulate CO2 emissions under the Clean Air
Act by establishing precedent and by undermining the basis of the lawsuits that had
been launched by the auto-manufacturers to stop California’s regulations (Doniger,
2007 p.77).
As such, there was significant pressure building within the US political system that
worked against many forms of corporate power. This pressure was further intensified
and broadened by continually rising oil prices. Hence, in his 2007 State of the Union
address, President Bush outlined his twenty-in-ten plan, which aimed to reduce the
(predicted future) national oil consumption by 20% over ten years through the
production of 35 billion gallons of renewable fuels per year46 to replace gasoline
usage and a 8.5 billion gallon a year (550,000 barrels per day) reduction in oil
consumption through increased CAFE standards (Bush, 2007a), which was
estimated to be equivalent to an annual 4% increase in the CAFE standards
(Yacobucci and Bamberger, 2007b p.5). President Bush also requested that the
authority “be provided to set the CAFE standards, based on cost/benefit analysis,
using sound science, and without impacting safety” (Bush, 2007b [emphasis added]).
Thus, while pressure was building that worked against corporate interests, the
corporations were still significantly empowered by their hidden and invisible power.
In the 2007 elections, Democrats won a majority in both houses for the first time
since 1995 and the debate on CAFE reform reopened in both House and Senate.
During the many debates, Michigan members of Congress promoted the “American
Manufacturing Initiative”. Reflecting the pro-CAFE pressures in the system, this
proposal did call for new CAFE regulations, but also called for a slew of tax credits,
automobile company supports (including help with autoworker “legacy” costs) and
technology goals. In fact, the technology goals were seen as rendering CAFE
redundant as the American Manufacturing Initiative would have seen CAFE
requirements waived if, by 2020, the automakers only sold new vehicles
“that 1) utilize advanced technology (such as hybrid, clean diesel, or fuel cells)
or alternative fuel; or 2) utilize an internal combustion engine that achieves at
46 Ethanol and other alcohol-based renewable fuels have lower energy density than gasoline. As such,
35 billion gallons of renewable fuels replaces around 23 billion gallons of oil, or 1.5 million bpd.
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least 35 miles per gallon” (Levin, 2007a).
Also, like with the Bryan Bill before it, CAFE standard proposals were subject to
intense lobbying by the auto companies in this period. During 2007, GM spent $14.2
million (Center for Responsive Politics, 2007a) and Ford $7.1 million (Center for
Responsive Politics, 2007b) on lobbying in the US. A number of the lobbyists hired
with this money had previously worked as staffers for still-standing US Congressmen
and women; they had been through the revolving door. For example, GM hired the
Duberstein Group to lobby on CAFE issues, who then utilised Eric Ueland, a 20-year
Congressional staffer and former Chief of Staff to the then Senate Majority Leader,
Bill Frist (R-TN), to lobby (Office of Public Records, 2007a). Likewise, Ford hired
Fierce, Isakowitz & Blalock who used Aleix Jarvis, former Legislative Director and
Chief policy Advisor to Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) (Office of Public Records,
2007b). In total and over all issue areas in 2007, 50 out of 59 lobbyists used by Ford
(Center for Responsive Politics, 2007c), and 74 out of 104 lobbyists used by GM
(Center for Responsive Politics, 2007d) were classified as having passed through
the revolving door by the Center for Responsive Politics.47 Furthermore, three of
GM’s lobbyists had previously worked in Congress, such as Robert Walker, who,
after 19 years in the House, became a partner in Wexler & Walker in 1997. In
contrast, in the first six months of 2007 “the total spending for the Sierra Club, Public
Citizen, the Union of Concerned Scientists and other organizations that lobbied for
tougher standards was…$917,108” (Hyde, 2007), which includes money spent
lobbying on other bills.
However, despite lobbying by the auto corporations and claims made in the Senate
that CAFE was “job-killing”, an appetite for change was in the air, particularly in the
Senate. As such, the Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid (D-NE), asked Senators to
“speak for the American people, not the three car companies” (Miller, 2007 p.H7081).
Several bills were introduced in the House and Senate that included changes to the
CAFE standards and three of which (from Senators Durbin, Obama and Luger)
contained a provision that would allow NHTSA to reduce the CAFE standard if the
standard would have led to a reduction in safety (Yacobucci and Bamberger, 2007b).
47 In 2007, Cerebus Capital Management bought a controlling stake in Chrysler and lobbied under its
own name, rather than Chrysler’s, for Chrysler’s interests, which makes untangling Chrysler’s
lobbying more difficult in this period. This situation continued until 2009, when Chrysler was declared
bankrupt and sold to Fiat.
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In this regard, the safety argument had moved from being a controversial topic in
1990, then became the accepted science in 2002 and, by 2007, had become a point
that was not challenged by CAFE proponents – Durbin, in particular, had been long
term advocate of CAFE increases. In this respect, the safety argument moved from
being a hidden power agenda-setting attempt – where certain concerns are raised
above others – to an invisible power manipulation – where the ordering of concerns
is broadly accepted as legitimate and hence not debated.
At the low-end of the proposed bills was the automaker-supported (Ford, 2007), and
the auto-state-representative proposed, Hill-Terry H.R. 2927, which called for fuel
economy to be not less than 32 mpg and not greater than 35 mpg by MY2022. At the
high end, one proposal had a 40 mpg requirement by MY2023, with many proposals
operating alternatively by mandating an annual 4% increase (Yacobucci and
Bamberger, 2007b). In the end, Congressional reformers were successful and the
authority to alter passenger car standards, as well as the wider structure of CAFE,
was given in the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA). EISA
(Congress, 2007) mandated that CAFE standards must rise to a minimum of 35 mpg
by 2020 and, extending EPCA’s original treatment of light trucks, should be set at the
“maximum feasible” after then. Also, following the advice of the 2002 NAS study very
closely, EISA abolished the light truck/passenger car distinction and, instead,
brought in an attribute standard for all passenger automobiles under 10,000lbs
(Congress, 2007 p.1499). The attribute standard, although not stated in the text of
EISA, was understood to be size-based 48 whereby the larger an automobile’s
wheelbase is, the lower the fuel economy requirements are. EPCA’s two-tier weight-
based distinction, then, was replaced by a sliding, many-tiered, scale. EISA, again
echoing the NAS study, also allowed auto-manufacturers to trade their CAFE credits
both between their internal fleets and with their competitors, and also expanded the
application period of CAFE credits from 3 years to 5 years (Congress, 2007 p.1501).
While, at first flush, EISA appears to be a defeat for the automakers, in that the
automakers would have been happiest with “no change at all” (Crain, 2007) to the
standards since they had learned to live comfortably with the “devil we know” (Dunn,
2006 p.203), the interests of auto manufacturers in general, and the interests of the
Big Three in particular, were of central concern during the formulation of EISA. In
48 Recorded Interview with Congressional Research staffer, 8th April 2011
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many areas, EISA represented a compromise with industry demands; the pressure
within the political system may have finally overcome corporate power, but it did not
overwhelm it nor defeat it. The main compromise was with the 35 mpg by MY2020
and the hanging MY2030 requirement (Inside Energy, 2007). Like the Bryan Bill
before it, initial legislation detailing CAFE increases called for a 40 mpg standard to
be reached ten years after enactment (Durbin, 2007 p.S8017). As the legislation
progressed, within the Senate a “compromise” of 35 mpg by 2020 and a 4% increase
until MY 2030 emerged (Durbin, 2007 p.S8020). However, in the final legislation
(after the House had passed an energy bill containing no mention of CAFE) this
requirement was further diluted by the stripping of the annual 4% improvement from
MY2021 through to MY2030 and leaving it as the “maximum feasible” as understood
by NHTSA. Put another way, an increase to 56 mpg by 2030 would have been
required by law, but was instead left open and subject to later regulation (Bragman,
2007). So, while the end result was not as low as the 32-35 mpg by 2022 in the Hill-
Terry bill, it was significantly lower, and more flexible, than what was potentially on
the table. Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) noted the role of Michigan politicians in
the resulting compromise, saying
"I want to praise Congressman John Dingell and Senator Carl Levin for their
great work in improving this legislation during House and Senate
consideration. It has been a pleasure to partner with them in this effort. There
is no question that the CAFE regulatory compromise was a victory in our hard
fought and on-going efforts to support the American auto industry and our
proud auto workers who are the back-bone of America's middle-class." (US
Fed News, 2007)
Furthermore, while the automakers were subject to the “costs” (discussed in the
implementation section) of CAFE compliance, following work led by Michigan
Congressmen (Congressional Record, 2007) EISA included compensatory
measures for the auto industry. The main compensatory measure authorised by
EISA were $25 billion worth of low-interest loans that were made available to the
auto industry (Cooney and Yacobucci, 2008 p.1). Viewed by many as a bailout (ibid.),
these loans represented the “largest government subsidy for the auto industry since
the [1979/80] Chrysler bailout” (Marr and Montgomery, 2008) and were designed, by
including a provision for the refurbishment of facilities over twenty years old, “to keep
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out [the] Japanese” (ibid.) and only provide funds for the US companies. Further to
the loans, EISA included grants for next-generation vehicle technology, for the
domestic manufacture of hybrid vehicles, for research into improvements to battery
technology and for the electrification of automobiles.
Moreover, in a move that particularly helped the Big Three automakers because of
their reliance on SUVs, EISA’s move to an attribute-based standard (supported by
the 2002 NAS study on the grounds of safety) allowed a variegated market (NHTSA,
2008 p.4), although with a no-backslide provision. Now, instead of each of the
automakers having to meet the fuel economy requirements across their fleets, the
fuel economy requirement is applied to the whole fleet and each automaker only has
to meet the requirements within the size-classes that they operate in. The
consequence of this change is that US automakers would no longer need to balance
their CAFE number by selling marginally-profitable or even loss-leading smaller cars,
thus, as Senator Levin stated, ending “the many years of discriminatory impacts on
domestic manufacturers imposed by the existing CAFE system” (Levin, 2007b
p.S15006). Put more simply, “GM will not be penalized for making more SUVs and
fewer small passenger vehicles than Toyota” (Durbin, 2007 p.S8017). One
interviewee, reflecting the impact of this change on a major Japanese automaker,
said that “we didn’t like size-based standards…Because we make smaller vehicles,
we were subjected to a higher standard, [the change] did not benefit us.”49
Lastly, with pressure from the White House, EISA narrowed (but was unable to
eliminate) the capacity of California and other states to set their own independent
fuel economy standards. Because of the Massachusetts decision the EPA, under
provisions of the Clean Air Act, was legally required to regulate CO2 emissions and
was required to allow California to set its own standards. However, EISA mandated
that NHTSA develop fuel economy standards in consultation with the EPA (Congress,
2007 p.1499). This move further strengthened Executive Order 13432 (the Bush
Administration’s response to Massachusetts), which required the Department of
Energy, DOT (of which NHTSA is a part) and the EPA to co-ordinate their
rulemaking in the area of vehicle CO2 emissions. In practice, EISA and Executive
Order 13432 meant that EPA’s required regulation of CO2 emissions was discharged
49 Recorded Interview with a former Auto Engineer for US and Japanese Auto Companies, 25th April
2011
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through NHTSA’s regulation of fuel economy standards. It also meant that
automakers would comply with both regulations by complying with one (Government
Accountability Office, 2010). In a further shoring up of the consolidation of policy
arenas at the federal level, in 2008 the EPA refused to grant CARB the waiver that
was required for it to set independent CO2 emission standards and NHTSA
attempted to include language in its rulemaking that would pre-empt state
greenhouse gas standards (Rendell, 2008). As such, the capacity of California to
drive its own higher standards (and the standards of those states that choose to
adopt them) was weakened; something the auto industry had been lobbying for
(Energy Washington Week, 2009).
Overall, then, because the political atmosphere had shifted due to a new Democrat
majority, continually rising oil prices and pressure from states, the administration and
the courts, CAFE reform was “politically unstoppable” (Maynard, 2007). This
inevitability was recognised by the auto companies who, instead of maintaining their
long-standing outright opposition to CAFE, recognised the necessity of concessions
over CAFE and tried to propose legislation that raised CAFE standards, but kept
their interests at heart. As Dalmia and Payne (2007) recognised: “Given the
backdrop [of rising oil prices, political pressure, etc], Detroit's goal this time was not
to dodge stricter CAFE standards – but to minimize their damage”. These efforts
were partially successful, as when reform came it was mitigated by the interests of
autocompanies – the Big Three in particular – in that the standards were not as high
as they could have been, compensatory measures were brought in, a variegated
market was allowed and authority for setting standards was centralised. So, while
EISA was not their ideal outcome, it represents a compromise that the auto
companies could live with and that sufficiently accommodated their needs. As such,
(then former Congressman) Dave McCurdy, president and CEO of the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, expressed the satisfaction of the auto industry with the
compromise in saying “we believe this tough, national fuel economy bill will be good
for both consumers and energy security” (Maynard, 2007). Likewise, an interviewee
from Chrysler indicated that they “quite” supported EISA, but added that “Do we
support a fuel economy bill? No, we're not suicidal.”50
One interesting side point to note is that, despite CAFE being an issue linked with oil
50 Recorded Interview with Senior Chrysler staff. 16th June 2011
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dependence and the consumption of oil, there was not political pressure opposing or
supporting CAFE from the oil companies51; there is not an oil-auto industry political
alliance within this issue area at least. Instead, the oil companies focused on issues
that affect their bottom line directly – drilling rights, taxes, the Alaskan Wildlife
Refuge, the Outer Continental Shelf and fuel composition requirements. Likewise,
auto companies don’t think beyond their particular issues. One interviewee recalled
that
“In 2001 we were working on an original energy bill and there were a number
of high profile issues, including CAFE. I remember walking over from my office
to the floor in Capitol and all of the lobbyists, GM and the rest of them, were
all catching members of Congress as they walked to the floor and reminding
them or whatever the hell it is they do...it's distasteful, frankly...that was on the
vote regarding CAFE. The next big vote was on ANWR [the Alaskan National
Wildlife Refuge], which would increase our proven reserves by 50% - it’s the
stuff their cars run on! Every time the price goes up or there’s instability, they
took a licking. But as soon as the vote for CAFE was over, they were all
gone…I thought to myself, y’know, the lack of understanding, or
comprehensive review of the facts, and how they relate to their business is
dumbfounding.”52
In fact, some issues, such as fuel emission requirements, often pit oil companies and
auto companies against each other as each try to shift the burden of regulation on to
the other.53 Such action indicates that corporations define their self-interest very
narrowly and seek to wield political influence on a limited number of issues. The
power of individuals corporations, then, should not be understood as primarily a
general political phenomena, but a specific phenomena that may be less wieldable
outside of areas close to their self-interest.
Summary
In the formulation of policy during the Bush period automaker interests in general,
and the interests of the Big Three in particular, were represented in a number of
51 Recorded Interview with former Congressional Staffer who had worked on several House and
Senate Energy Committees, 6th June 2011.
52 Recorded Interview with former Congressional Staffer who had worked on several House and
Senate Energy Committees, 6th June 2011.
53 Recorded interview with GM Spokesperson, 6th May 2011.
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direct and indirect ways and through many mechanisms of influence. Directly, the US
automakers publicised their views on CAFE through the media, met with key policy
actors and lobbied Congress using millions of dollars and with former Congressional
staffers. Indirectly, automaker interests were represented by auto-state
Congressmen, by anti-regulatory Republicans, by various front groups, and by the
continued deployment, and political legitimisation, of arguments established in earlier
years by industry-funded think-tanks. The outcome of all of these avenues of
influence was that, despite significant pressure from other actors, the auto industry
was heavily represented in the formulation of policy and, while the situation was less
than ideal for them, their interests were heavily promoted in the eventual outcome of
the policy-making process: EISA 2007.
Implementation
Changes to CAFE, while mandated by the executive and legislature, had to be
refined and then put into practice by NHTSA – an executive agency. The process of
refining and implementing rules allowed a significant opportunity for policy to be
changed and, consequently, offered the autocompanies a further chance to influence
policy. So, in order to extend the analysis of American automaker power, this section
will examine NHTSA’s CAFE rulemaking procedure during the Bush period using
both the 2003 enacted light truck standards and the proposed, but not finalised, post-
EISA entire fleet standards as examples.
As part of NHTSA’s rulemaking procedure, it had to set CAFE at the “maximum
feasible” level in line with the four factors laid out by the EPCA – technological
feasibility, economic practicability, effect of other standards on fuel economy and the
need of the nation to conserve energy. The process of rulemaking that NHTSA
follows, in line with Executive Order 1286654, involves an initial public notification of
proposed rulemaking, a proposed rule based on cost-benefit analysis and a period
for public comment. Public comment then has to be analysed and responded to
before the final rulemaking, which can then be subject to judicial review. All of the
data from this process is made available to the public in both the Federal Register
54 Signed by President Clinton in 1993, Executive Order 12866 requires executive agencies to
undertake cost-benefit analyses of new regulations and to ensure new regulations maximise net
benefits. This order continued the practice of cost-benefit analysis that was started by President
Reagan “at the behest of persistent industry lobbyists, who clearly viewed it as a tool for squelching
and delaying regulation” (Sinden et al., 2009 p.49).
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and on regulations.gov, where it is arranged in dockets according to particular
rulemakings and which include all non-confidential letters to NHTSA. As such,
NHTSA stress the transparency of the decision-making process and, echoing
pluralist views, stress that they “meet with all stakeholders”.55 Furthermore, following
the calls for being based on “sound science”, NHTSA has repeatedly emphasised
that, by using cost-benefit calculations, its decisions are “science-based and data-
driven”56 and seek to portray their rulemakings as apolitical, neutral and based on
the “facts”. In these regards, NHTSA’s rulemaking procedure was preconfigured
according to invisible power discourses that had previously worked to empower
corporations.
Additionally, there are significant avenues of influence for auto corporations within
both the process of engaging in cost-benefit analysis and the wider procedures
adopted by NHTSA. The following section, then, first examines NHTSA’s use of cost-
benefit analysis and how this process both procedurally and intentionally benefited
US auto corporations. The section then moves on to analyse wider related issues to
do with NHTSA’s rulemaking procedures and the capacity of automakers to influence
the final outcomes of NHTSA’s rulemaking. Put together, these points both call into
question the neutrality of NHTSA’s rule-making process and suggest that corporate
interests were further represented in the implementation stage of CAFE.
Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis involves the monetisation of predicted costs and benefits of
alternative rules so that a decision that considers and weighs each relevant aspect
can be reached. As can be seen in figure 5.1 (which is taken from the 2008
proposed rulemaking), NHTSA’s cost-benefit analysis tried to analyse a wide array of
factors. The main benefits of CAFE that NHTSA evaluated were the saving of fuel,
the reduction in the costs of oil imports and the benefits of reductions in the emission
of pollutants, which, for the 2008 rulemaking only, include CO2. However, despite the
breadth of work done by NHTSA and the precision with which its numbers are
presented, its use of cost-benefit analysis inevitably runs into problems that result in
it being a political exercise that primarily benefits the auto corporations. There are
two main problems with the cost-benefit approach and several further problems
55 Recorded Interview with Senior NHTSA Staff, 4th May 2011. Media handler present.
56 Recorded Interview with Senior NHTSA Staff, 4th May 2011. Media handler present.
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specific to NHTSA’s analysis of CAFE standards.
First, with cost-benefit generally, cost-benefit calculations depend fundamentally on
what is counted as a cost, what is counted as a benefit, and what levels these costs
and benefits are set at; as the 2002 NAS study mentions, “cost-efficient calculations
depend critically on the assumptions one makes about a variety of parameters”
(National Academy of Sciences, 2002 p.112). What level costs and benefits are set
at, then, necessarily involves taking a disputable, rather than “factual”, position,
particularly as many numbers can be dependent upon predictions about the future.
For example, the “military security” benefit of reduced oil consumption is rated at $0.
NHTSA set it at this level under the reasoning that US military actions in oil-
producing regions would still occur (and costs would remain the same) even if CAFE
reduced US oil dependence (NHTSA, 2008 p.61). However, such a position is
untenable as, if total US oil dependence on the Middle East and other oil-producing
regions bears costs (which NHTSA accepts), there will be benefits in the future,
regardless of their separability of the costs at the current point in time – particularly
with the inevitable decline of Middle Eastern, and world, oil reserves.
Figure 5-1: Economic Values for Benefit Computations
Source: NHTSA (2008 p.54)
Second, to understand many benefits can require the monetisation of issues that are
not necessarily amenable to monetisation (Ackerman, 2007 p.206). For example,
calculating the benefit of CO2 reduction involved estimating the economic impact of
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possible climate change. In looking into CO2, NHTSA tried to provide a monetary
estimate of the contribution of US automobiles to an issue that will have an unknown
impact upon the entire world for numerous generations and then weigh this unknown
impact against the increased costs of auto producers in one country (Masur and
Posner, 2011 p.1560). Essentially, NHTSA tried to put a price on a “priceless” benefit
(Ackerman, 2007 p.208). Likewise, emission damage costs were calculated
according to how much damage they do to humans, which, in the process of
monetisation, involves establishing the “value” of a human life (ibid. p.208). These
two problems resulted, as can be seen in the above examples, in NHTSA
underestimating/being unable to estimate the benefits of CAFE reform. The benefits
of CAFE reform were thus poorly understood.
Equally, even with issues that could be estimated with reasonable accuracy NHTSA
underestimated the benefits. For instance, NHTSA predicted that the retail price of
gasoline, expressed in 2006 dollars, “during calendar year 2020 is $2.36 per gallon,
rising gradually to $2.51 by the year 2030 (these values include federal, state and
local taxes)” and maintaining the 2030 price until 2050 (NHTSA, 2008 p.55). Not only
is this assumption questionable with hindsight, since prices are much higher now
and poised to remain high, but it was also questionable at the time of the analysis
(2008) when oil prices were rapidly rising. In fact, NHTSA faced criticism from
environmental and consumer groups for their view on the price of oil in their 2008
proposed rulemaking. Likewise, lawmakers protested, with ten Senators writing to
the Transport Secretary to express that they “do not believe it is reasonable to
assume that the price of gasoline will drop precipitously in the coming years, as
NHTSA has done” (Karey, 2008). The importance of this variable is that it was a
major input for determining cost effectiveness; as can be seen in NHTSA’s 2008
high-end sensitivity analysis where the predicted cost of gasoline was instead set to
rise to $3.85 by 2020 and which, as a result, recommended passenger car standards
in MY2015 moving from the proposed 35.7 mpg to 42.2 mpg.
As such, NHTSA benefit estimates were systematically underestimated. In contrast,
however, “cost” estimates were both over-played and imagined. This situation suited
automobile industry interests as the costs calculated by NHTSA were primarily the
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cost to manufacturers of utilising more fuel efficient technologies in their cars57, the
costs of developing the manufacturing capacity for the mass production of more fuel
efficient vehicles, and the design/prototyping costs of future cars (NHTSA, 2008
p.54); in this manner, the automobile industry was seen as getting many of the costs,
but few of the benefits. Such “costs” for manufacturers were fundamentally
misrepresented in two ways. The first way in which costs to manufacturers were
misrepresented was in simply estimating how much more the companies would have
to invest in new technologies since expenditure on more fuel efficient technologies
can be recouped through a higher sticker price to the consumer58; the manufacturer,
in this case, does not lose anything. As such, this “cost” can be labelled as
“investment” in that the manufacturer puts in more money, produces a better product
(gaining intellectual property rights over new technologies as well) and then recoups
that money. It is also worth noting that EISA specifically provided loans to offset
some of the investment required by higher CAFE standards, which was not included
in NHTSA’s analysis.
The second way in which costs were misrepresented is that the “costs” were
understood as reductions in benefits relative to the status quo projected into the
future (Sinden et al., 2009 p.57). Again, these are not direct costs that these
companies will bear, but represent the departure from a “business-as-usual” situation
as cost. These “costs”, then, actually represent changes over time to the currently
existing rights and preferences, which are assumed to be continuing into the future.
Thus, for an example of the fluidity of this notion of cost, if the price of oil increased,
and subsequently consumer demand for higher-efficiency cars increased, than the
experienced “cost” of CAFE compliance would be reduced, or even eliminated as the
existing rights and preferences (fewer sales of low-mpg vehicles) are changed
(Center for Biological Diversity, 2008 pp.5-6). NHTSA’s analysis, then, does not
support its EPCA-remit of setting the “maximum feasible level” but instead works to
conform law “to the predilections of the status quo” (Sinden et al., 2009 p.57) and to
the existing distribution of benefits and privileges.
In sum, NHTSA’s cost-benefit calculations were unable to offer a good
57 Recorded Interview with Senior NHTSA Staff, 4th May 2011. Media handler present.
58 Equally, investing in more fuel efficient technology is likely to have beneficial consequences for the
competiveness of the overseas operations of the manufacturers due to the higher fuel economy
requirements in many developed markets.
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understanding of the benefits of CAFE increases, but were able to advance an
understanding of the “costs” to corporations. NHTSA, following long-established
procedures, systematically engaged in a process whereby public benefits – such as
the saving of fuel (underestimated because of optimistic predictions about the cost of
gasoline), reductions in global warming (impossible to estimate) and increased
military security (impossible to separate) – were marginalised and then discounted
against the requirement for increased private investment which, under provisions in
EISA, was going to be partially subsidised by the government. Essentially then,
several hidden power mechanisms were used to “organise out” environmental and
health interests and “organise in” corporate interests. Moreover, in this use of a
strictly economic approach to understand diverse issues, it can be seen that
NHTSA’s work conformed to corporate-empowering neoliberal economic discourses
that worked to the exclusion of other discourses and potential ways of understanding
the topics.
Following the logic, as stated by a Department of Transport spokesman, that “it
doesn’t make sense to impose costs on manufacturers if…those cost requirements
do not produce obviously benefits equivalent to the cost” (Duvall, 2008 p.433), the
cost-benefit approach facilitated a greater regard for the interests of the auto industry
over and above the public interest. As these calculations formed the basis of
NHTSA’s rulemakings, the rulemakings were set at a level more to the industry’s
liking than the “maximum feasible” level required by the EPCA. Such an outcome
was always likely as cost-benefit analysis has consistently been used in the US as a
“one-way ratchet” to weaken environmental regulations (Sinden et al., 2009 p.50,
Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2001).
Further Issues
Beyond the assumptions that go in to NHTSA’s cost-benefit analysis, there are five
major issues with NHTSA’s role in CAFE standards that warrant attention. The first
major issue is that NHTSA calculations on the economic and technological feasibility
of new CAFE standards were developed with regard to auto company product plans,
which were freely given (rather than subpoenaed) and kept confidential by NHTSA
for business reasons. As NHTSA says “the proposed standards are, in the first
instance, based on the confidential product plans submitted by the manufacturers”
(NHTSA, 2008 p.24355 [emphasis added]). In other words, the development of a
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CAFE regulation by NHTSA, and of the final corporate product plans that comply
with new regulations, occurs in an iterative process that begins with corporate
product plans.
The sharing of product plans, and of confidential information more generally, gives
the auto companies the capacity to misrepresent, in a rather opaque way, the costs
associated with new regulations and the capabilities of the auto companies
themselves; the auto companies are able to mislead NHTSA with little accountability
or oversight of their conduct. Moreover, such misconstrual need not be intentional,
but more the basis of mind-set. As one interviewee said “the auto industry is risk
averse” when considering new regulations that require utilising new technology
because
“there is uncertainty about how well these options are going to work and also
a range of costs depending upon how fast costs come down with learning and
experience and what suppliers do and so on...and so the auto industry, they
naturally take the conservative end of each of those ranges...they’re not
cheating, they’re not even wrong; it’s a different mind-set.”59
Regardless of intent, the confidential nature of industry-agency information-sharing
gave the auto industry the capacity to mislead without checks by other groups – they
worked in a closed political space without any means of public oversight.
Furthermore, the working and confidential relationships formed through the
information-sharing process gave the auto companies a direct and exclusive line of
access to lobby NHTSA and an environment where they can do so opaquely. Such
lobbying, if successful, could skew the entire cost-benefit model that NHTSA
rulemaking is based upon. For example, in 2006, despite opposition from the Union
of Concerned Scientists, GM successfully lobbied NHTSA for setting the estimated
rebound effect of new rules at 20% (Bialik, 2009). The models, then, predicted that
lower oil consumption caused by efficiency improvements would be offset by
consumers reacting to lower costs of vehicle use by driving, on average, over a fifth
more than currently. As such, the model produced a lower estimate of total fuel
savings, a higher estimate of rebound congestion and accidents, and so justified a
lower CAFE standard.
59 Recorded Interview with a former Auto Engineer for US and Japanese Auto Companies, 25th April
2011.
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The second major issue of concern is that the standards were set with regards to a
“baseline fleet”, which is a model of the vehicles available, the vehicles currently
being sold, and the vehicles estimated to be sold in the future. Up until EISA 2007 –
so for the light truck reform in 2003 – the baseline fleet was based upon confidential
manufacturer data, which again allowed opaque manipulation. In order to improve
transparency EISA 2007 mandated that the baseline fleet was to be set in
collaboration with EPA and had to rely on publically-available data about the
MY2008 fleet. Even so, in both such procedures, the baseline fleet takes current
performance requirements as a given.
Such an approach, however, does not reflect that the current performance
requirements of the baseline fleet are significantly greater than previous baseline
fleets. The reason for the increase in performance was that since the late 1980s,
auto companies decided to prioritise performance over fuel economy; the fuel
efficiency of engines increased, but the fuel savings have been “spent” on
performance. As one interviewee observed “industry, on average, increases
efficiency by 1-1.5% [a year] and doesn't turn it into fuel economy because
customers use that in other things”. 60 Thus, a MY1990 baseline would have
considered much greater increases in fuel economy as being possible with current
fuel efficiency technology. The legislative deadlock from 1990 onwards, then,
afforded the automotive corporations the leeway to enact changes for 15-20 years –
such as increasing horsepower and acceleration (see fig 5.2) – that were not in line
with the “maximum feasible” rule, but which are then considered the status quo and
so protected by current and future rulemakings. NHTSA artificially limited itself to
CAFE standards that did not reduce performance attributes in any way.
60 Recorded Interview with Senior Chrysler staff, 16th June 2011.
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Figure 5-2: MPG (efficiency), horsepower to weight ratio (power), and acceleration time (speed) of
new US vehicles since 1975.
Source: Anderson et al. (2011 p.95)
The third major issue of concern is NHTSA’s interpretation of “economic
practicability”. In its 2002 provisional rulemaking for light trucks, NHTSA explained its
understanding of the limit of economic practicability as “that of the least capable
manufacturer with a substantial share of the relevant market” (NHTSA, 2002a
p.77020), defending this interpretation on the grounds that pushing further could
impede “motor vehicle safety”. In the 2002 rulemaking, this interpretation meant that
NHTSA determined the “maximum feasible” level of fuel economy on the basis of the
capacities of Ford, GM and, particularly, DaimlerChrysler (ibid. p.77019) and not of
the market, or industry, as a whole.
Yet, acting in such a manner is against NHTSA’s remit, as defined by the EPCA. The
EPCA (NHTSA, 2003 p.16872) states that the “determination of maximum feasible
average fuel economy should not be keyed to the single manufacturer which might
have the most difficulty achieving a given level of average fuel economy.” By
interpreting economic feasibility as the capabilities of a few manufacturers, NHTSA
allowed the scope of its recommendations to be bound by the manufacturing
decisions, and health, of these (American) auto companies. Moreover, these
companies were, at the time, increasingly ailing as SUV sales fell and were seen as
out of touch with consumer demands. This point is particularly important as two of
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the companies, Chrysler and GM, were later to go bankrupt, meaning that the status
quo situation that NHTSA bound itself to was characterised by organisations that
were failing, weak and inefficient, a situation that had occurred on the basis of the
choices that these corporations had made.61
The fourth major issue concerns the data gathered by NHTSA and its considerations
of alternatives. NHTSA’s data, gathered to allow it to set the “maximum feasible”
level, was limited to the US, to product plans within the US, and to the state of fuel
economy technology within the US. In focusing on this data, comparisons with the
level of fuel economy standards and the deployment of technology in other countries
were not performed and data of the non-US market was not considered. However,
such comparisons, in that they represent already-achieved technology deployment,
could be very fruitful in understanding the maximum technological and economic
feasibility of fuel economy requirements, particularly as the Big Three, to varying
degrees, are present in other markets in which they are subject to stricter fuel
economy requirements.
The fifth and final major issue is that NHTSA itself has been criticised for being too
weak, for being too close to the auto industry, and because many of its former staff
have gone through the “revolving door” to later work for the auto industry. In a 2010
Congressional hearing former NHTSA director Joan Claybrook highlighted several
weakness she saw in the organisation, seeing it as being “grossly underfunded”
(Claybrook, 2010 p.136) and “very secretive” (ibid. p.135). She also criticised the
revolving door between NHTSA and the auto companies, noting that
“there are 28 former top officials of this agency that have gone to work for the
auto companies in one capacity or another in the last 25 years. A former
NHTSA administrator, several of them former chief counsels, former deputy
administrators, top engineers, and lawyers of this agency, have become the
face and voice of auto manufacturers after they have left the agency” (ibid.
p.135).
Claybrook concludes in her testimony that “NHTSA has become a lapdog, not a
watchdog” (ibid. p.142).
61 As one interviewee said, in not moving towards greater fuel efficiency, “GM wasn't in trouble
because it was smart”. Interview with Congressional Staffer, 11th May 2011.
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One such example of the revolving door was the appointment of the NHTSA
Administrator from 1983-1989, Diane Steed, to head the Coalition for Vehicle Choice.
Yet, the relationship also works the other way, with a 2010 report by The Washington
Post identifying two former auto industry workers working for NHTSA. The report
also notes that while moving from industry to government “typically includes taking a
pay cut, employees can cycle back into the private sector within a few years,
sometimes doubling their salaries with their highly marketable insider knowledge of
the agency” (Kindy, 2010). Such is the relationship that Daniel Becker, director of the
Sierra Club's global warming and energy team, said in 2002 that “NHTSA is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Detroit” (Zagaroli, 2002). A different (yet suggestive) slant on
the relationship was provided by a Chrysler executive, who said that
“outside of public view, in the background, the relationships that industry has
with the regulators is – I'm not going to say chummy, buddy or friendly, that's
not the point – it's very professional and there's two-way respect on [fuel
economy standards], and that respect is built over decades.”62
While the close relationship between NHTSA and the automakers could be justified
on pragmatic grounds – NHTSA needed information that the corporations possessed
– such a justification would be based on a notion of output legitimacy, rather than
input legitimacy (Scharpf, 1997 p.19). Output legitimacy is the idea of making
decisions in the best interests of the people (achieving the best possible results),
rather than working in such a manner that people represent their own interests in line
with democratic norms (Kratochwil, 2006). Therefore, such a pragmatic argument is
only persuasive if the outcomes are in the best interests of the people, rather than,
as shown above, in the interests of corporations.
Summary
As in the formulation of CAFE standards, the process of CAFE implementation also
saw significant representation of auto industry interests, mainly through hidden
power mechanisms of influence. This representation of interests occurred for three
main reasons. Foremost was the process of cost-benefit analysis, which
systematically underestimated benefits and valued these against imagined, or
mislabelled, costs. In fact, the use of cost-benefit analysis itself served to obfuscate
62 Recorded Interview with Senior Chrysler staff, 16th June 2011.
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the very political and subjective process of rulemaking by hiding assumptions and
decisions behind numbers, allowing NHTSA to present itself as science-driven and
deploy both the sound science discourse and neoliberal discourses. Second, NHTSA,
perhaps due to the revolving door or to genuine belief in corporate-empowering
discourses, chose to analyse from a narrow, US-centric and conservative
perspective. Instead of taking an independent stance in understanding feasibility of
standards (such as through international comparison), NHTSA used corporate
information, considered corporate bottom-lines and worked within the framework of
previous corporate decisions. Such a consideration of the status quo fell significantly
short of NHTSA’s “technology-forcing” mandate and requirement to work out the
“maximum feasible” level. Third, automakers benefited from cosy and opaque
relations with NHTSA, created by both the sharing of confidential information and,
over the long-term, of staff, between the automakers and NHTSA.
Following this line of thought, the Center for Biological Diversity (2008) argued that
the 2008 proposed rulemaking “systematically manipulates the analysis,
assumptions and modelling inputs such that NHTSA selects proposed CAFE levels
far below [EPCA’s] technology forcing mandate” and that the use of cost-benefit
analysis in this instance “defer[s] overwhelmingly to the automakers and prioritize[s]
the economic benefit of the automakers.” Corporate influence, then, further moulded
CAFE standards in the policy implementation stage.
Outcomes and Potential to Reduce Oil Dependence
There were two major policy outcomes regarding CAFE during the Bush
administrations. First, using the powers afforded the Secretary of Transport under
EPCA, light truck standards were increased from 20.7 to 22.2 mpg (NHTSA, 2003).
Second, EISA 2007 mandated a minimum increase in the standards to 35 mpg by
2020, with NHTSA given the power to increase the standard beyond these levels
through to MY2030. However, both light truck reform and EISA reforms ran into
problems within the Bush period in producing outcomes that did, or would, reduce
US oil dependence.
The light truck standards, while successfully applied in MY2005, MY2006 and
MY2007, suffered a legal setback when NHTSA attempted to issue new rules for
MY2008-2011. In the Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic
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Safety Administration, which included eleven states, three environmental groups and
two cities in the petitioners, the Ninth Circuit Court ruled that, by not including the
costs of the emission of greenhouse gases and by not closing the SUV loophole, the
final rule was “arbitrary and capricious” and “contrary to the EPCA” (Carlarne, 2010
p.111). As such, the Ninth Circuit Court sent the rule back to NHTSA to be
reanalysed and then amended (NHTSA, 2008 p.24362). In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit Court both highlighted the point made above about the selectivity of cost-
benefit analysis and also ratcheted up the legal pressure on the administration to
reform CAFE standards.
However, the actual impact of the ruling on CAFE standards was limited as the
automakers followed the intent of the regulation despite not being bound by it
because they had already designed and begun manufacturing the vehicles.
Furthermore, the light truck rulemaking struck down by the court on 15th November
2007 was effectively overwritten by Bush’s signing of EISA (which mandated full fleet
rulemaking) on 19th December 2007. Thus, the outcomes of Bush’s raising of light
truck standards were twofold. First, the fuel economy of light trucks that were
produced by MY2008 was increased by 2.4 mpg, from 20.7 to 23.1 mpg. Second,
through the Ninth Circuit Court decision, NHTSA was forced to assess the impact of
greenhouse gas emissions in subsequent rulemaking analyses, including its 2008
analysis.
Similarly, during the Bush period EISA did not produce new CAFE standards. While
EISA mandated changes for MY2011 and NHTSA conducted the analysis for
changes to standards for MY2011-2015 (analysed in the previous section), no new
standards were actually enacted. The reason for this inaction by the Bush
administration was the financial difficulties that the US auto industry was suffering in
the face of the onset of the global financial crisis, which eventually bankrupted both
Chrysler and GM. The decision, announced in a brief statement by the Department
of Transport, passed the responsibility for finalising the standards to the incoming
Obama administration, saying
“the recent financial difficulties of the automobile industry will require the next
administration to conduct a thorough review of matters affecting the industry,
including how to effectively implement EISA. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration has done significant work that will position the next
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Transportation Secretary to finalize a rule before the April 1, 2009 deadline”
(Department of Transport, 2009).
In delaying the rulemaking, Bush reopened the policy implementation stage and
allowed further renegotiation of the CAFE standards at this level. To try to ensure the
health of the auto companies a 1 mpg63 lower requirement in MY2011 was enacted
by the Obama administration (Center for Biological Diversity, 2009). The decisions to
both delay the rulemaking and the MY2011 reduction by the Obama administration
displays the concern with which the political establishment has for the health and
vitality of the American auto corporations and how their interests are, on occasion,
put above many others; it displays the visible power the major US auto corporations
have on a national scale. This concern is, in fact, best demonstrated by the bailouts
of both GM and Chrysler (Singh, 2012, Moore et al., 2012), despite their troubles
being largely self-inflicted64 and the free market discourse of both the companies and
the government in better times.
Widening the context slightly, even without the problems that the policies faced in
producing discernible outcomes, the EISA changes (which incorporated new light
truck changes post-Center for Biological Diversity) represented “exceedingly
modest”65 successes in decreasing US oil dependence. This modesty is apparent in
both a historical and a comparative context. In a historical context, the final figure of
35 mpg represents 5 mpg less than the level the 1990 Bryan bill was calling for by
MY2000. In essence then, EISA mandated an increase 5 mpg lower and 20 years
later than the Bryan bill (although on vehicles with greater speed and power).
Moreover, if the minimum standards required by EISA had been implemented then
the US would have only seen a total increase of 10 mpg in the 35 years since 1985.
In a comparative context, US standards were already significantly below fuel
economy standards in similarly-developed countries (see fig. 5-3) and, if the 35 mpg
by MY2020 provision was achieved, would remain below currently achieved levels of
fuel economy around the world. Current European, Japanese and Chinese
63 The MY2011 standards were reduced from Bush’s proposed 31.2 mpg for passenger cars and 25
mpg for light trucks to 30.2 mpg and 24.1 mpg respectively. The new light truck standard was 0.1 mpg
higher than the MY2011 standard that was overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court.
64 While the global financial crisis was the proximate cause of the economic troubles of the American
automakers, ultimate causes include long-term declining market share, their production of low-quality
smaller vehicles and an over-reliance on profits from SUVs coupled with a massive increase in the
price of oil (Canis and Yacobucci, 2010).
65 Recorded interview with environmental think-tank staff, 11th April 2011.
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standards are 43.3 mpg, 42.6 mpg and 35.8 mpg respectively (Center for Biological
Diversity, 2009, An and Sauer, 2004). That the Chinese standard is higher than the
US standard is particularly noteworthy as it would appear the Chinese have
managed to surpass the US’s “maximum feasible” fuel economy, in spite of the
relative inexperience of Chinese automakers and the lower technology base in the
country.
Figure 5-3: Fuel Economy Standards by Country
Notes: Dashed lines indicate proposed fuel economy targets not yet enacted. For Canada, the
program includes in-use vehicles. This graph includes Obama era changes to CAFE.
Source: Anderson et al. (2011 p.92)
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Widening the context further, the changes to CAFE made by the Bush administration
validated, endorsed and furthered changes and decisions that had been made by
automakers to the size, features and performance of the vehicles that they produce,
which had limited their gains in fuel economy (fig. 5.2). The deference with which
NHTSA treated the market situation at the time meant that the market environment,
which had been created by consumers following the lead of the automakers for 30
years (Inslee, 2008 pp.429-430), was not challenged or rectified; the visible power
production decisions of corporations were not reversed because the invisible power
consumer choice discourse held that the production decisions simply reflected
consumer demand. Essentially, the eventual reform of CAFE standards internalised
within CAFE standards the decisions of corporations to exploit the “SUV loophole” in
the twenty years prior. Not only did it internalise those decisions, but it specifically
made provisions to accommodate (what had become) the dangerous over-reliance
of US automakers on profits from SUVs. As such, automakers were able, in the
1985-2009 period (between which no new fleet standards were set) to fundamentally
alter the “situation on the ground” and then use the modified status quo as a position
from which to negotiation changes.
There was, however, one possible major benefit in terms of oil dependence. EISA
2007 moved the responsibility for setting CAFE standards from Congress to the
executive, specifically to NHTSA. While Congress does retain the capacity to restrict
NHTSA funds, as in the 1995-2001 period, EISA 2007 mostly removes Congress as
a blocking mechanism to new CAFE standards; another 20 year debate will not need
to occur. After Bush postponed the finalisation of new standards, the Obama
administration has subsequently utilised the provisions of EISA 2007 to raise CAFE
standards higher than the Bush-era proposed standards (for MY2012 onwards).
Conclusions
As seen at the start of the formulation section, a GM Vice President, Thomas Davis
(2001), set out the interests of the Big Three automakers early on in the Bush
presidency;
“Any reform of CAFE would have to address the significant adverse
consequences of the current system, including the disparate impact on
domestic [and] foreign automakers…the adverse impact on driver and
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passenger safety; the opposition to natural market forces; the negative impact
on the consumer’s choice of vehicle; the encouragement to increase driving
by reduced mile per gallon costs…CAFE cannot be fixed by simply a simple
shift in the formula. CAFE is determined primarily by what people choose to
buy, and that choice reflects consumer needs.”
Each of these concerns, all of which are highly debatable, was carefully considered
when reforming CAFE, with many becoming central to the Bush-era debate and,
subsequently, included in the process of reforming CAFE standards. The result of
the inclusion of these issues, alongside many other factors, resulted in CAFE
reforms that paid inordinate attention to the interests of major automotive
corporations; the US auto corporations realised their interests to a large degree. In
the political arena, then, the corporations were not directly ruling, but formal power
was used to rule in the interests of the Big Three auto corporations.
The reasons for the power of the US automobile corporations in CAFE policy
evolution during the George W. Bush administrations are many and varied, with
events prior to the Bush-era having done the groundwork for Bush-era corporate
power. The most important mechanisms of influence wielded by the auto
corporations that set the stage for the Bush-era negotiations were production
decisions, Republican and auto-state politician support, and the establishment of
several CAFE-specific discourses through think-tanks. Through production decisions
the economic landscape that policy had to navigate was changed, with the large
increase in SUV sales eroding the spirit of CAFE standards. Republican and auto-
state politician support ensured a standstill in Congress that facilitated the continual
operation of the first mechanism. Finally, through think-tanks many of the discourses
– the safety argument, consumer choice and Jevons’ paradox – that were used to
good effect during the Bush period were provided.
These three mechanisms continued to work, alongside other mechanisms, in the
Bush period, as figure 5-4 illustrates.
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Figure 5-4: Mechanisms of Influence in CAFE Standards
Note: Green boxes refer to actions that were primarily taken by the automakers, blue to actions
primarily reliant on others/structural conditions and red to issues that were both structural/indirect and
involved actions by the automakers. The direct/indirect nature of a mechanism is not necessarily set,
with the revolving door, for instance, being both directly and indirectly used in the formulation stage,
but only indirectly in the implementation stage.
As figure 5-4 shows, corporate interests were represented during the Bush period in
a number of different ways. The most reliable of these mechanisms was
neoliberalism and the view of corporations as politico-economic experts. These
invisible power mechanisms were not issues the auto corporations had to work to
support, nor were they issues that were significantly debated. In contrast, other
discourses – the safety argument in particular – involved corporate action to a great
degree, as well as involving the support of other actors (auto-state politicians, NAS,
the media, think-tanks and NHTSA). In the formulation stage, the discursive
environment worked to paint CAFE standards as irrational, as dangerous, as against
freedom and not making economic sense; forcing proponents of CAFE to negotiate
some tricky political terrain and even internalise (or, at least, not challenge) some of
the discourses.
Other forms of power were also working in concert with the invisible power
discourses in the formulation stage. Through many hidden power mechanisms,
many of the invisible power discourses were strengthened both in terms of their
perceived legitimacy (such as in NAS’s gold-stamping of the safety argument) and
the extent of their dissemination to the public and policymakers – which the media,
think-tanks and the Coalition for Vehicle Choice all helped with. On the level of
visible power, auto-state politicians (also supported through campaign contributions)
were particularly active in taking measures that protected the auto industry (who also
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aggressively lobbied independently) from new CAFE standards for many years. In
2007, when external events weakened CAFE opposition, such actions were to prove
very useful in negotiating a compromise that the auto industry could support. The
formulation stage, then, saw a full spectrum of power mechanisms being deployed.
The implementation of CAFE standards, however, involved less visible power
mechanisms and more hidden power mechanisms than the formulation stage. This
situation was always likely as NHTSA’s rulemaking process is relatively protected
from political pressure – certainly in comparison to Congress. However, despite
NHTSA’s protection, the procedures adopted and the assumptions made ensured
the representation of the interests of the Big Three. This “organising in” of corporate
interests makes sense in terms of strongly embedded invisible power discourses,
most notably in the form of neoliberal support for cost-benefit analysis – which had
actually been legally embedded in the US government since President Reagan. One
other notable discourse that significantly effected NHTSA’s procedures (and which
the auto corporations sought to cultivate) was “sound science”, as it justified
approaches to understanding the world, such as cost-benefit analysis, that aim more
for precision than accuracy.
The end result of the operation of corporate power in the policy evolution of CAFE
standards was policy that prioritised corporate interests over national interests – that
prioritised corporate profits over beginning to deal with US oil dependence. Moreover,
the societal impact of the changes made during the Bush period were, at the end of
the Bush period, yet to be realised and are still subject to corporate power in the
marketplace and possible future renegotiation in the political arena.
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Chapter 6 – Hydrogen Dreams: The FreedomCAR
Partnership
“Hydrogen fuel cells represent one of the most encouraging, innovative technologies
of our era. And if you’re interested in our environment and if you’re interested in
doing what’s right for the American people, if you’re tired of the same old endless
struggles that seem to produce nothing but noise and high bills, let us promote
hydrogen fuel cells as a way to advance into the 21st century.”
President George W. Bush (2003a p.162)
Hydrogen fuel cell technology research was pursued by the George W. Bush
administration as a way to move America away from its situation of oil dependence
into a clean energy, post-petroleum future (Congress, 2003 p.3). Primarily, Bush
promoted hydrogen fuel cells through the Freedom Co-operative Automotive
Research (FreedomCAR) partnership, which saw the government partner a number
of corporations in directing and producing research. FreedomCAR directly replaced
Clinton’s hybrid-vehicle-focused Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles
(PNGV). Unlike CAFE and PNGV, which could only lessen US oil dependence,
FreedomCAR was ultimately intended to completely eliminate US oil dependence by
shifting the main automotive fuel from gasoline/diesel to hydrogen and creating a
hydrogen economy.
However, the FreedomCAR partnership was very poorly positioned to actually help
US oil dependence in the long term because of the inappropriateness of the
technology. In the short term, FreedomCAR may have even worsened US oil
dependence by drawing attention away from small incremental changes that were
possible in the present, such as CAFE, and from technologies with immediate
payoffs, such as hybrids. One of the main reasons FreedomCAR was so poorly
positioned to help oil dependence is that the partnership was attentive more to
corporate interests than to achieving its professed goal.
As such, this chapter explains the extent and methods of the influence of major
corporations in the formulation, execution and outcomes of the FreedomCAR
partnership, and explores the consequent capacity of the partnership to deal with oil
dependence. In order to do so, the first section of this chapter gives the technological
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and historical background to hydrogen fuel cell policy and covers the possible
benefits, and problems, with a hydrogen system. The second section considers the
FreedomCAR partnership directly; looking first at its predecessor – the Partnership
for a New Generation of Vehicles – before considering how the FreedomCAR
partnership was created, what goals the partnership was set and how the
partnership operated. The third section explores what the FreedomCAR partnership
has achieved, what it is ultimately able to achieve and its impact on oil dependence.
Finally, this chapter summarises its contents and offers conclusions.
Like in the previous chapter, the evolution of the policy is explored for the
mechanisms of influence identified in chapter three. However, the particular
mechanisms discussed in this case study are somewhat different because
FreedomCAR policy evolution took place in different arenas than CAFE standards. In
this chapter, for instance, production decisions taken by the automakers, the
expansion of private authority, and direct negotiation with the government are major
sources of the corporations’ capacity to realise their interests; visible power is much
more prevalent in this case study than in CAFE, where many more hidden power
mechanisms were seen. By exploring the power of corporations in the creation and
workings of a public-private partnership that had little congressional oversight, this
chapter adds to the previous chapter and jointly show a broad picture of some of the
locations within the political system that corporate power can operate in. As such,
this chapter plays an important role in helping to understand, in contrast to the
majority of interest group literature, corporate power outside of Congress and outside
of the more observable parts of the political arena.
Background
Technological Background
Hydrogen is the most abundant element in the universe and the lightest, and
smallest, element in the periodic table. Combustible at room temperature, there is a
long history of research into utilising hydrogen as an automotive fuel. Research into
hydrogen has explored two main methods of using hydrogen as a fuel for
automobiles – burning it in an internal combustion engine (ICE), or using it in a fuel
cell to produce electricity that powers an electric engine. While there has been some
interest in the hydrogen ICE – particularly by BMW and Mazda – the main research
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focus has been on improving fuel cells for vehicles and, indeed, improvements to
fuel cells were the main aim of the FreedomCAR partnership.
Hydrogen fuel cells have a long history. The invention of the fuel cell can be traced
to Christian Friedrich Schonbein, who uncovered the principles underlying fuel cells
in 1838, and William Grove, who made the first working model in 1839 (Hoffmann,
2002 ch.7). While there are several different configurations of fuel cells,
FreedomCAR was specifically based on improving the proton exchange membrane
(PEM) fuel cell. A PEM hydrogen fuel cell consists of a PEM that separates an
anode made of platinum from a cathode. It works by the hydrogen entering the cell at
the anode, where the platinum works to catalyse a reaction that splits the hydrogen
into negatively-charged electrons and positively-charged hydrogen protons. While
both the hydrogen protons and electrons are drawn to the cathode, the PEM only
allows the protons to travel to the cathode. Instead, to reach the cathode, the
electrons flow round an external circuit (i.e. a current is produced), where they power
attached devices (an engine in the case of a vehicle). At the cathode, oxygen from
air is catalysed and combines both with the hydrogen protons and electrons,
producing water and some heat. As each fuel cell only produces a low voltage in
order to produce sufficient energy to power a vehicle they are stacked together in a
series.
HFCs, then, operate as a generator of electricity – you put fuel in, you get energy out.
In this role, HFCs have been used for a wide variety of applications – as back-up
generators in hospitals, for example – and have the potential for use in many more
situations. Most notably, hydrogen fuel cells were used as a source of energy – and
drinking water – in the Apollo and Gemini missions (Foley, 2001 p.16). When used
for vehicles, HFCs operate in much the same way as a battery in that they work as a
source of electrical energy used to power an electric motor. There is, in fact, a broad
degree of cross compatibility between the technology within a hydrogen fuel cell car
and an entirely electric car because in a HFC vehicle, with the exception of the fuel
cell and fuel tank, all the components are electrical. Hence, hydrogen fuel cell
vehicles can be classed as a form of electric car.66
66 Interview with Congressional Staffer, 9th June 2011.
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There are two main advantages of a hydrogen economy and HFC cars. The first
advantage is that hydrogen is politically uncontrollable. Unlike oil, hydrogen cannot
be controlled by a small group of nations because it is not located within a small
geographical territory. In fact, there are no reserves of pure hydrogen on Earth
(Holland and Provenzano, 2008 p.12). Instead of tapping such reserves for use in
HFCs and a hydrogen economy hydrogen has to be produced using other sources of
energy. As such, hydrogen is not a source of energy it is an energy carrier (Romm,
2004 p.x) – much like electricity – and can be produced anywhere in the world. The
second advantage is that “cars that run on hydrogen fuel produce only water, not
exhaust fumes” (Bush, 2003a p.162). A move to hydrogen, then, would see an
improvement in the health of citizens – particularly inner city residents – as
emissions of gasoline-based exhaust, and the pollutants contained in that exhaust,
are eliminated. Furthermore, hydrogen, if produced from renewable energy sources,
would also eliminate CO2 emissions and substantially reduce the American
contribution to global warming (Scott and Hafele, 1990).
However, despite the potential for a hydrogen economy to provide an emission-free
and post-fossil system, a hydrogen economy needs to overcome a series of issues
to realise these advantages. The first issue is that, because hydrogen is an energy
carrier rather than an energy source, other fuels must be used to produce hydrogen.
Currently, there are two main ways in which hydrogen is produced: reforming of
natural gas or electrolysis of water (Little, 2002). Reforming natural gas, which is the
current dominant method of producing hydrogen, unavoidably produces CO2
emissions, utilises fossil fuels and, in the process, loses some of the energy
contained within the gas. In contrast, electrolysis of water can be emission-free, but
only if the source of the electricity is renewable. As only 14.3% of US electricity is
currently renewably created, to manufacture emission-free and post-fossil hydrogen
requires a massive switch to the use of renewables in the electricity production
system. Furthermore, because producing hydrogen would entail an increased
demand for electricity, a large increase in the size and production capacity of the
electricity production system would also have to occur for a hydrogen economy to
realise its potential benefits.
Second, the implementation of HFC cars would require the overhaul of the entire
gasoline-distribution infrastructure and of the privately-owned vehicle stock. This
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overhaul would require a substantial investment of resources that, for the majority of
the investment, must come from individuals and companies. This second issue has
been labelled the “chicken and egg” problem in that there is an issue as to what
comes first – the infrastructure to fuel the cars and allow them to run, or the HFC car
owners who would buy the fuel to make the creation of the infrastructure worthwhile.
As neither companies nor individuals would be willing to spend their money on
infrastructure that they are unable to use or profit from extensive government
intervention would be required. Moreover, unlike existing gasoline infrastructure,
which evolved slowly and spread over a century, this hydrogen infrastructure would
have to be built very quickly (Pfeffier, 2006) to compete with the gasoline
infrastructure in terms of scope of coverage, cost and convenience.
Third, the cost of hydrogen vehicle technology is very high, particularly in
comparison to oil-based technologies. As a replacement technology in a market
system, hydrogen vehicle technology needs to be cost-competitive with gasoline-ICE
technology so that the average consumer would be willing to purchase it. However,
ICE technology has had a century to bring costs down and so the cost of HFC
vehicles is very high, comparatively speaking. While the cost is not often publically
revealed, in 2002 Honda’s lead fuel cell engineer said that it would take at least ten
years to bring the sticker price of a HFC vehicle down to $100,000 (Dawson, 2002).
Likewise, Geoffrey Ballard, founder of Ballard Systems – a leading fuel cell company
– said that “The family-owned, garaged vehicle is the last vehicle that’s going to get
a fuel cell. Fuel cells are still 30 times the cost of what they need to be for the
automotive market” (as quoted in Romm, 2004 p.189).
Finally, it is relatively hard to contain, transport and store hydrogen because it is the
smallest atom on the periodic table, is a gas over a wide range of temperatures67
and is very reactive. The small size and reactivity of hydrogen means that it
embrittles, weakens and can fracture many metals over time (particularly high-
strength ones (Campbell, 2003)) as the hydrogen atoms can diffuse through the
metal and combine with the metal to form hydrides within the metal. The diffusion of
hydrogen atoms through metal also means that the amount of stored hydrogen can
decrease over time. Additionally, due to its small size and gaseous form, hydrogen
has a far lower energy density than natural gas or gasoline and so, to contain the
67 It becomes a liquid at -253 degrees Celsius, which is 20 degrees above absolute zero.
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same amount of energy within a fuel tank requires either a substantially larger fuel
tank or the pressurisation of hydrogen68, with pressurisation requiring further energy
(and cost) expenditure on top of the production of hydrogen.
As such, research into hydrogen and HFCs has sought to overcome many and
varying technical problems, particularly regarding costs and storage. Nevertheless,
while hydrogen may have the potential to be a panacea for many societal problems,
significant uncertainties exist about the potential solutions to the technical problems,
the timeframe for overcoming these problems and the timeframe for
commercialisation of hydrogen technology. Indeed, “although fuel cells seem like a
twenty-first-century marvel, they are a nineteenth-century invention” (Romm, 2004
p.35) that is not currently competitive with alternative technologies despite two
hundred years of research.
Policy History
Apart from some military experiments with hydrogen as a fuel, the US government
and the US auto companies were not interested in hydrogen research until after the
1973 oil shock (Foley, 2001 p.15). The events of 1973 provided the impetus to
consider alternatives to gasoline and fossil fuels more generally. Optimism about the
potential for a hydrogen economy was high and it began to register in the political
world, with President Carter’s inauguration parade involving a hydrogen-ICE Cadillac.
Federal research money, following Europe and Japan’s lead, began to flow towards
exploring a new hydrogen economy – with $24 million budgeted for hydrogen
research by the US government in 1978 (Hoffmann, 2002 p.42).
Yet this period proved to be a false dawn of a hydrogen age. Initial expectations of
hydrogen’s implementation timeline were not met. Moreover, with the initial optimism
in the research community fading and with the price of oil dropping, governments
started decreasing funding for research. In the US the decrease was particularly
sharp as the Reagan administration, in part of a wider move placing renewable
energy and environmental concerns on the back burner, slashed hydrogen research
budgets (Hoffmann, 2002 p.45). Hydrogen funding continued to decline through the
1980s, despite repeated attempts by Representative George Brown (D-CA) and
Senator Spark Matsunaga (D-HI) to pass a hydrogen research bill. The low point in
68 Other method for increasing the energy density, and allowing the storage, of hydrogen, such as
metal hydrides, are currently in the experimental research stage.
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hydrogen research funding was reached in financial year 1988, when the
Department of Energy’s (DOE) hydrogen research budget was a mere $1 million.
However, the Spark M. Matsunaga Hydrogen Research Development and
Demonstration Act of 1990, named in his honour after his death, established greater
funding for hydrogen research. In 1992 it authorised $3 million, in 1993 $7 million
and in 1994 $10 million (Cannon, 1994 p.907). About half of the funds within these
years were dedicated to researching materials and methods for storing hydrogen.
The Matsunaga act also established the Hydrogen Technical Advisory Panel (HTAP),
whose purpose was to evaluate the research progress of hydrogen technology and
advise, and make recommendations to, the Secretary of Energy (HTAP, 1999 p.7).
The Matsunaga act was followed by the 1996 Hydrogen Future Act, which further
increased funding by $5 million per year, to a 2001 total of $40 million (Congress,
1996). It was around this time that some automakers started paying greater attention
to hydrogen research, with a 1997 newspaper article noting “Chrysler, GM, Toyota
and Mercedes-Benz are the heavy hitters” (Tuckey, 1997). The Hydrogen Future Act
also required the Secretary of Energy (in effect, HTAP (Department of Energy, 2011))
to produce a report to Congress on the status, progress and potential of the existing
hydrogen research policy by 1999. This 1999 Congressional Report was highly
optimistic about hydrogen’s near-term prospects, claiming that “the automobile
industry is expected to be producing commercial buses by 2002 and tens of
thousands of cars annually by 2004” (Department of Energy, 1999 p.ii); the latter
claim seemingly based on GM, which had committed itself to a 2004 deadline for the
commercialisation of hydrogen cars (ibid. p.1).
One reason for GM and other automakers moving towards hydrogen was California’s
Air Resource Board’s (CARB) Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate. Part of an
effort to reduce air pollution, and using California’s special provisions under the
Clean Air Act, the aggressive 1990 mandate required the major carmakers to sell an
increasing percentage of ZEVs – starting at 2% (of the 1992 total of 1.2 million) in
1998 and up to 10% in 2003 (Larrue, 2003 p.6). Failure to meet the required number
would be met with a $5,000 fine per vehicle below their quota (Collantes, 2006 p.23).
The Clean Air Act’s provision also allowed other state to adopt California’s standards,
nine of which voluntarily did and three, having existing laws that linked their clean air
standards to California’s, automatically did. The three states who automatically
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adopted the mandate – Massachusetts, New York and Vermont – combined with
California accounted for 18% of the US automotive market in 2000 (Larrue, 2003
p.6).
Not happy with the mandate (Collantes, 2006 p.93), the US and Japanese
automakers repeatedly lobbied against it at CARB’s biennial reviews of the program
(Brown, 2001 p.59). Indeed “major players in the auto and oil industries lobbied
aggressively against the mandate from its inception, going so far as to publicize
inflated EV price quotes to stimulate public opposition to the mandate” (ibid. p.59). In
1996 they successfully argued that the technology was not advanced enough to
meet a 2% sale requirement. Despite public opposition to changing the mandate,
CARB discarded the 1998 figure. In its place would be a public demonstration
program of ZEVs and a requirement to create ZEVs in line with public demand,
although the 2003 10% requirement remained. These new “market-based” (Larrue,
2003 p.13) requirements were established in confidential memoranda of agreement
that were negotiated by CARB with each automaker. The spin-off of this approach
was that the twelve other states that had adopted California’s clean air regulation
could no longer enforce the old requirements, and could not enact the new
requirements as they were done informally and outside the Clean Air Act.
The public demonstration program saw the automakers try to satisfy the ZEV
mandate in California with battery-electric vehicles; producing and leasing 5,000
electric cars between them. However, two interlinked arguments soon became
prominent in the automakers protestations about the ZEV mandate and having to
fulfil it with electric cars. First, automakers claimed that the technology was not yet
sufficiently developed, reflected in the 100-mile range of most of the cars and the 30
per cent greater cost than conventional cars (Mann, 2000). Second, in light of these
problems, automakers argued that public demand was non-existent and that CARB
was trying to get the automakers to do the impossible – to sell something no-one
wanted to buy. Such arguments pushed CARB to further reconsider its policy and its
view of battery technology.
At the same time as CARB was reconsidering its ZEV mandate, it set up, with the
California Energy Commission and six private business – DaimlerChrysler, Ford
Motor Company, BP, Shell Hydrogen, ChevronTexaco and Ballard Power Systems –
the California Fuel Cell Partnership (CaFCP). By 2000 this partnership had
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expanded to include GM, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Volkswagen and Hyundai. The
CaFCP sought to promote hydrogen technology and started to build hydrogen
fuelling stations in California in 1999. So, when Bush came to power, California was
pushing non-oil vehicle technologies and, due to continuing problems with battery
electrics, was also displaying increased interest in hydrogen fuel cell vehicles.
Alongside California’s ZEV mandate and the Matsunga funds was a more general
vehicle technologies program that also, but not primarily, researched HFCs for
transport. On the 29th September 1993, President Clinton and the CEOs of the Big
Three automakers announced the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles
(PNGV). PNGV formally operated as a partnership between the federal government
(including eight executive agencies), and the US Council for Automotive Research
(USCAR, a company set up by Chrysler, Ford and GM that facilitates co-operation
and joint research). The PNGV was established with three main goals. The first goal
was to improve manufacturing techniques so as to minimize costs, improve
productivity, reduce environmental impacts and improve product quality. The second
goal was to incorporate already developed and developing technologies within
commercially-available vehicles. The third goal, which received the most press, was
the goal of creating a “supercar” family sedan that would run at three times the mpg
of the 1994 average sedan, which had been 26.6 mpg. This third goal had a timeline
of identifying the most fruitful technology by 1997, building a concept car by 2000
and a production prototype by 2004. Commercial production was assumed to take
place 3 to 5 years after the production prototype, although no concrete requirement
for the production of vehicles was included.
The Partnership was headed by Vice President Al Gore and operated by both the
corporations and government funding research at the National Laboratories and
Universities, with the corporations also conducting some research in-house. There
was a notional 50/50 split on research funding between the corporations and
government, although the split was not monitored (Wells, 2002 p.1). On the
government side, funding for the PNGV came from “channelling existing funding”
(Kildee, 2000 H4439) from a number of government agencies – Department of
Commerce, DOE, DOT, EPA and National Science Foundation (Yacobucci, 2003 p.2)
– rather than being a new request from Congress. While the most fruitful technology
identified by the PNGV for building the supercars was diesel hybrid ICEs, PNGV also
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contained government funding – amounting to $33 million (26% of the annual total)
in FY1999 (Dicks, 2000 H4441) for hydrogen fuel cells.
The forming of the partnership was largely motivated, on both sides, by previous
attempts at government regulation of the auto industry. So, “the primary motivation of
the [automotive] industry was to avoid federally mandated fuel efficiency and
emissions standards” (Chapman, 1998 p.9) and to sidestep regulatory issues by
utilising leapfrog technology to make regulations moot (Wald, 1993). On the
administrative side, having seen the fractious relationship that previous
administrations had with the automotive industry and the political power exercised by
the automotive industry, there was an attempt to replace “lawyers with engineers”
(Wald, 1993) by President Clinton. The desire to transform the relationship between
the automakers and the government can be seen in President Clinton announcing
that the PNGV
“represents a major step in breaking down the decades of mistrust between
the federal government and the Big 3 over fuel economy, emissions, and
safety issues. Whether a new car is invented or not, the agreement will break
down the wasteful gridlock over regulation of the automobile industry” (Gates,
1993).
The PNGV also bolstered Vice President Gore’s environmental credentials and, in its
inception, was also supported by environmental groups.
However, by 1997 the Big Three were reluctant to expend resources on developing
their concept prototype. Vice-President Al Gore met with the CEOs of the Big Three
to discuss why they were dragging their heels (Hais and Winograd, 2009). Their
response was that they were making their profits from SUVs, not cars and that
PNGV did not reflect this shift in the market. In response, Gore offered not to pursue
increased emission standards
“if the car companies would join in expanding the scope of the PNGV plan to
include SUVs, the very product they said the marketplace was asking for.
Gore suggested each company produce a concept SUV by 2002 and three
production prototypes by 2006, capable of getting 80 mpg. He also suggested
they advance the mass production goal for cars to 2002 by deploying a 60
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mpg five passenger sedan in 2002 rather than waiting for an 80 mpg version
in 2004” (ibid.).
Gore’s compromise, however, was rejected, with USCAR instead announcing that
''some new technologies that might be specific'' to SUVs were now being considered
as part of PNGV (Loveless, 1999).
While displaying lukewarm support for PNGV in this instance, autocompanies (and
their supporters) would demonstrate their commitment to the partnership when it was
threatened in Congress in 2000. The only power Congress had over the partnership
was to stop the funding of the partnership. On 14 June 2000, in the FY2001 budget
request, members of the House tried to utilise this power by tabling an amendment
to redistribute PNGV’s funding. Arguing that PNGV amounted to “corporate welfare”
for profitable companies (Sununu, 2000 H4438), House Republicans sought to zero
PNGV’s budget (Behrens, 2000). The move was supported by an “unusual” (ibid.)
coalition of environmental groups – Ralph Nader groups, Sierra Club and Friends of
the Earth – and “fiscally responsible” groups – Citizens against Government Waste
and the National Taxpayers Union.
Successful in the House by a narrow margin, the amendment galvanised Dingell and
other Michigan Representatives in “leading the effort” to reinstate PNGV funding in
the House bill. Likewise, auto companies came out in support of PNGV saying that
they were “disappointed” in the decision and that it was based upon “limited
information” (Behrens, 2000) and indicating that they had substantially exceeded a
50/50 split in funding, having spent $980 million a year on “PNGV-related
research”.69 While the amendment was successful in the House, Senate support for
the Partnership meant that funding was reinstated in final conference and PNGV
survived (Yacobucci, 2003 p.6).
The FreedomCAR Partnership
“We have a chance to move beyond the environmental debates of the past, debates
that centered around regulation and lawsuit -- what I like to call the command and
control era of environmental policy, where all wisdom that seemed to emanate out of
69 The $980 million figure, which was echoed in both Congress and the media, was indicated to be
“highly subjective” by a National Research Council review of PNGV as most of the funding was spent
on the development of “propriety product plans” (National Research Council, 2001, p.10).
Hydrogen Dreams: The FreedomCAR Partnership
184
Washington, D.C. where things got hamstrung and stuck because lawyers got more
involved in the process than the people on the front lines of actually improving our
environment. We can move beyond that through technology”
George W. Bush (2003b)
Short Chronology
2001: Bush aims to trim PNGV
2001: Hydrogen fuel cells endorsed in the Cheney report
2002: FreedomCAR – a government partnership with GM, Chrysler and Ford using
PNGV funding – announced
2003: FreedomFuel – a government partnership with ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips,
Chevron, BP and Shell Hydrogen – added to FreedomCAR
2004: California shifts focus from electric vehicles to hydrogen vehicles
2004: House Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Caucus formed
2005: First National Academy of Sciences (2005 p.97) study on FreedomCAR
reports “it is [not] appropriate or useful at this time to speculate on the probability of
this program achieving its long-term vision”
2008: DTE Energy (Detroit) and Southern California Edison added to partnership
2010: Final National Academy of Sciences (2010 p.135) study reports “there remain
very formidable barriers to the mass-production of affordable hydrogen and fuel-cell-
powered vehicles”
Formulation
While there was some federal interest in hydrogen fuel cell technology when
President Bush came to power in 2001 it was not the main priority of government
research programmes. Instead, vehicle technology research, in the form of the
PNGV, was focused on improving gas-electric hybrid vehicles. Despite having
detractors, PNGV was positively viewed in its final NAS review as having overcome
“many challenges and [having] forged a useful and productive partnership of industry
and government participants” (National Research Council, 2001 p.2). PNGV had
partially achieved some of its aims and was also viewed as being on track to achieve
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its three stated goals. The first goal, to improve manufacturing processes, saw “a
wide array of manufacturing issues [being] addressed” (ibid. p.2) which had reduced
costs and improved recyclability of materials (Yacobucci, 2003 p.4). The second goal,
to introduce technologies into commercially-available vehicles, had also produced
clear outcomes – with greater use of lightweight materials and improved combustion
technologies being reported in automaker vehicles (National Research Council, 2001
pp.2-3).
With the third goal, the Big Three had largely succeeded in reaching the 2000 interim
goal of producing a concept family sedan that had triple the efficiency of the 1994
average, and were also on target to introduce production prototypes by 2004
(Government Accountability Office, 2000 p.32). GM produced the “Precept” rated at
80 mpg, DaimlerChrysler made the “Dodge ESX3” rated at 72 mpg and Ford created
the “Prodigy”, which was rated at 70 mpg (ibid. pp.32-35). These vehicles all
maintained “the same emissions and safety standards [as current cars] without
sacrificing performance, utility, or affordability” (ibid. p.32). GM also offered a version
of the car (the Precept FCEV) that utilised a fuel cell as a “sexy alternative”.70 While
never put into full production, DaimlerChrysler’s estimated that its ESX3 prototype
would have cost $7,500 more than a conventional car of equivalent size (Mateja,
2000).
However, despite its successes and despite automaker support during possible
Congressional cuts, the Bush administration, in consultation with the automakers,
quickly moved to redevelop the PNGV, and change the nature of the partnership. On
April 9th 2001, the former Michigan Senator and then current Secretary of Energy71,
Spencer Abraham, said that PNGV’s “direction is inconsistent with where the market
is headed and where the automakers are headed” (Stoffer and Stoll, 2001) and, in
agreement with the automakers, decided to trim the budget of the PNGV (Behrens,
2001a). Echoing the automakers’ arguments in their 1997 meeting with Gore,
Abraham stated that the direction in which the market was heading was SUVs.
Moreover, the Bush administration was not convinced of hydrogen technology;
initially wanting to cut the FY2002 hydrogen research budget by 48% (Department of
Energy, 2001a p.14) before introducing last minute changes (Department of Energy,
70 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011.
71 Abraham was an interesting choice for Secretary of Energy, considering that as a Senator he had
cosponsored a bill to abolish the Department of Energy (Abraham and Tucker, 2010 p.xii).
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2001b) to be more in line with the evolving position of the NEPDG as they developed
the Cheney report (Department of Energy, 2001a p.16).
During this period, the American automakers were clear that they were heading
towards focusing on hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. General Motors, building on its
PreceptFCEV, had already signalled that hydrogen-based technology was the only
way forward. In a Senate committee hearing on CAFE standards Thomas Davis, a
Vice President of GM, stated that “as a company, we are committed to be the leader
in new technologies to meet the energy, environmental and economic challenges of
the 21st century...We see the ultimate vision for sustainable energy future in vehicles
powered by hydrogen fuel cells” (Davis, 2001 pp.40-41). Likewise, in the same
hearing, Ford's Susan Cischke, talked of hydrogen as “one of the most promising
long-term technologies [that] offers the hope of breakthrough fuel economy
improvements” as a range of technologies that Ford were pursuing (Cischke, 2001
p.47). While Cischke did mention hydrogen during a debate on CAFE standards,
Davis more overtly displayed GM’s position in saying that “CAFE is actually an
obstacle to the realization of this [hydrogen economy] vision” (Davis, 2001 p.41); the
argument being that
“we are investing significant engineering resources to create a completely
revolutionary technical capability. A near-term shift in CAFE policy pulls
engineering resources back to the incremental advancements in internal
combustion engine systems and through reductions in vehicle power, weight,
and size” (ibid. p.41).
At this point, then, investment in hydrogen, in return for a freeze in CAFE, is what the
automakers were pushing for; they wanted to further delay the point at which they
moved away from the current technological set up. They were also deploying several
mechanisms of influence in order to push the US towards a hydrogen policy. In
terms of visible power, the automakers were taking production decisions in line with
their preferences, which saw them reject hybrids and embrace hydrogen. Likewise,
in terms of hidden power, the auto corporations had worked to establish hydrogen as
the dominant alternative fuel technology and successfully focused the debate on
hydrogen, with the CaFCP and the “sexy alternative” Precept FCEV as good
examples of these actions. These two manifestations of power were backed up by
the invisible-power supported view of the auto corporations as the politico-economic
Hydrogen Dreams: The FreedomCAR Partnership
187
expert; the auto corporations were seen to be the best, and most informed, decision
maker in terms of what vehicles technology to pursue because of their position in the
market and were invited into policymaking spaces to give their views on such
matters.
Yet Big Three decisions were not made in a vacuum. Beyond the US, German and
Japanese automakers had also begun investing in hydrogen research as the
hydrogen push became global. Optimism was high worldwide within the industry,
with Honda saying it would sell HFC vehicles by 2003 (Nauman, 2000), GM
predicting in 2000 that by 2010 10% of its global sales would be HFC vehicles which
would rise to 25% in 2025 (Parry, 2000) and BMW predicting that half the vehicles it
would produce in 2020 would be HFC vehicles. Competition within the automotive
sector over this issue was based on a desire to be first, set the standard and
“intimidate your competitors” (Hughes, 1997). Moreover, following the automotive
companies, oil companies – such as BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Shell and
ExxonMobil – began investing in hydrogen and setting up subsidiary companies to
produce hydrogen.
However, the move to focusing on hydrogen and the explosion in enthusiasm was at
odds with the state of hydrogen research at the time. In the PNGV “the original
targets for 2000 for the fuel cell system were not met” which meant “that the dates
for meeting these targets [need to] be extended substantially” (National Research
Council, 2001 p.9). Similarly, it also showed little awareness of, or reflection on,
previous extensions of the HFC research timeframe, particularly from the hydrogen
experiments in the 1970s. However, because of the status of the auto corporations
as experts on the state of automotive research and the vehicle market, this
dissonance between the state of the research and corporate pronouncements could
not be, and was not, challenged effectively.
As such, following the renewed hydrogen optimism President Bush’s administration
endorsed hydrogen in the Cheney Report (the creation of which, as the previous
chapter explained, involved the automanufacturers and oil companies) and then
moved to work with the automakers to re-shape the PNGV so as to create a
hydrogen future. On the 9th January 2002, surrounded by fuel cell concept cars and
high-ranking individuals from the Big Three, Spencer Abraham formally announced
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the FreedomCAR partnership.72 Like PNGV, it focused on conducting precompetitive
research that would accelerate the adoption of advanced vehicle technologies, but,
unlike PNGV, would also advance the development of technologies required to
create a hydrogen infrastructure. Joined by Senator Carl Levin, and other Michigan
Congressmen, who stated that the Michigan delegation was “delighted” by the
announcement and that the partnership represented “an alternative to federal
mandates”73 (Levin, 2002), Abraham claimed that PNGV was reformed because it
“wasn’t moving a competitive automobile to the showroom” (Abraham, 2002).
Likewise, following Senator Levin, automakers were quick to stress how their co-
operative approach related to regulation, with Will Boddie, a Ford Vice President,
talking of Ford’s commitment “to take significant environmental actions on our
vehicles before regulation requires it” (Boddie, 2002). Spencer Abraham echoed this
view, saying that “addressing our energy problems need not be a matter of
tremendous hardship for small, incremental gains…We have within our reach the
capability to leapfrog those problems with a wholly new approach to energy”
(Schmidt, 2003). There was thus acceptance of the CAFE Hydrogen trade-off
agenda by the executive, which occurred after several confidential meetings
between representatives of both.
Although details about measurable goals and funding were limited at first,
FreedomCAR’s objectives emerged a month after Abraham’s announcement at a
House Science Committee hearing. The specific goals announced, which were
agreed between the DOE and the auto industry (Culver, 2002 p.40), concerned
meeting technical requirements for HFC components by 2010 and 2015. For
example, one goal was “fuel cell systems, including a fuel reformer, having a peak
brake engine efficiency of 45 percent, and that meet or exceed emissions standards
with a cost target of $45/kW by 2010 and $30/kW in 2015” (Garman, 2002 p.40).
More generally, however, the long-term aims of FreedomCAR were to give citizens
72 A FreedomCAR document (FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership, 2006 p.iii) clarifies the meaning of
the partnership as “not a legal entity and it is not intended that the “partners” have the responsibilities
or rights of legal partners. Rather, everywhere that “Partnership” and “partners” are used it is used in
an informal sense to denote participants working together towards the stated goals of the group.”
73 Senator Levin went on to say that “we could not have a better break here than to have Spencer
Abraham, who knows the auto industry, comes from Michigan, whose family has been so much
involved in producing automobiles from the ground up. We are lucky to have Spencer Abraham in
charge of this program.”
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“Freedom from petroleum dependence; Freedom from pollutant
emissions; Freedom for Americans to choose the kind of vehicle they want to
drive, and to drive where they want, when they want; and Freedom to obtain
fuel affordably and conveniently” (Garman, 2002).
While the headline-grabbing part of FreedomCAR was the move to hydrogen74, the
partnership did continue research into other drivetrains (hybrids, full electrics, etc).
As with PNGV, commercialisation was left entirely to the automakers
“just as soon as the market case can be made for them. They don't have to
wait for the hydrogen infrastructure. They don't have to wait for the fuel cell.
As soon as these improvements are available, they will be available for the
automakers to put into the cars to improve their performance” (Garman, 2002
p.129).
Yet the initial lack of information on the FreedomCAR partnership, combined with
rhetoric of having a bold new hydrogen vision but also continuing research into
hybrids, led to some confusion about the FreedomCAR partnership. Representative
Boehlert (R-NY), speaking in the hearing when the goals were announced said that
“the Department of Energy has oscillated between describing the program as a
radical departure from PNGV and as its logical continuation” (Boehlert, 2002 p.16).
These two distinct ways of describing the partnership continued to both be deployed
throughout the early years of FreedomCAR, even though the “transition was pretty
seamless”75 between PNGV and FreedomCAR.
Similarly, confusion was caused by the Bush administration funding for
FreedomCAR and their apparent flip-flopping on the issue of PNGV. As Automotive
News (Stoffer, 2001) put it:
“the administration came to office 17 months ago calling the Clinton-era
partnership misguided, unaccountable and bloated. A year later it proposed to
spend about the same amount of money with the same industry partners”.
Initially, funds for FreedomCAR were simply transferred from PNGV and continued
at the same level as before, although with the funding emphasis moving from hybrids
to HFCs (Yacobucci, 2008 p.2). These funds were then enhanced in Bush’s 2003
74 Recorded interview with GM, NAS and FreedomCAR Engineer, 19th April 2011.
75 Recorded interview with GM, NAS and FreedomCAR Engineer, 19th April 2011.
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State of the Union – a year after the announcement of FreedomCAR – as he
requested a $1.2 billion increase over five years in funding for hydrogen research so
that “America can lead the world in developing clean, hydrogen-powered
automobiles”. Consistent with Bush’s promise and the shift in emphasis of the
vehicle technologies partnerships, around 70% of the total FreedomCAR expenditure
was on HFC technology (National Academy of Sciences, 2010 p.145).
Beyond the switch in research from hybrids to hydrogen and the expansion of the
partnership budget, the main feature that changed in the move from PNGV to
FreedomCAR was the lack of any set commercialisation timeframe. Instead of a
commercialisation goal or any joint partnership requirements, the decision was left to
the individual companies “depending upon establishment of viable business cases”
(FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership, 2006 p.iv). According to a provision of the
partnership agreed between the auto companies and the government, a “business
case” meant that “all new vehicle and fuels options, including hydrogen, have to be
cost-competitive with current vehicle and fuels options, including gasoline and diesel”
(ibid. p.10). Thus, the PNGV to FreedomCAR change saw a move from trying to
reduce the cost of vehicles that were $7,500 more expensive than normal (as the
Chrysler ESX3 was reported to be), to attempting to decrease the cost of vehicles
that were 30 times the price of a conventional car.
Following this increase in the cost-reduction goal was an increased timeframe for
expected commercialisation. PNGV’s commercialisation of high-mpg vehicles was
meant to occur between 2004 and 2007. Instead, DOE’s projection of the future
became:
“By 2020, vehicles are available that double fuel economy at an incremental
cost that is paid back within three years through fuel cost savings; by 2030,
affordable hydrogen vehicle technology options are widely available for
Americans” (DOE Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 2002 p.5).
Essentially, then, the utilisation of currently available technology was left to the
automakers and the focus of the partnership became a technical leapfrogging of the
status quo (with no requirements on commercialisation because of the uncertainty
surrounding the technology readiness date) rather than on mandated gradual
improvements to existing technology.
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As such, the move against PNGV was driven by both industry and the executive
branch. Industry, while liking the partnership (seen in their defence of the PNGV in
2000) as it provided cover for CAFE intransigence and provided them with positive
environmental credentials, did not want to be bound by regulations, goals and
requirements, which was their long-standing political position. 76 The executive
position was somewhat more complex. Initially, the administration sought to cut the
budget as part of a wider move to trim spending across government. However, over
the course of several months where the government communicated intensely with
the auto industry, the Bush administration switched to putting forward a positive
vision of energy and environmental policy and, standing alongside industry, invested
in the idea of a hydrogen economy. Such inconsistency in the Bush administration’s
continually-evolving position on hydrogen can be seen in the fact that Spencer
Abraham had justified getting rid of PNGV because, as noted above, it “wasn’t
moving a competitive automobile to the showroom” (Abraham, 2002) and then
replaced it with a new partnership that had a twenty year minimum before it would
deliver a vehicle to a showroom.
While the operation of mechanisms of corporate influence and power in this situation
are difficult to isolate due to the secrecy of the meetings and negotiations, one major
mechanism appears to be the inviting of the corporations to exclusive policy-making
spaces; perhaps due a combination of hidden and invisible power in the form of
interpersonal relations and the view of the auto corporations as the appropriate and
legitimate politico-economic experts. In particular, the NEPDG and the collaboration
between Michigan members of Congress, the auto corporations and the Secretary of
Energy are the most documentable instances of the operation of this mechanism.
Regardless as to the nature of its genesis, the FreedomCAR partnership became an
important policy of the Bush government. In fact, the increase in the cost of oil
throughout the Bush presidency added emphasis to Bush’s promotion of the
FreedomCAR partnership; as did the solidification of the scientific consensus, and
world public opinion, on global warming. As part of its growing importance in
September 2003 the FreedomCAR partnership was formally expanded to the
FreedomCAR and FreedomFuel partnership. Utilising $720 million of the $1.2 billion
76 Recorded Interview with a former Auto Engineer for US and Japanese Auto Companies, 25th April
2011.
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announced in the 2003 State of the Union (Cole, 2003), the purpose of FreedomFuel
was to “improve efficiency, lower emissions and lower the cost of technologies that
produce hydrogen from natural gas” (Behrens, 2001b). It also had to develop, reduce
the cost of, and demonstrate, hydrogen refuelling infrastructure, as the cost of
installing hydrogen dispensing equipment at just one fuel station was around
$500,000-$1,000,000 (Stoffer and Truett, 2003). In order to achieve these goals,
ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, BP and Shell Hydrogen joined the partnership.
Like the auto companies, although to a lesser extent, these companies had
conducted some research on hydrogen prior to FreedomCAR – with GM and
ExxonMobil collaborating to produce an onboard gasoline-to-hydrogen processor in
2000 (Ogden, 2002 p.15).
That two of the oil companies were foreign is particularly noteworthy. On the
automobile side, European and Japanese companies were excluded as the
government “have a mandate to help America, not the world”. 77 This exclusion
reflects the long-standing tension between the US and foreign automakers whereby
foreign encroachment on the US auto market has only come at the expense of the
Big Three’s market share and so caused them major problems. This tension can be
seen quite clearly in the example of the Big Three successfully pushing President
Reagan – the most free market modern President – to agree an import quota with
the Japanese government that restricted the number of cars Japanese companies
could ship to the US regardless of demand (Luger, 2000 p.141).78 In contrast to
foreign automakers, the foreign oil companies were much more politically connected
in the US (being, for instance, members of the American Petroleum Institute, which
primarily represents the (American) supermajors) 79 and are seen as more
international than national – the American units of Shell and BP “put a lot of money
in the pockets of American investors and taxpayers” 80 and so were somewhat
different to the foreign automakers.81
77 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
78 A direct consequence of Reagan’s import quota was the Japanese (followed by European) auto
companies setting up “transplant” factories in the US.
79 Recorded interview with American Petroleum Institute staff, 14th April 2011
80 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
81 One important element in the way foreign companies in each industry are viewed is that auto
companies rely heavily on branding and identifying difference between brands, whereas the oil
industry largely supplies a standard product and can not substantially compete on this level, despite
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In 2008 the partnership was expanded again. This time two major power companies
– DTE Energy (Detroit) and Southern California Edison – were added to the
partnership. These corporations joined after the agenda had already been set and so,
particularly in the Bush period, made little contribution to the initial goals, aims and
running of the FreedomCAR partnership. Their inclusion reflected the dampening
down of hydrogen enthusiasm and an increasing belief in plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEVs) as a path to post-fossil transport; with the role of these companies
to help with the creation of infrastructure capable of supporting a PHEV
(Congressional Quarterly, 2008). Despite the increase in interest in PHEVs, the
primary focus of FreedomCAR remained hydrogen in the Bush period.
FreedomCAR and California
While through the FreedomCAR partnership, the Bush administration claimed it was
seeking to improve the environment, green the transportation system and move to a
post-petroleum world, it also sought to monopolise policy making in the area.
Following similar moves with CAFE standards, the Bush administration and the
automakers sought to limit California’s capacity to force technology in the automotive
sector. The actions taken in California saw a similar situation as at the federal level
play out at the state level, with both a negative campaign against the old
requirements for electric-drive vehicles and a positive campaign for hydrogen
vehicles.
The negative campaign saw the Bush administration supporting a lawsuit initially
filed by GM, DaimlerChrysler and Californian car dealers over the ZEV mandate.
With the automakers arguing that the ZEV violates the EPCA in that it is a regulation
pertaining to fuel economy, the US Justice Department filed an amicus brief (a
unsolicited supporting statement) with the court on the side of the auto companies
(Rajan, 2004 p.218). A GM source (McKay, 2001), stated the position of his
company as “We are aggressively opposed to mandates in all forms…If there was a
market for (zero emission) vehicles in California, there would be no need for a
mandate”. To resolve the litigation and bring the automakers back on side, CARB
reformed the ZEV mandate, dropping any requirement for electric cars. In a CARB
their best efforts. Auto corporations, then, work to have a greater identity; part of which is unavoidably
nationality.
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press release (CARB, 2003b), a DaimlerChrysler spokesman spoke of how his
company agreed with CARB’s reforms:
“While we don’t believe mandates are appropriate in the consumer-driven
marketplace, DaimlerChrysler is committed to work with the Air Resource
Board and other interested parties to ensure that all technologies that can
benefit the air quality in the State of California are recognized and permitted in
any future regulations.”
Following success in their litigative moves the auto companies quickly withdrew the
electric vehicles that had been used in the trial program agreed to in the Memoranda
of Understanding. While a consumer campaign sought to fight the withdrawal of
these electric vehicles, the automakers successfully took back and destroyed the
vehicles. For example, GM, ignoring the $1.9 million offered by former leasees for 78
remaining EV1s, insisted that there was no consumer demand for electric vehicles
as people would not be willing to accept range limitations and crushed the majority of
the 1,115 original vehicles (Paine, 2006). Around 40 of the EV1s were deactivated –
components removed, wires cut and software wiped – and given to museums and
Universities, with the result that “the GM EV1 was all but wiped from the earth” (Holt,
2008 H10927). GM, then, brusquely utilised their visible power; turning down cash
for vehicles that people wanted, refusing to offer or produce vehicles for a market
niche that wanted them and, ultimately, destroying the idea of the EV1 as a
functional vehicle that provided a technological stepping stone and replacing it with
the idea of the EV1 as a historical misstep.
On the positive side of the hydrogen campaign, in 2003 the California Fuel Cell
Partnership put on a three-day 400 mile trip from West Sacramento (home of the
partnership) to Los Angeles as a demonstration of the capacities of hydrogen
vehicles – arguing that the event demonstrated that HFC vehicles were “road ready”
(Hall, 2003). Thus, at the same time as denouncing electric cars and actively
opposing consumers, the industry began to promote hydrogen vehicles.
While CARB’s reform of the ZEV mandate did not drop the idea of encouraging new
technologies since it required the six main auto manufacturers to produce 250 fuel
cell vehicles in the 2005-2008 period (CARB, 2003a) it accepted that fuel cell
technology was not close to commercialisation and so offered credits for hybrid
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vehicles that could offset any shortfalls in HFC vehicles (Goodhue, 2004). Thus,
while still retaining some resemblance to its original provisions, California’s policy
had been slowly stripped of its teeth, which resulted in it having little direct impact on
air quality.
The Californian shift to hydrogen was complete when Governor Schwarzenegger, in
his 2004 State of the State, laid out his “Vision 2010”. Vision 2010 envisioned private
money (“spearhead[ed]” by the California Fuel Cell Partnership (Rohde, 2002))
setting up 150-200 hydrogen fuelling stations on California’s major highways, which
was estimated to be around one every 20 miles. These stations were intended to
support the “tens of thousands” (California.gov, 2004) of HFC vehicles that the
automakers had indicated were going to be available by 2010. The vision was later
supported by public funding of $6.5 million to support 3 hydrogen fuelling stations
and the purchase of 12 HFC vehicles (California.gov, 2005). However, by 2009 the
total number of hydrogen fuel stations was 24, mostly clustered around Los Angeles
(Sullivan, 2009).
Summary
The Bush administration came to power and initially sought to reduce the Clinton-era
PNGV; claiming that the PNGV was not in line with the market in not producing SUV
technology (something Gore had been willing to concede in 1997) and had not
brought vehicles to the showroom. However, after a period of confidential meetings
with the automakers (and with optimistic industry assessments of the hydrogen
timeframe and with a Secretary of Energy well-disposed to the auto industry) the
Bush administration shifted the PNGV to the FreedomCAR partnership. While
maintaining some of the same focus, the new partnership was much more long term
and had few clear goals, significantly reducing the accountability of the auto
corporations. The partnership also served wider auto interests by providing a positive
“non-regulatory” approach that shielded them from pressure over CAFE standards
and that provided proof for the public that the Big Three were concerned with the
environment. At the same time, the government and the auto corporations were
fighting California and rejecting any requirements for the implementation of electric
vehicles or hybrids. Technology that was approaching, or had, a viable business
case was rejected for research into a technology that had repeatedly proven to be
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further-off than thought and was accepted as taking a very long time to bring to
commercialisation.
Because of a lack of internal documents about the decision-making process, the
extent of, or reason for, corporate influence is difficult to gauge. The most noticeable
element of corporate power in the formulation of FreedomCAR was the executive
working alongside the auto industry to realise (almost entirely) auto industry goals.
However, as the last chapter documented, the executive was less aligned with
industry objectives in CAFE and much more reform minded. In explaining this
variance two non-exclusive explanations, based on hidden and invisible power
respectively, present themselves. First, that powerful actors within the executive with
pro-corporate or pro-auto beliefs/associations – such as Dick Cheney, Andrew Card
and Spencer Abraham – were able to influence this particular policy area, but not the
other. This explanation is bolstered by the fact that there were a greater number of
actors able to influence CAFE (with particular support for reform in the Senate) and
so the role of individuals was lessened. It is also supported by FreedomCAR being
part of Michigan-born-and-bred Spencer Abraham’s remit in being Secretary of
Energy, as opposed to CAFE being the remit of Secretary of Transport Norman
Mineta – the only Democrat in Bush’s cabinets.
Second, that there was a significant degree of genuine belief in the executive (and
perhaps the auto industry) about the prospects for a technological fix in the form of
hydrogen fuel cell technology. Instead of having a largely closed debate about the
effectiveness of CAFE – thirty years of evidence had shown it to be able to improve
fuel economy – hydrogen fuel cell technology, and future technology more generally,
was an open debate. This debate would have been significantly swayed by the auto
industry pushing the technology, giving it its expert recommendation and choosing
hydrogen in the allocation of its research funds. Thus the creation of FreedomCAR
and the executive internalisation of auto industry goals can be explained by the
greater scope for decisive action by auto supporters in the executive and by a
genuine belief in hydrogen technology that was inculcated by the auto industry.
Implementation
The FreedomCAR partnership, as a partnership between corporations and
government, necessarily involved a large degree of corporate involvement. In itself,
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this relationship transcended normal interest group-government interactions. Yet, if
the structure of the partnership was vertical, whereby corporations were the junior
partners being used to achieve specified government goals, then the relationship
would not move too far beyond normal, democratic interactions. In the case of
vertical partnerships, the distinction between government and governed is
maintained and, while a group is privileged and their visible power has been
extended, control remains with the elected government.
However, the FreedomCAR partnership was horizontal, with the corporations
involved in decisions about the direction, make-up and goals of the partnership. This
horizontal interaction occurred through the Executive Steering Group (ESG), which
consisted of the Assistant Secretary for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
(EERE), and a vice-President or President of each of the corporate partners. ESG
meetings occurred irregularly and subject to need. When they did meet, the ESG
discussed issues pertaining to the overall direction of the partnership and concerns
or issues with the partnership. Reflecting the horizontal nature of the partnership
“ESG members participate as peers with no designation of officers” (FreedomCAR
and Fuel Partnership, 2006 p.5). This relationship was reiterated in the policy of who
hosted meetings, with each of the companies and the DOE taking turns in rotation.
The infrequent meetings of the ESG, then, were where non-technical high-level
officials from both government and corporations would collaboratively make
decisions with a view to achieving political and commercial goals. While these
meetings were, in essence, establishing government policy, the extent to which
corporate executives had a say in directing the partnership is impossible to gauge as
the minutes of these meetings, alongside membership of the ESG, have been kept
confidential. However, considering the role the auto corporations played in the
setting up of the partnership and the horizontal relationship dynamics evident in the
ESG, it is unlikely to be small. Thus, in the ESG, and FreedomCAR more generally,
the visible power of the participant corporations was expanded significantly in that
they were given public authority.
Beyond the ESG, however, the partnership was vertical, with decisions occurring at
the top affecting the actions of those at the bottom. In the layer below the ESG were
the operations groups (see fig. 6.1), which were run by a mix of technical and non-
technical managerial-level staff. These groups tried to provide a two-way bridge
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between the wider strategic political and commercial goals decided by the ESG and
the technical goals and achievements of the partnership. Their direct remit within the
partnership’s hierarchical structure, then, was to be “responsible for directing the
technical teams and prioritizing research issues” (National Academy of Sciences,
2010 p.21). As the groups were split according to their area of expertise (i.e. the fuel
operations groups had representatives from the oil companies, but not the auto
companies) the groups also worked to improve technical co-ordination between the
fuel, automotive and (later) utility sides of the partnership.
Figure 6-1 Structure of the FreedomCAR partnership in 2006, prior to addition of utility companies
FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership (2006 p.5).
The final level, and most active part, of the partnership were the technical teams.
Technical teams consisted of DOE and corporate scientists and engineers with
knowledge specific to the area. Meeting at least once a month (depending on the
team and need) their purpose was to provide ideas of where research would be
helpful to them (Devlin, 2005). As such, the technical teams would “jointly conduct
technology roadmapping, determine technical requirements, suggest research and
development (R&D) priorities, [and] monitor R&D activities” (FreedomCAR and Fuel
Partnership, 2006 p.iv). However, due to antitrust laws that prevented companies
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from directing federal research, the tech teams were not able to set research
priorities, but to collaboratively work through the teams.82
As such, the FreedomCAR partners were not primarily engaged in conducting
research funded by government; research funds did not primarily flow to the
corporate partners but to research institutions and smaller businesses. Like PNGV,
“the Partnership intends to fund R&D activities at the national laboratories,
traditional and non-traditional automotive suppliers, universities, small
businesses, and other research institutions. It is expected that direct funding
to automobile companies will be limited. In general, research projects will be
selected competitively, with industry and government jointly developing the
technical scope, priorities, and project measures” (FreedomCAR Partnership,
2002 p.7).
There were two reasons for this arrangement. DOE (in particular the office of Basic
Energy Sciences) didn’t want to fund the corporations as they “want it to go to
academics and are trying to educate graduate students...[corporations] would go
waste it on some damn product.”83 The second reason is that the auto companies
did not want to obtain government funding as
“the last thing you wanted to do was tell your boss you had got a line on some
government funding because that meant you had got a line on some
government restrictions and why on earth would you want that? We have all
the money you need.”84
Thus the structure of the partnership, laid out above, gave corporate partners two
roles within FreedomCAR research. The first role of corporations within
FreedomCAR can be seen in 2005 NAS overview of the FreedomCAR partnership,
which assessed the structure of the partnership as “bring[ing] the capabilities of the
nation’s federal laboratories and other research institutions to bear on overcoming
the problems, identified by industry, that are critical to achieving the program vision”
(National Academy of Sciences, 2005 pp.1-2 [emphasis added]). Therefore, the role
of the corporations, alongside DOE, was to direct research by other bodies so that,
82 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011.
83 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
84 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011. Note: The quote was preceded by
the interviewee saying how this attitude has changed since the bankruptcies of Chrysler and GM and,
at present, is no longer applicable.
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ultimately, it can be used in corporate products and to direct an overall plan as to
how to create a hydrogen economy. Both of these functions were done using
taxpayer funds. Essentially, then, through the tech teams, operations groups and
executive steering group, the FreedomCAR partnership was designed in a manner
that allowed the DOE and corporations to tailor public research for industry-defined
goals and industry needs; with potential profits from the partnership accruing to the
partner corporations.
The second role of the corporations was to actually be involved in the process of
progressing hydrogen technology with their own funds. This involvement came in
conducting pre-competitive collaborative research, conducting proprietary research
and demonstrating technology; each of which needs some explanation. Pre-
competitive collaborative research involves exploring the basic principles of how
necessary systems/components for a hydrogen economy would/could work and
pooling this data with their competitors. It is pre-competitive in the sense that an end
product is not being developed. With the corporations, the emphasis of their pre-
competitive research was on applied (mechanism) rather than basic (principle)
science, which was primarily researched in universities.
In co-operating with other partners, the corporations’ role was to work within
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs). As one staff
member of the partnership put it, “the idea is that you work together, then the
partners pull pieces of the knowledge [developed by the partnership] off as they can
use it.”85 CRADAs are where costs and/or resources (such as staff or equipment) are
shared in conducting the research, and intellectual property arising out of the
research is also shared (FreedomCAR Partnership, 2002). As technology
progressed, the corporations had to decrease co-operation when they started to
conduct proprietary research. The details of proprietary research, as they could form
the basis of a product/patent, were kept confidential from both the public and other
members of the partnership. Ultimately, corporate proprietary research was meant to
cover the gap between basic research and the showroom.
In bridging the laboratory-showroom gap with hydrogen cars, partnership work would
necessarily become increasingly marginalised as the required basic collaborative
85 Recorded interview with GM and FreedomCAR Scientist, 19th April 2011.
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research neared completion and competitive proprietary research outside of the
purview of the partnership took over, “thus eliminating many of the benefits of a
partnership” (Misiak, 2004). Also, through proprietary research, the partner
corporations would be able to financially benefit from public-funded research;
potentially, if a hydrogen economy actually took off, to a truly massive extent. So,
while financial costs are (nominally, although unverifiably) shared between the public
and corporations, the vast majority of the current, and potential, financial benefits
that come from proprietary research are not.
The final element of the research carried out by the corporations was technology
demonstration and validation. These roles were performed to such a great extent by
the corporate partners that "you could almost make the argument [that the
partnership corporations] are the technology validation program".86 Demonstration
involved the creation of vehicles and hydrogen stations. Ostensibly, the purpose of
demonstration was to try the technology in real world conditions and so both
anticipate and solve potential issues before commercialisation and to gather data on
performance of current components. However, demonstration was also used to
increase public support for FreedomCAR in that it showed a concrete example of
what the research is trying to achieve – a working hydrogen vehicle and fuelling
infrastructure – and thus portrays the idea that the technology is not far off. The most
obvious example of hydrogen being used in this manner is Governor
Schwarzenegger’s (and GM’s) “hydrogen hummer” H2H, which was lent to the
Governor to open new stations on the hydrogen highway. That the vehicle is
prohibitively expensive and has durability issues, or that the fuelling infrastructure is
limited in its coverage, are issues that were not covered when Governor
Schwarzenegger drove on to a new hydrogen forecourt.
Demonstration also has a positive impact for the corporate partners as it improves
the commercial perception of their technological capabilities. Having a working “car
of the future” provided positive public relations material for the companies that could
improve sales of their current products and gave them advertising that backed up
their green credentials – a particularly important public message for the oil
companies. For example, in figure 6-2 the angle of the car allows both the full display
of GM’s logo and Shell’s branded pump next to the President of the United States.
86 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011.
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This image sends both an idea of the companies working with the government in
making progress towards a fossil-free future and an idea of these companies as
futuristic and cutting-edge, particularly through GM’s use of “technology” and “Gen”.
Source: WhiteHouse.gov (2005)
As such, both the roles the corporate partners played allowed them to profit from the
partnership. The corporations were able to profit financially by utilising public
research to support product creation and profit-driven activity. They were also able,
alongside the government, to profit politically by being seen as the “good guys”87 and
as environmentally-friendly companies. Another form of political profit was being
allowed to collaboratively direct public-funded research and to have a privy position
in deciding the future of US environmental and transportation policy. This decision-
making position was further enhanced by the commercialisation of technology
decisions being left entirely in the hands of the partner corporations.
Combined, the two roles corporations had within the FreedomCAR partnership made
the partnership out of sync with both administration rhetoric and US law. With
87 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
Figure 6-2: President Bush with Rick Scott (Shell)
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rhetoric, George W. Bush and the Republican party professed that support for free
markets is a core American value and the right way to govern. For example, in his
memoirs, Bush (2010 p.38) stated that
“the free market provided the fairest way to allocate resources. Lower taxes
rewarded hard work and encouraged risk taking. Eliminating barriers to trade
created new export markets for American producers & more choice for our
consumers. Government should respect its constitutional limits”.
However, in actively involving a select group of corporations in a partnership to
distribute research funds, the Bush government violated free market principles of
market competition; instead collaborating with corporations who, in the automotive
sector in 2002 for example, accounted for 60% of the US market (Wards Automotive,
2012).
In law, the FreedomCAR partnership skirted so close to antitrust laws that lawyers
had to present at every meeting to ensure compliance with the law.88 Yet in many
ways the partnership was constructed in such a manner that it actually provided de
facto political protection against antitrust law as the inclusion of the DOE in the
partnership meant that prosecutions under anti-trust law, which is mainly enforced by
the US Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission (each of which are
heading by Presidential appointees), were extremely unlikely; the executive was
unlikely to undermine a partnership it founded (Cefo, 2009 p.25).
Oversight and Accountability
As seen in the formulation section, the creation of the FreedomCAR partnership had
little democratic oversight or accountability as the decisions were made behind
closed doors with little public, or even Congressional, oversight. Within the
implementation of the partnership there were further issues with transparency and,
subsequently, with the accountability of the partnership to both the public and other
government branches. Oversight and transparency of the FreedomCAR partnership
– and the subsequent ability for other groups to understand or influence the
partnership and vehicle technology policy – was limited on a number of levels.
At the highest level, in the form of the ESG, the FreedomCAR partnership was not
transparent or directly accountable to the public. The membership of the board and
88 Recorded interview with American Petroleum Institute staff, 14th April 2011.
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what was discussed at board meetings is not publically available. Changes in
direction, or the admission of new members to the partnership were made in the
ESG and not subject to government approval other than by the DOE. There was a
somewhat small and tenuous link to the democratic accountability structure of the
US government in the only publically-known participant in the ESG – the EERE
Assistant Secretary – being a political appointee but even this tenuous link is diluted
by the horizontal nature of the ESG and the view of members as equals.
Similarly, “oversight by Congress is extremely indirect, if it exists at all” and
Congressional input was very limited.89 The only avenue for Congressional power
over the partnership was the power of the purse. While utilising the power of the
purse could have potentially ended FreedomCAR entirely (as was attempted with
PNGV in 2000) the relatively low levels of expenditure on the partnership meant “its
not really worth their while” 90 to reduce or zero funding. Moreover, attempts to
reduce funding for FreedomCAR would probably have run into opposition from
Congresspeople with automanufacturers, hydrogen fuel cell companies or national
labs91 in their district, who would work to protect the funding for the benefit of their
districts. As one interviewee put it, “you know where your support is going to come
from, [if you] know where the businesses are – South Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, starting to see more from Ohio, California [and Michigan].”92 Indeed, the
House Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Caucus was founded in 2004 by Representatives
from South Carolina, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, alongside a Representative
from Maryland (Larson, 2012). When it came to Congressional hearings about
FreedomCAR, the partnership could rely on these supporters to ensure the
discussions were about technology options and the future of technology (hence
names such as “The Pathway to the Hydrogen Economy”) rather than questions
about the working of the partnership and the close relationship between the DOE
and the automakers.
Further down the partnership structure, at the tech team level, there was greater
information, but public accountability was still difficult. No careful record was taken of
what was discussed at meetings, only basic minutes that were not even publically-
89 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
90 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
91 Recorded interview with American Petroleum Institute staff, 14th April 2011
92 Recorded interview with Congressional Staffer, 9th June 2011
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available. Likewise, while not confidential, the membership of the tech teams was
also not publicised. Public accountability was meant to be enhanced through tech
team “roadmaps”, which detailed the goals of the teams, and the Merit Review and
Peer Evaluation of DOE’s hydrogen fuel cells program – a free, publically-accessible
meeting that takes place each year in Washington D.C. – where roadmap progress
is meant to be assessed. Yet, the lack of vital information about the operation of the
tech teams, and the technical focus of the Merit Review (it works more akin to an
academic conference on hydrogen), means what happens at the tech teams is
“quasi-public.”93
Outside of the formal structure of the partnership, at the research level, information is
even more available, but public accountability still remains difficult. So, for example,
research conducted by public bodies is publically available, but research conducted
through CRADAs can have availability delayed by up to 5 years, and proprietary
research is not available at all.94 The lack of availability of CRADA and proprietary
research particularly frustrates accountability as this research is the sort that could
lead to the end goal of producing hydrogen vehicles. It also weakens the extent to
which the Annual Merit Review is able to contribute to an assessment of the
progress being made through the tech teams because of the disconnect between the
publically-available information and the end goal of producing a commercially-
available hydrogen vehicle.
Some of the problems with public oversight are common to public-private
partnerships and other collaborative arrangements in the US. Collaboration between
government and business, while having some degree of pragmatic output
legitimacy95, struggles to follow the basic procedures required for democratic control
and, as such, amplifies Lindblom’s (1977 p.356) point that the major corporation
“does not fit” within democratic theory in and of themselves; major corporations fit
even less well in democratic theory when they take on traditionally public roles such
as deciding publically-funded research goals. This point is particularly true when the
partnership is organised, as FreedomCAR is, in a horizontal manner.
93 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
94 Recorded interview with FreedomCAR Senior Staff, 15th April 2011.
95 “A legitimacy deriving from the ability to provide desired results rather than based on participatory
democratic norms and procedures” (Fuchs, 2005, p.22).
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Yet other issues were built in during the formulation and construction of the
FreedomCAR partnership as part of the switch from PNGV. PNGV had relatively
clear and reasonably straightforward technology goals that allowed citizen
assessment since a citizen could simply assess if the auto companies had an 80
mpg concept car in 2000. In contrast, the goals of FreedomCAR were highly
technical and accessible only to experts (such as “fuel cell systems, including a fuel
reformer, having a peak brake engine efficiency of 45 percent, and that meet or
exceed emissions standards with a cost target of $45/kW by 2010 and $30/kW in
2015”); accountability was obscured to a greater extent with FreedomCAR. In
particular, the removal of a vehicle production goal made public oversight and
accountability much more difficult. Hence, one interviewee summed up public
oversight at the research level as “it’s open, it’s transparent and no-one cares.”96
Summary
The role of corporations – BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil, Shell
Hydrogen and USCAR – in the implementation and running of FreedomCAR and
FreedomFuel was, as it was a public-private partnership, necessarily large. They had
an instrumental role in developing and assessing overall partnership goals, of
admitting new partners and of determining where (federal) research funds were
directed. The benefits for these corporations were potentially massive, as the
partnership-directed research could have been spun-off and utilised in new products
and advanced technologies. At the highest level, these actions were taken with little
oversight by, or transparency to, Congress and the public. At lower levels, there was
greater information available yet this information only mildly aided oversight as the
technical nature of the information meant most of the public (and Congressmen)
would be “bored to tears” 97 ; information about the actual political decisions
concerning a policy intended to solve major problems in the US was not made
available.
In the implementation of FreedomCAR, then, the auto corporations primarily
exercised visible power and the use of private authority in a (traditionally) public
space. However, invisible power had helped create a legal framework that the
corporations were empowered by and maintained the legitimacy of the partnership
96 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
97 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
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and its actions. Equally, hidden power mechanisms were operating to provide cover
for the partnership, with media coverage of the technology validation programme
conveying the idea that the technology was increasingly close to commercialisation.
Potential to Reduce Oil Dependence
The FreedomCAR partnership, and the development of a hydrogen economy, was
sold from the outset, as a method of reducing US oil dependence. However, one
basic point that was clear about FreedomCAR is that it would not reduce, by any
small measure, US oil dependence in the short term. Beyond its short-term outlook,
there are a number of ways to evaluate FreedomCAR’s long-term potential to reduce
oil dependence: its potential at the outset, in comparison to the marketplace, in the
capacity of the structure to reach its goals, in the outcomes so far and in the
prudence of the policy. Evaluating from these perspectives will allow an assessment
of the extent to which the FreedomCAR partnership was a representation of
corporate interests, a prudent evidence-driven policy, or a mixture of the two.
At the outset of the partnership, there was not an established scientific consensus on
the potential of HFCs to become competitive with conventional technology. There
were international conferences, academic journals and professional organisations
dedicated to establishing a hydrogen economy (Veziroglu, 2000), which were forums
for scientists who saw the technology as not only the ideal solution to a host of
problems, but as nearing maturity. There were also other policies around the world,
with Iceland attempting to create a hydrogen economy for its 320,000 inhabitants
starting in 1998. Like with FreedomCAR, Iceland formed a public-private company –
Icelandic New Energy Ltd. – whose ownership was split between a 51% stake
owned by a combination of Icelandic firms and the Icelandic government and a 49%
stake split between Norsk Hydro, Shell Hydrogen and DaimlerChrysler. This public-
private company was meant to research and demonstrate hydrogen technology with
the intention of powering buses, private vehicles and fishing boats with domestically
(and renewably) produced hydrogen (Sigfusson, 2006), and foresaw the complete
transition to a hydrogen economy by 2050 (Sigfusson, 2007 p.411).
Likewise, hydrogen optimism came from the autocompanies themselves, who had
conducted research on HFCs for many years and, starting in the mid-1990s, had
publicised commercialisation dates that were very near term, such as GM’s 1999
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estimation of commercialisation by 2004.98 The autocompanies continued to produce
optismistic assessments, with GM and Shell’s 2003 estimation of commercialisation
by 2010 (Tierney, 2003). While this “just-around-the-corner” (Freedonia, 2002) view
of hydrogen that the industry perpetuated did not seem to directly impact the
formulation of the partnership, in that FreedomCAR was conceived of as a long-term
project, it was a significant part of the industry’s attempt to sell hydrogen to the public
and policymakers, such as in the CaFCP tour in 2003. Likewise, the oil companies
had shown public interest in, and talked up, hydrogen as part of their move towards
a greener “Beyond Petroleum” image.
Before the Bush period, when interest in hydrogen was operating at a relatively low
level, opposition to the technology was muted; it was an idea that did not warrant
much critical attention as it was a 163-year-old technology that was not threatening
to replace the ICE in any way. Yet when the idea of a hydrogen economy became
well-known through the move to FreedomCAR, scientific opposition galvanised
quickly because it drew attention away from other potential solutions; with attempts
to create a hydrogen economy described as a “almost certainly futile attempt to find
a utopian way to reduce dependency on fossil fuels” (Shinnar, 2003 p.474),
“inefficient” and “flawed” (Kreith and West, 2004 p.256) and an experiment “not
supported by the laws of nature” (Bossel, 2003 p.16). Following a similar train of
thought, former DOE Assistant Secretary, Joseph Romm argued that to combat such
“hyping” that occurred with hydrogen that
“Analysts should state clearly what is technologically and commercially
possible today and, when discussing the future, be equally clear that
projections are speculative and will require both major advances in technology
and major government intervention in the marketplace. Analysis should treat
competition fairly: If major advances in cost reduction and performance are
projected for hydrogen technologies, similar advances must be projected for
hybrid vehicles, renewable biofuels, and the like. If hydrogen is being
presented as a solution to problems such as global warming and dependence
98 The disjoint between the public assessment of the technology by the corporations and the goals for
the partnership that were set by the corporations (which were originally set for HFCs to be somewhat
cost-competitive with ICEs by 2015) suggests that behind closed doors a longer timeframe was being
represented.
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on imported oil, then the projected costs must be compared with those of the
likely competition” (2004 pp.188-189).
There was a positive view of hydrogen, but it was not the established or mainstream
scientific consensus. Instead, it was parochial, speculative, beset by problems and,
in retrospect, “incredibly naive”.99 Politicians and decision-makers either ignored or
were not cognizant of the shaky foundations from which policy was being made.
From the outset, the possibility of achieving the intended policy goals of
FreedomCAR – to reduce US oil dependence and to combat climate change – was
uncertain because the timeline for research progression, and the capacity of HFCs to
compete with current and alternative technologies, was very uncertain.
In comparison to the uncertainty of hydrogen, technological changes were occurring
in the marketplace throughout the Bush presidency. In 2000 Honda and Toyota
starting selling the Insight and the Prius, respectively, which both utilised an
electric/gasoline hybrid drivetrain that improved fuel efficiency significantly, with the
MY2000 Insight being rated at 53mpg and the MY2000 Prius at 41mpg (Department
of Energy, 2012a). By 2011, 2.15 million hybrid vehicles had been sold in the US, of
which 1.75 million were produced by Japanese companies (Department of Energy,
2012b). Although hybrids were not a complete and total solution to US oil
dependence they were actually reducing individual citizens’ oil consumption in the
present and had two further advantages over hydrogen.
First, the PNGV had prepared the automakers to produce hybrid vehicles and the
technology was nearing cost-competitiveness with traditional ICEs. Promoting these
vehicles in 2000 would have meant that (even more than without government
promotion) significant improvements in the technology would have occurred before
the first HFC vehicle was even sold. As Joseph Romm (2004 p.147), considering the
achievements of MY2000 Toyota Prius, says “imagine how good hybrid vehicles will
be by 2020, when they might first have to face fuel cell vehicles in the marketplace.”
Second, in having an electric drive system, hybrids encourage investment and
research into batteries and electric technologies. Improvements in these
technologies would make full-electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids100 more viable in
99 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
100 Plug-in hybrids, which come in many varieties, utilise more electric power and can be charged
directly, often from the national grid.
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the open market and more liable to attract increasing funding from companies and
investors. As such, for hybrids and electric vehicles, a gradual progression of the
technology (and the market) is possible that would be much more in line with the
professed free market ideology of the Bush government and could still achieve an
oil-free transportation system. Even if, in the future, battery technology did not
progress to the extent desired, hybrid technology would still have reduced America’s
consumption of oil from 2000 onwards. In contrast, deployment of HFCs require the
technology to be fully ready before it begins to cut oil consumption and does not
naturally support a gradual progression (Romm, 2006 p.2612).
Third, if battery technology did progress, the infrastructure needed for plug-in hybrids
and electric cars is not an entirely new infrastructure. Instead of requiring new
infrastructure to be built from the point of production to the point of use, as is the
case with hydrogen, electric vehicle fuelling involves extending the already-existent
infrastructure. In such a case of creating an electric vehicle market, plug-in hybrids
would serve as an important bridge to the infrastructural changes needed for full
electric vehicles in that they would utilise the required infrastructure (thus creating
demand for the expansion of the infrastructure) but would not be totally reliant on the
infrastructure; they can switch to gasoline when charging infrastructure is not
available and so minimise the chicken-and-egg problem (ibid. p.2612). As such,
encouraging hybridisation offered the Bush government an evolutionary approach
that did not require extensive government involvement, made use of an already-
established program in PNGV and promised immediate progress towards stated
goals, but was not pursued in any meaningful way and instead left hybrid technology
production decisions “to the market”. Even if the myriad of problems (mostly coming
from battery technology) that full electric vehicles currently face result in the
technology never going mainstream the hybrid approach would have still produced
benefits of reduced oil consumption in the meantime; the technology gamble on
electrics always had a payoff, whereas hydrogen did not.
What is more, the manner by which a hydrogen transportation system was pursued
involved a great deal of non-competitive actions that did not utilise “efficient” market
mechanisms and transferred significant powers to the private sector. In having the
structure of FreedomCAR as an equal partnership between the government and a
select group of corporations the Bush administration limited the partnership’s
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capacity to achieve its stated goals in three ways. First, it excluded start-up
companies and did not harness the potential of these companies to introduce
revolutionary technologies. As the 2005 NAS review pointed out,
“historically, in fields as disparate as microelectronics and medical devices,
pathbreaking commercial innovations have come from start-up companies at
least as often as from the industry incumbents” (National Academy of
Sciences, 2005 p.105).
For instance, in 2008 Tesla Motors, a Silicon Valley-based independent founded in
2003, produced the Tesla Roadster, a 111 mpg-equivalent, 245 mile range, fully-
electric car (Loveday, 2011). Building a research partnership exclusively with
“incumbent” corporations, then, cannot even be justified on pragmatic grounds as
these companies are not necessarily the most innovative, or have the best ideas as
to what direction research should be heading in.
Second, the partnership “was for the domestic manufacturers, all the other
manufacturers were shut out”101; the partnership excluded Japanese and European
automakers, who were conducting their own research and who would have been
able to make a significant contribution to the partnership. These corporations were
excluded because, as one interviewee stated, the government “have a mandate to
help America, not the world”. 102 Yet, the entire purpose of the FreedomCAR
partnership was to help the US by producing hydrogen technology; its publically-
stated goal was not to help US automakers, but to help the country achieve freedom
from oil dependence (National Academy of Sciences, 2005 p.2).
Third, in bringing in the (American) corporate partners, and giving them the power to
decide on commercialisation, priority was given to the interests of the corporations
and important national decisions were deferred to the corporations (Congress, 2003
p.5). This approach is particularly problematic as “the automakers are in here all the
time telling us that if we don’t get the infrastructure here [they won’t produce cars
here]”103, meaning that the automakers were willing to accept the chicken-and-egg
problem and not produce hydrogen vehicles. Overcoming this problem would require
101 Recorded interview with a former Auto Engineer for US and Japanese Auto Companies, 25th April
2011.
102 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011.
103 Recorded interview with Congressional Staffer, 9th June 2011
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even more government involvement in helping to provide the estimated $200 billion
plus (Congress, 2003 p.5) needed to create a hydrogen infrastructure.
In relying on the corporations to commercialise the technology, there was a lack of
recognition that what may be the best for society may not be reflected in company
policy – the research may not be commercialised because it is more profitable not to
commercialise than to commercialise. Such self-interest is evident in the fact the
partnership included one company who “were not really interested in hydrogen”104
and did little to research it. In fact, a number of the partner corporations had been
accused of technology-stifling through patent encumbrance in the past. For example,
GM was accused of limiting the availability of next generation battery technology
after it purchased Ovonics, and gained control of its patents, in 1994. Started by
Stan Ovshinsky, Ovonics had developed an advanced nickel metal hydride (NiMH)
battery that significantly outperformed the lead-acid batteries available at the time,
with initial tests extending the range of GM’s EV1 from 90 to 200 miles (Greenberg,
2008). In upping the EV1’s range one of the main problems with electric cars was
alleviated, but, instead of heralding the technology, GM crushed the cars and did not
pursue the technology (Paine, 2006).
In 2001, GM then sold its interest in Ovonics to its future FreedomCAR partner,
Chevron, who reformed the company into Cobasys. Under Chevron’s ownership,
Cobasys has suffered from a lack of cash, has upped its minimum order for large
scale batteries to 10,000, refused to honour previously-agreed contracts for batteries
and sued Panasonic, who were producing NiMH batteries for Toyota, Ford and
Honda, for infringing its patents (Boschert, 2006). Chevron’s patents limiting the use
of the technology, and that allow the continuation of this behaviour, last until 2014. In
light of these events, Ovshinsky has since stated that
“we made a mistake of having a joint venture with an oil company, frankly
speaking. And I think it’s not a good idea to go into business with somebody
whose strategies would put you out of business, rather than building the
business” (Greenberg, 2008).
Considering the issues with the aims and structure of the partnership it is worth
exploring how far FreedomCAR has come in the ten years since the beginning of the
104 Unrecorded interview with oil company executive, 26th April 2011.
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partnership to reducing oil dependence and solving the problems associated with oil
dependence. Advances towards all of partnership technical goals have occurred
(National Research Council, 2010 p.3). For instance, the partnership’s 2010 goal of
having the cost of fuel cells be $45kW was narrowly missed, with $51kw achieved,
which is an 80% reduction since 2002 and a 30% reduction since 2008.105 As such,
the partnership (including the automotive partners) still feels that it can have a cost-
competitive HFC vehicle on the road around 2015.106
However, optimism outside the partnership about HFCs is not as bright. One
interviewee said that predicting when HFCs would be ready was like “crystal ball
gazing” as “there are Three Nobel Prizes between here and fuel cell vehicles. Ones
the fuel cell stacks themselves. One’s on the storage. And one’s on the fuel…it's a
technology that is perennially 15-20 years off."107 Likewise, another interviewee said
that “fuel cells are still 15-20 years off. I’m still cautiously optimistic that they will be
the long-term solution, but you won’t see them before 2035, maybe 2030.”108 More
conservatively, an oil industry interviewee said in 2011 that the commercialisation
timeframe was “20, 30, 40 years. I don’t see it as near term…it’s definitely 20-40
years out.”109 Such conservatism is understandable considering that by April 2010
there were only 68 hydrogen fuel stations and 223 fuel cell vehicles in the country
(Kreith and West, 2011 p.5).
So, much like at the start of the partnership, the estimates and scientific view of
when hydrogen fuel cell vehicles will be ready for private-vehicle use remains
uncertain. Yet, even if all of these issues with automotive technology and the chicken
and egg problem were swept aside and a hydrogen economy was set up, it would
most likely continue many of the problems associated with oil dependence. Because
the US does not have the renewable electricity capacity to produce sufficient
hydrogen for a national fleet, hydrogen production would either involve using
electricity from fossil fuel plants or involve reforming natural gas, both of which would
retain issues with CO2 production and air pollution.
105 Recorded interview with FreedomCAR Senior Staff, 15th April 2011.
106 Recorded interview with FreedomCAR Senior Staff, 15th April 2011.
107 Recorded Interview with Congressional Research staffer, 8th April 2011
108 Recorded Interview with a former Auto Engineer for US and Japanese Auto Companies, 25th April
109 Recorded interview with American Petroleum Institute staff, 14th April 2011
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Moreover, one potential outcome of the move to hydrogen produced by natural gas
would be the utilisation of unconventional gas reserves accessed by hydraulic
fracturing (fracking) (Hickey, 2012). Currently highly-touted in US energy circles,
fracking involves forcing a slurry of sand, water and chemicals into gas-bearing rock
formations to increase pressure and fracture the rock, releasing the gas. This
method has been accused110 of contaminating local watertables and producing much
more CO2 than conventional methods of accessing natural gas (Shelley, 2011),
which has obvious implications for climate change if the expansion of hydrogen was
based on an expansion of fracking. The only problem solved if there was a switch to
hydrogen from fracked gas would be import reliance.
Finally, all the above issues raise the question of whether hydrogen fuel cell
research constituted a prudent policy to reduce oil dependence and the problems
associated with oil dependence. In itself, for the problems raised above,
FreedomCAR was insufficient. It wouldn’t produce immediate outcomes, it was
uncertain from the outset whether it could produce outcomes eventually and it was
not known how long the technology would take to come to fruition. Yet, if
FreedomCAR was part of a portfolio approach that included more immediate
attempts to reduce oil dependence it could be seen as prudent policy in that it is
laying the foundations for a future transition to a post-carbon economy. Put more
bluntly, if FreedomCAR was accompanied by CAFE or/and other incremental
approaches (such as higher gas taxes and encouraging hybridisation) then it would
be both sensible and farsighted. However, the incremental approach and the
“leapfrog” HFCs research approach were presented as an either/or choice by the
executive and the corporate partners; as Spencer Abraham said in 2003
“Addressing our energy problems need not be a matter of tremendous
hardship for small, incremental gains…We have within our reach the
capability to leapfrog those problems with a wholly new approach to energy”
(Schmidt, 2003).
As the previous chapter demonstrated, a modest increase in CAFE was only
accepted due to substantial pressure being exerted within the political system.
In only adopting a leapfrog approach, FreedomCAR constituted a bet on
110 Fracking is currently the subject of a contentious politico-scientific debate in both the US and the
UK.
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“technologies [that] are largely in early stages of development. On the one
hand, they evict other potential efficient technologies, such as the already
mentioned Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles. On the other hand,
their outcomes are uncertain in terms of emission reduction potential, cost,
and timing” (Blanchard and Perkaus, 2004 p.1997).
In terms of reducing oil dependence, then, FreedomCAR was not a prudent policy; it
was a risky pipedream that staked too much on an uncertain payoff and that
detracted from the possibility of immediate action and, at the same time, gave the
executive and the corporate partners a “green” PR image that covered them
politically from more substantial changes.
Conclusions
The entry of the Big Three into the FreedomCAR partnership was motivated by a
desire to delay (perhaps indefinitely) CAFE standards, to improve their
environmental credentials and to be well placed in terms of intellectual property
should a rival firm make a breakthrough.111 All of these interests were realised
through the FreedomCAR partnership, although, as the previous chapter attests, the
automakers still faced CAFE increases. The various ways in which the automakers
were able to realise their interests is represented in figure 6-3.
Figure 6-3: Mechanisms of influence in FreedomCAR
(Note: Green represents direct action, blue indirect action/structural conditions and red a mixture of
the two.)
At the formulation stage, very few of the mechanisms seen in the CAFE chapter and
commonly associated with the political arena were operating. With the exception of
111 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011.
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the attempt to promote hydrogen in the media and through CaFCP, the
FreedomCAR partnership was largely formed without inside or outside lobbying
tactics. In this respect, invisible power discourses were not substantially deployed
(consumer choice with regards to SUVs being an exception) but instead passively
ensured the legitimacy of the creation of a public-private partnership. Moreover, in a
rather bizarre manner, many aspects of the embedded neoliberal discourse
empowered the corporations with regards to hydrogen. Even though FreedomCAR
represented a very large intervention by the government in the market, the
commercialisation of both hybrids and fuel cell cars were decisions that were left to
the corporations because making such decisions was not seen as the responsibility
of the government; belief in the market (and their control of production decisions)
gave the corporations the ultimate decision in whether to implement hydrogen
technology or not.
Primarily, however, the creation of the FreedomCAR partnership was due to
automaker hidden and visible power; it was a case of both elite decisions in closed
spaces and having to rely on corporations to realise certain goals because they
control production and investment decisions. So the high-level and opaque
negotiations that formed the Cheney report, and which the automakers were
involved in, was pivotal in the policy U-turn that saw the Bush government move
from scrapping PNGV to replacing it with a largely similar entity. Likewise, the entire
premise of the partnership was to support and help the auto corporations to facilitate
a transition to a hydrogen economy.
At the implementation level, the mechanisms of influence were primarily in the form
of visible power. Like with the implementation stage in the CAFE standards, this shift
is unsurprising as the partnership gave the automakers authority to directly make
decisions – it vested them with visible power. But additionally, mechanisms of hidden
and invisible power served to legitimate the partnership and insulate it from
accountability in the political arena. Most notably, the adoption of technical goals
served as an important way in which functional accountability was avoided.
Finally, while hydrogen may turn out to be the energy carrier of choice – it may have
a positive outcome for oil dependence – and the FreedomCAR partnership may well
have played a decisive and pivotal role in changing, and improving, the US by
eliminating US oil dependence, it will have done so in a manner that was inherently
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oriented towards the interests and decisions of a select group of major corporations;
it would have been a high-risk bet, whose risk was amplified by the manner in which
it was placed, that paid off. Yet, even in this situation, millions of gallons of fuel would
still have been burnt in the intervening years while waiting for the long-term payoff
when implementation of current technology could have had an immediate benefit.
Ultimately, during the Bush period, the hydrogen fuel cell program worked as a
distraction from more immediate-term solutions. As a policy designed to reduce US
oil dependence it was little more than a pipe dream.
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Chapter 7 – Discussion
In exploring the role of corporations in two oil dependence policies of the George W.
Bush administrations, using a broad actor-centred framework of power, substantial
influence for particular corporations in the two case studies was found. In fact, the
interests of these corporations took precedence over many national goals and, by
weakening the two case study policies, contributed to the endurance of long-
standing national (and international) problems. In light of these findings, this chapter
serves to draw out the wider implications of these examples of corporate influence
by directly answering the research questions, and so is organised with a section on
each research question. As such, this chapter discusses the extent of corporate
influence, how corporations were influential (and what methods they used), why
corporations were influential, and the societal impact of corporate influence in turn. In
addition, this chapter highlights the academic contribution of this thesis, the
limitations of this research and possible potential future research on the basis of this
thesis.
To what extent were corporate interests influential in US oil-
dependence policy evolution under Bush?
Specific corporate interests – the Big Three US automobile companies in particular –
were significantly influential in both case studies. These companies were able to
represent their interests, and have their interests represented, in national policy to a
very large extent. In addition to the automobile companies, several supermajor oil
companies – ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, Chevron and ConocoPhillips – were involved in
the FreedomCAR case study, with two utility energy companies joining late into the
case study timeframe. However, because these companies came later to the
partnership, and their actions with regards to the case study occurred within the
bounds of the partnership’s confidentiality, their involvement was less documentable
and so less documented by the thesis. However, from what information was
available, the oil companies were involved in hyping hydrogen in the early 2000s and,
at times, co-operated with the auto companies in trying to sell the viability of a
hydrogen economy future. For the oil companies, involvement in the partnership was
beneficial in that it allowed the cultivation of a progressive, environmental image.
Nevertheless, as was seen in the case of lack of oil company involvement in CAFE
Discussion
225
standards and the lack of automobile company involvement in the opening of ANWR
oil resources to exploitation, when a corporation did not view an issue to be directly
related to their economic interests they did not get involved. These corporations,
then, worked as profit-oriented political actors that pursued goals with returns
specific to them.
In addition to the specificity of corporate concern, there was also a national element
to corporate involvement.112 Foreign automakers, while involved in both of the case
studies, had their interests relegated to the periphery in the formulation of policy. In
CAFE standards, foreign automaker interests were poorly represented in EISA, with
the shift to a variegated market disadvantaging them and through being frozen out of
government loans. In the case of the FreedomCAR partnership foreign automakers
were excluded entirely. Yet, in a strange contrast, international oil companies (BP
and Shell) were included in the FreedomCAR partnership. One interviewee
explained the difference in treatment as because researchers for the foreign auto
companies
“live in Japan, their money stays in Japan and all the profits go back to Tokyo;
that is not the US government’s mission…now with the oil companies it’s a bit
different…they are more international…The profits do eventually go home to
Britain or Holland, but the American units [of BP and Shell] do put a lot of
money into the pockets of American investors and taxpayers [through their
investments and research infrastructure in the US.]”113
In this respect, then, in both the executive and the legislature there was an implicit
protectionism regarding where economic benefits accrued in the formulation of policy.
Similarly, foreign automakers had little impact on either of the implementation parts
of the case studies – having reasonably similar goals to the US automakers in CAFE
implementation and being entirely excluded with FreedomCAR. The only real place
that foreign automakers had significant power to alter situations is the marketplace,
which they did successfully use through the manufacture and sale of hybrids. In
future policies such foreign automaker marketplace decisions made during the Bush
period could play an important role; much like the Big Three encouraged the move
112 Hansen and Mitchell (2000) note the lower likelihood of foreign firms, compared to domestic firms,
in engaging in overt actions (such as lobbying or campaign contributions) in the political arena.
113 Recorded interview with GM Hydrogen Engineer, 13th May 2011
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towards SUVs in the 1980s and 1990s that set the stage for the changes in the
2000s.
Like foreign automakers, other relevant and concerned organised interests –
particularly environmental and safety groups – had little impact on the formulation of
the two case studies; their actions (or actions of people on behalf of them) did not
result in their interests being realised to any significant degree. With FreedomCAR,
this lack of impact was due to the fact that there was relatively little opposition; other
groups, like the public, did not pay that much attention to the issue, apart from
viewing it as continued corporate welfare. With CAFE, however, these public interest
groups were very interested but had a limited impact.
The limited impact of these groups was partially due to the corporations having far
greater resources; corporations could hire revolving door lobbyists, had better
contacts with the media, could fund think-tanks and could set up astroturf groups to a
far greater extent than these interest groups. For instance, Ford and GM spent $21
million in 2007 – the year of EISA – and Sierra Club, Public Citizen, the Union of
Concerned Scientists and other organizations who lobbied for higher CAFE
standards collectively spent $917k spent in the first six months of 2007. Likewise,
these public interest groups had fewer supporters in Congress because they were
not major employers in a number of constituencies and instead had to rely on
individuals with a similar ideological commitment as them, such as Rep. Henry
Waxman (D-CA), to champion their causes. In this respect, these public interest
groups were simply out-gunned in the political arena. But additionally, public groups
also had low levels of access to the Bush administration; as one interviewee said
“the [Bush] administration was not a friendly venue for environmentalists”.114 For
instance, in the crafting of both the 2002 NAS report on CAFE standards and the
Cheney report the number of meetings with environmental groups was significantly
outweighed by the meetings with corporate groups.
More generally, in both CAFE standards and FreedomCAR, environmental groups
were poorly positioned in the discursive environment. As mentioned in chapter three,
the focus on GDP growth – on “economic health” – effectively marginalised
environmental concerns. Including environmental concerns was not seen as part and
114 Recorded interview with environmental think-tank staff, 11th April 2011.
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parcel of ensuring the welfare of the nation, but as an extra cost. Hence,
FreedomCAR was designed along the lines that hydrogen technology would work as
a technological substitution to the gasoline ICE that would simply allow the
continuation of the high consumption American way of life. Combined, all three of
these points – lack of resources, lack of access and marginalising discourses – help
explain why “environmental groups played no role in the Bush administration's
formulation of energy policy”.115
In the implementation stage environmental interests played even less of a role.
FreedomCAR did not include such groups as part of its structure, so they could have
had no impact at all on the case study even if they were sufficiently concerned to
focus their limited resources on FreedomCAR. In CAFE, NHTSA did accept
comments from environmental groups but, as chapter five indicates, environmental
concerns were effectively organised out in their rule-making procedure. Outside of
the formulation and implementation of policy – outside of what is traditionally
considered political – these groups had no powers to subsequently alter policy. So,
unlike foreign automakers, environmental groups capacity to exercise power only
really existed in Congress.
In sum, American automobile corporations – GM, Ford and Chrysler – were very
influential in both the formulation and implementation of the case studies; their
interests were of paramount importance in the construction and execution of CAFE
and FreedomCAR. Moreover, these interests were realised despite the differing
interests of foreign automakers and the opposed interests of public interest groups.
As such, the case studies reveal the American automobile corporations to have been
powerful political actors in the Bush period.
1. Through what methods did the influence of corporate
interests work?
Primarily this question concerns the indirect actor-centred methods of corporate
influence (in the case study conclusions, these mechanisms of influence were mainly
in blue boxes). From the case studies, four main ways – one primarily visible power
mechanism and three primarily hidden power mechanisms – can be identified in
which this representation of corporate interests occurred. Turning first to the visible
115 Recorded interview with environmental think-tank staff, 11th April 2011.
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power mechanisms, elected officials engaged in “particularistic, reelection-oriented
behavior” (Lee, 2003 p.715) by supporting corporations who were major employers
in their constituencies. In the case studies within Congress there were several
bipartisan caucuses supporting the auto industry and the hydrogen industry that
consisted of Congressmen drawn from auto plant constituencies and which had the
aim of giving voice to the concerns of the auto industry within Congress. This form of
corporate power does not come from politicians being bought (which is suggested in
the PAC literature), instead the manner of this visible power mechanism is, as
Lowery (2007 p.36) says, “government officials serving the democratic demands of
constituents, a wholly legitimate type of interaction within democratic political
systems”.
Among the auto plant Congressmen who sought to represent the industry in a
democratically-legitimate way, the most notable was John Dingell (D-MI). Dingell,
“having a strong constituency in auto jobs”116, was instrumental in the defeat of
earlier efforts to raise CAFE standards, has held important positions on relevant
Congressional committees, and has been seen as protecting the auto industry since
first being elected in 1955. As one corporate executive put it
“he guides us very nicely, and when he helps us it’s only because he can see
that the help is a nudge, not a push, to keeping a strong auto industry, in the
sense of jobs and economic interests.”117
Assistance, then, from local politicians went beyond a hands-off support on votes on
bills and by working through other formal mechanisms of the political arena, to
behind-the-scenes signalling and communication. As a case in point, behind-the-
scenes communication and co-operation can be seen in the Hill-Terry bill, which
offered limited CAFE standards, get-out clauses and financial support for the
automakers. The industry and Michigan representatives both pushed the Hill-Terry
bill from the outset, with the automakers taking the chance to represent their support
as evidence they “openly and aggressively supported CAFE legislation that serves
both the environment and consumers” (McCurdy, 2007) and thus head off higher
CAFE standards that were in the offing. Moreover, local politicians did not shy away
from being linked with the corporations, as can be seen in Fig. 7-1.
116 Recorded Interview with Senior Chrysler staff, 16th June 2011
117 Recorded Interview with Senior Chrysler staff, 16th June 2011
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Figure 7-1: Rep. Miller (R-MI) with Ford CEO Alan Mulally
Source: Rep. Miller’s website (2012)
Yet, the connection between a politician and a constituency-based industry can go
beyond purely re-election-oriented behaviour. Politicians, not working as pure
rational actors, can adopt a local pride and self-identification with regards to a major
industry, particularly if the politician is originally from the constituency state. This self-
identification with certain industries works in the form of a politician supporting their
“team”. Such behaviour was, for example, evident in an interview with a staffer from
a Pennsylvania district, who kept a supply of miniature bottles of oil from a famous
local well to give to visitors. The prime example in this thesis of this behaviour
occurred in the FreedomCAR case study, where former Michigan Senator and then
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham worked very closely with the automakers on
FreedomCAR to their benefit even while, as an appointee, there was no re-election
incentive. So, in both FreedomCAR and CAFE, then, the auto corporations
benefitted both from local politicians perceiving support for major constituency
employers and the interests of their constituents as one and the same, and from
goodwill and affection from certain politicians. The former point likely works fairly
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broadly for corporations, with one interviewee saying “generally speaking
government representatives will support those from their constituency”.118
Moving to the three hidden power mechanisms, first the auto corporations were
empowered by the passage of employees between government and corporate
employ; by people moving through the revolving door. The most high profile
automotive revolving door case in the Bush era was Andrew Card, who was Bush’s
Chief of Staff and was, prior to this role, the CEO of the American Automobile
Manufacturers Association and a GM Vice President. However, revolving door
personnel were present in many stages of policy evolution. NHTSA had two former
automotive staff working for it in 2010, and there was a long-standing trend of former
top NHTSA officials going to work for the automobile industry; one former NHTSA
administrator, Diane Steed, even headed the automobile astroturf group, the
Coalition for Vehicle Choice.
In fact, interpersonal relations with corporations were pervasive in the Bush
administration (Coen et al., 2010 p.25). George W. Bush himself, as well senior
cabinet figures such as Dick Cheney and Condolezza Rice, had held previous high-
ranking roles in the oil industry. Through high-ranking roles in the banking, insurance,
pharmaceutical, chemical manufacture and utility industries the majority (13 out of 16)
of the Bush cabinet were millionaires and had an average wealth of $10.9 million
(Mesler, 2001).
Furthermore, moving more to a direct role, the auto corporations also flexed their
financial muscle to hire people with good political interpersonal connections which
these people could exploit for the automakers. These revolving door lobbyists were
former staffers in key committees or with key Congressmen, former Congressmen or
even former Presidential appointees. The hiring of such revolving door lobbyists was
seen in the CAFE chapter, with Ford hiring 50, and General Motors 74, revolving
door lobbyists while EISA was being debated (Center for Responsive Politics, 2007a,
b). Although other interest groups can also benefit from the revolving door – for
instance, Joan Claybrook moved from being NHTSA Administrator to President of
Public Citizen – the lesser scope (and resources) of these operations mean they
have fewer possible employees who could go through the revolving door (in either
118 Recorded interview with Toyota staff, 11th May 2011.
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direction) and fewer financial resources to recruit people, which is particularly
important in the revolving door marketplace as “lobbying salaries are typically
several times higher than public sector salaries” (Vidal et al., 2010 p.2).
The existence of the revolving door and other interpersonal relations between
corporations and members of government is one of the few (non-exclusive) ways in
which the degree of access afforded to the automobile corporations can be
explained. For instance, the move from PNGV to FreedomCAR showed telling signs
of non-formalised backroom discussions between the auto corporations and the
government that effectively decided a major part of US energy policy for eight years.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the initial moves by the Bush administration were
to cut hydrogen funding and to cut PNGV. However, over the course of a few months
this decision was first retreated from, with a 48% cut to the hydrogen research
budget being excluded at the last minute and claims to trim PNGV being dropped,
and then completely reversed, as FreedomCAR was announced and then, a year
after FreedomCAR’s inception, had its budget expanded. Invitation to such
backroom decision making can be explained as due to the close links between the
corporations and government, although a conclusive statement on the importance of
interpersonal relations relative to other mechanisms of influence cannot be drawn.
Second, corporations were able to have their interests represented due to the
procedural bias of the decision-making approach of the government. In particular,
the auto industry benefitted from NHTSA’s use of cost-benefit analysis in setting the
CAFE standards. Working to organise certain concerns out (ironically, in the
following example, by trying to include them) NHTSA’s 2008 analysis saw the
attempt to include non-quantifiable and controversial issues, such as the value of a
human life, the cost of ensuring energy security, and the cost of climate change, in
its analysis. This approach led the “costs” of increased regulation to be well
understood, but the benefits to be poorly so.
Additionally, NHTSA’s procedures relied upon corporate data and corporate product
plans. The benefit from NHTSA relying on voluntarily-provided corporate data for the
corporations was that they had a confidential avenue for influence where they could
pass information (of unknown veracity) that could never be independently
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assessed.119 The result of this arrangement was that NHTSA’s analysis could not be
re-created, that documents pertaining to discussions between NHTSA and the
corporations offered scant information as to what was discussed and that the extent
to which automakers were truthful or accurate could not be evaluated.120 It also
resulted in NHTSA’s estimation of the “maximum feasible” level of fuel economy
being conformed to the predilections of the status quo in the US and to the desires
and projects of the automakers. These procedures were the most important part of
automaker influence in the CAFE implementation stage, but did not really have
broad influence in other areas of the thesis.
Third, corporate claims were widely disseminated by the media, which both helped to
win public backing for the automaker position and to indirectly lobby politicians. In
both case studies the media released stories that worked in the interest of the
American automakers. With FreedomCAR, optimistic assessments of the hydrogen
timeframe, supported by coverage of working (but very expensive and of limited
durability) hydrogen vehicles, helped create the hydrogen hype that supported and
gave legitimacy to the FreedomCAR partnership. Likewise in CAFE, the media
repeatedly deployed the safety argument, most notably in a widely-cited 1998 USA
TODAY article that concluded that 46,000 people had died as a result of the CAFE
standards (Healey, 1999).
All four of these mechanisms show how well-linked the automakers were with other
powerful actors and how such linkages can result in greater corporate power. Such
linkages may not always work – individual journalists could be particularly
independent – but, as chapter three explained, many of these indirect mechanisms
of influence are structurally and economically embedded and, thus, are likely to
operate for other corporations in other policy areas too.
119 The automakers technological capacity to meet new standards can somewhat be assessed
through international comparisons and comparisons to the views on the timeline for a hydrogen
economy, however.
120 In recognition of the issue in this particular example, NHTSA’s post-Bush rulemakings have been
based upon information available in the public realm.
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1a. What methods did corporations themselves use to
represent their interests?
Alongside the indirect representation of their interests, corporations also worked to
garner public and political support by taking direct actions in their interests. With
regards to this research question, ten main points can be drawn from the case
studies. Four of these points – campaign contributions, lobbying, think-tanks and
astroturf groups – have been studied, often in isolation, in the interest group
literature, as explained in chapter two. The six remaining points concern corporations
working as politico-economic actors and which consequently have been overlooked
in the interest group literature.
First, again starting with visible power mechanisms, auto corporations represented
their interests through lobbying and other direct attempts to pass information to
government officials. Primarily working in the CAFE formulation stage, the auto
corporations spent millions of dollars on lobbyists and lobbying in order to try to
influence legislators during the debates that led up to EISA 2007. Equally, the
corporations tried to influence legislative staff and to change their mind, so that they
could in turn influence their legislator. As one interviewee noted "these poor staffers
rarely got genuine unbiased information, what they normally got was people lobbying
them and only giving them one side of an issue."121 Lobbying also occurred at the
implementation level, with GM successfully lobbying NHTSA to set a higher rebound
rate in their calculations of CAFE. Outside of these two situations, however, the
corporations did not need to lobby because they enjoyed close relations with
policymakers. Lobbying, then, while one of the most noticed mechanisms of
corporate influence, does not necessarily operate in many dimensions of corporate
political activity; to return to Schattschneider’s point (1960 p.40) “it is probably a
mistake to assume that pressure politics is the typical or even the most important
relation between government and business.”
Second, the auto corporations gave campaign contributions to politicians in order to
shore up political support and to help ensure the re-election of supportive politicians.
So, for example, John Dingell’s top five campaign contributors from 1989 to present
day include Ford, GM and Chrysler, who collectively spent $726,000 helping him get
121 Recorded Interview with a former Auto Engineer for US and Japanese Auto Companies, 25th April
2011
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elected (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012). In general, however, the
autocompanies gave more money to Republicans than Democrats; with the 29
automotive PACs in the 2006 federal elections donating 73% of their $5.6 million
donation total to Republicans (Center for Responsive Politics, 2006c). Such
partisanship in donations can be understood as a product of Republican opposition
to CAFE – viewing the standards as “anti-business, anti-consumer and too
expensive”122 – and the more general pro-business positions of the Republicans.
However, unlike what could be assumed from the interest group literature’s focus on
PAC contributions, the amount of money that went into campaign contributions was
only a fraction of what the Big Three spent on lobbying. In 2006, for instance, the Big
Three donated $1.65 million to Congressional campaigns (Center for Responsive
Politics, 2006b), but spent $37 million on lobbying, which include $13 million through
the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Center for Responsive Politics, 2006a).
The degree of expense on lobbying suggests the corporations felt that such lobbying
was a worthwhile activity; it had a payoff. Equally, despite prominence in earlier
interest group literature, campaign contributions were not a significant avenue of
corporate resources and, presumably, influence; if contributions worked to change
legislator behaviour significantly then corporations would give more (Ansolabehere et
al., 2003). Instead, what contributions did was signal that the giver was an interested
or important party whose issues deserved attention (Hall and Wayman, 1990). As
one corporate executive said “we give $50, $500…and what that tends to give you is
access…contributions separate the giver from the non-voting population.” 123 A
campaign contribution, then, can serve as a marker for possible future attempts to
influence, but is not a significant attempt to influence in and of itself.
Third, moving to hidden power mechanisms, the auto corporations gave money to
individuals and think-tanks to produce research supportive of their position and that
was not tainted by obvious economic self-interest, which it would have been had it
come directly from the corporations (Smith, 2000 p.193). This paid-for research
provided ammunition for lobbyists, for supportive politicians and for the auto
companies themselves. The most notable example of this activity was in the
automakers funding of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the CEI helping to
122 Recorded Interview with Congressional Research staffer, 8th April 2011
123 Recorded Interview with Auto Company Executive, 11th June 2011
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produce research that established the safety argument against CAFE standards in
the 1980s. This move was very influential over both the short- and long-term. In the
short term, the safety argument successfully altered the agenda of the debate in the
Bryan bill and contributed to the defeat of the 1990 legislation.
Over a longer term, through media repetition and through the continued work of the
think-tanks the safety argument became established truth; the safety argument
switched from being a position that politicians argued about, to an argument
politicians argued from. This shift in the position of the safety argument was
complete when the argument was taken into the centrally-important 2002 NAS,
which anointed the argument with political legitimacy as it became established “fact”.
Reflecting this shift, one think-tank interviewee said that “the finding about CAFE’s
effects on auto safety [in the 2002 NAS] is a finding, rather than a speculation.”124
That a minority opinion chapter – the only in the report – disagreed with the finding
was something that was left out of the political record (and the interview); that the
report itself was still mired in controversy did not stop the safety argument becoming
the basis for NHTSA rulemakings, becoming an important point of reference in
political debates or being included as a provision in proposed bills by long-term
advocates of higher CAFE standards. Through think-tanks, then, the automakers
managed to fundamentally alter the terms of the CAFE debate and change the
accepted political facts about CAFE standards, size and safety.
Fourth, the auto corporations utilised front and astroturf groups to represent their
interests. The purpose of these groups was to give the appearance of widespread
public concern, to galvanise the public and to disseminate information to the media,
while appearing as a disinterested, neutral party. For instance, the Coalition for
Vehicle Choice campaigned very effectively against the Bryan bill in 1990 and the
McCain-Kerry amendment in 2002. The CVC employed various advertising and
outside lobbying techniques, such as when the coalition set up an online form
entitled “Tell your Senators to protect vehicle choice” that would send messages to
Senators and that encouraged users to “discuss how higher CAFE standards would
affect you, your family and the vehicle(s) you drive” (Coalition for Vehicle Choice,
2001 [emphasis in original]) in their message. Moreover, the CVC was seen as
sufficiently independent that it was invited to the 2002 NAS study meetings alongside
124 Recorded interview with free market think-tank staff, 8th June 2011
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the auto corporations; adding a veneer of independence to the claims of the auto
industry. Astroturfing, then, offered the auto corporations a way in which they could
attempt to influence the public and policymakers while not appearing to be doing
anything.
Moving to the mechanisms of influence that are largely absent in the interest group
literature, the case studies showed six different mechanisms – four visible power and
two hidden power – in which corporations were able to represent their interests. First,
the most notable visible power mechanism exercised by the automakers was making
production decisions and plans in line with their interests. Basically, the US
automakers represented their interests through building SUVs and then deploying
the many methods of persuasion used by almost all modern major corporations to
get individuals to buy SUVs. The cumulative impact of these automaker actions was
to fundamentally shift the “economic reality” that policymakers worked around; it
directly altered society and altered the social foundations of new policy. In its
everyday deployment, this mechanism of influence is perhaps both the most
significant and, because of the consumer choice discourse, one of the least
appreciated manners of corporate political action.
Second, the auto corporations were able to realise their interests by establishing
deadlines and goals that they then do not meet and then setting new deadline and
goals; to repeatedly kick the can further down the road. Long-term goals worked
particularly well, as agreements made with one administration were not a priority for
the new administration and so were reneged on without any negative consequences.
For instance, President Clinton tried to increase national fuel efficiency by creating
the PNGV, instead of pursuing CAFE increases. PNGV had a ten year timeframe
and thus making progress on the issue of fuel economy was pushed ten years
forward. Yet, after eight years and the removal of the Democrats from the White
House, the auto corporations backed out of PNGV and pushed for hydrogen (again
on the understanding that FreedomCAR was instead of CAFE), which was meant to
kick the can another 10-20 years forward. In these cases, the auto corporations were
able to claim they were working on a problem, which allowed them to not tackle the
problem right away. Such tactics were clearly highlighted when a GM Vice President
argued that, because of having to divert resources to incremental immediate pay-off
technologies, “CAFE is actually an obstacle to the realization of this [hydrogen
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economy] vision” (Davis, 2001 p.41). This argument was made even despite the fact
that the auto corporations had improved engine efficiency, but spent these
improvements on increased performance (as seen in fig 5.2). By kicking the can, the
automakers were able to continue to produce and profit from SUVs, and so shift
CAFE’s political landscape further; it provided a useful tactic for protecting
automaker production decisions.
Third, when the auto corporations felt that a policy or an action was not in their
interest the corporations would drag their feet, would claim such an action was not
feasible and would, essentially, refuse to use their material resources to achieve the
political goals of others; part of automaker visible power was the capacity to not act.
For instance, as the corporations came nearer to having to deliver on some of the
PNGV goals, they started to resist spending money on the PNGV prototypes, making
the argument that a family sedan wasn’t what the marketplace wanted. Yet Gore’s
offer to include SUVs in PNGV, and so align PNGV with the “direction of the market”,
was rejected. Such obstructionism was not a new feature of industry-government
relations, with one Senator saying that
“I remember – and I probably should not say this – when cars got 10 miles to
the gallon, 12 miles to the gallon, and the auto companies said, ‘‘Oh, my God,
we really cannot do better, it is impossible.’’ And they could not make seat
belts, and they could not make airbags” (Boxer, 2001 p.20).
Such automaker claims about the lack of the technological possibility of new features,
or the lack of market demand, are given extra weight because the view of the auto
corporations as having technical and marketplace expertise, with relative inattention
being given to the conflict of interest present with their views.
Conversely, when the auto corporations felt that an action or policy was in their
interest, they became enthusiastic supporters of it; they took the opportunities
presented to them with gusto. So, in contrast to the auto companies’ rejection of
Gore’s offer to include SUVs in PNGV and their long-standing rejection of CAFE
standards, the auto companies were active supporters of the FreedomCAR
partnership, with its lack of commercialisation goals, acceptance of SUVs, longer
timeframe and recognition that the technology was high-risk. Such selectivity in
action – kicking the can, dragging their feet and charging forward – is particularly
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effective in dealing with government due to the endurance of corporate management
structures. For example, while GM’s interests and goals were relatively stable,
government goals changed with elections. Corporations, then, can exploit the fact
that they are able to work with regards to much longer (political) timeframes than
government’s 2/4/8-year views. As such, corporations, in pursuing their interests,
can adopt tactics that reflect a changed political environment; they can bend with the
times so as to minimise losses in bad situations and maximise gains in good
situations, all the time aiming to realise their (primarily financial) interests.
An ancillary benefit for corporations of the constant changing of government
personnel is that the claims and arguments made by corporations can be recycled
over different administrations. For instance, claims about hydrogen being just around
the corner were not met with the scepticism that was warranted by previous
automaker investigations into alternative fuel technology. 125 This recycling gives
some of the claims time to become established and shift the terms of the debate,
such as the safety argument in CAFE, whereas other arguments, such as the choice
argument or the technical feasibility argument, are simply reused in the same format.
Fourth, the automakers were brought in to have discussions with the government
about policy so as to directly represent their views and negotiate with government;
they were afforded a degree of access that at times bordered on the corporations
becoming decision makers, and at other times, saw the automakers become formal
decision makers in government policy. The best examples of direct negotiations with
the automakers occurred during the genesis of both PNGV and FreedomCAR,
whereby the details of the partnership were negotiated in private between the
government and the automakers; at these points while the corporations were taking
part in decision-making, authority remained with the government. However, in the
form of the horizontal structure adopted by FreedomCAR’s Executive Steering group
the automakers had shared authority over a traditionally-public role in the form of the
disbursement of public funds. So, the auto corporations were able to represent their
interests through both getting very high levels of access to decision-making spaces
and to be formally included – vested with authority – in decision-making spaces.
125 The various assortment of alternative fuels that have been explored, and hyped, since 1973
include compressed natural gas, liquid petroleum gas, methanol, ethanol and cellulosic ethanol.
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Fifth, moving to hidden power mechanisms, the automakers successfully set the
agenda through the demonstration of technology and the production of prototypes.
Such technology demonstration was an important part in convincing the public and
politicians that the companies were making progress towards goals, and that certain
technology options were viable; it gave their claims a material reality. For instance,
the move by the auto companies towards hydrogen was accompanied by public
demonstrations (and media coverage) of HFC vehicles in order to give the idea of
such vehicles as “road ready” and the widespread application of the technology as
just around the corner. Thus, one of the ways in which the automakers ensured
support for their plans was via giving material evidence of the feasibility of their plans,
even if such material cost hundreds of thousands of dollars (as HFC prototypes did)
to produce.
Sixth, the automakers were able to put forward certain arguments and make certain
claims due to their control of scarce information about their activities and the market
due to their technological expertise. For instance, the auto corporations made the
claim, which was influential in policy debates to keep PNGV funding, that they had
spent $980 million a year on “PNGV-related research”, which served as a way to
prove their commitment to the partnership and as a justification for continued funding.
Yet this spending was never independently verifiable and, when looked at in greater
(but still not full) detail, was described by the National Research Council (2001 p.10)
as “highly subjective” in what it included as PNGV related. The control of such
scarce information, then, allowed corporations to selectively reveal information in a
manner that manipulated perceptions.
Therefore, in addition to showing indirect represent of corporate interests, the cases
also demonstrated a large number of ways in which corporations directly
represented their interests. Many of these mechanisms of influence – lobbying,
campaign contributions, think-tanks and astroturf groups – are well-represented in
the interest group literature. Yet, due to these avenues of influence being often
studied in isolation, and only explored to the extent that they influence the political
arena, conclusions drawn just from these mechanisms of influence have neglected
much of the influence of corporations. Hence, studies on PACs, for instance, have
failed consistently to find corporate influence operating through donations to
campaigns (Werner and Wilson, 2010 p.265). The points raised in this section
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concerning the actions of auto corporations outside of the formal political arena
showed how important other mechanisms of influence were in changing both
government policy and societal outcomes. Thus, greater attention needs to be given
to these mechanisms of influence, alongside the traditional mechanisms identified in
the interest group literature, in further explorations of corporate power.
2. Were corporations influential and, if so, why?
How auto corporations were able to have their interests represented only tells half of
the story. The success of the tactics used, the arguments used, the access granted
and the reasons that other actors helped represent to corporate interests, were all
reliant upon the wider discursive and legal environment in which policy evolved.
Discussing how the wider context empowered corporations would be rather broad,
so only the most important elements seen in the case studies are discussed here.
For instance, the legal fiction of corporate personhood is important but was not
documented as contributing in any specific way to the case studies and so is not
discussed here. In total, six main reasons – one hidden power mechanism and five
broader invisible power mechanisms – for the success of corporate interests can be
discerned from the case studies.
Starting with the sole hidden power mechanism, the auto corporations were able to
have their interests represented successfully due to the privilege of corporate
confidentiality as this privilege underlay many of the other mechanisms seen above.
Corporate confidentiality is not a privilege the automakers had to fight for, but it was
a situation that helped them realise their interests none the less. In the most extreme
cases, confidentiality was actually a prerequisite for some mechanisms, such as the
use of think-tanks and astroturf groups. Without such confidentiality, particularly
regarding the distribution of corporate funds, the links between corporations and
these groups would be apparent and the mechanisms would be significantly less
effective. In the main, however, corporate confidentiality ensured their continued
access to scarce information, which allowed the automakers to manipulate through
omission, and by complicating the accountability of the corporations, particularly
regarding FreedomCAR’s Executive Steering Group.
Moving now to the five invisible power discourses that empowered the auto
corporations, the first were widespread neoliberal beliefs in the positive and
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normative relationship between the market and the state. On the positive side, the
automakers were viewed as conditioned by the market. The consequence of this
view is two-fold. First, consumers were viewed as sovereign and the market as a
reflection of consumer choice. This belief in consumer choice gave the automakers a
powerful tool with which to oppose CAFE standards and PNGV with, which they did,
most notably through the Coalition for Vehicle Choice. This discourse was powerful
because it aped ideas of democracy and freedom, and so arguing against it would
have involved navigating some difficult terrain.
Second, the automakers were able to make decisions in the market, while protected
by this view of economic democracy. So, in spite of the fact that the automakers
decided to improve performance over fuel efficiency and chose to prioritise the sale
of SUVs and large vehicles over smaller vehicles, these decisions were not seen as
decisions made by corporations, instead they were perceived as solely the desires of
consumers and the product of the decisions of these consumers. While consumers
were not absent in this situation and did buy SUVs, the auto companies chose to
produce the vehicles (in violation of the spirit of CAFE) and spent a lot of time and
money convincing consumers they wanted SUVs as “you have to have compelling
marketing to sell vehicles”. 126 In corporate decisions not being recognised,
accountability for the violation of the spirit of the EPCA was lost and the societal shift
to SUVs was conferred with a form of cast-iron “democratic” legitimacy. This
legitimacy meant that the switch from PNGV was able to be justified on the grounds
that it did not reflect the “direction of the market” and that CAFE proponents had to
reconcile themselves to the automakers’ blurring of the boundaries between
passenger vehicles and light trucks.
On the normative side, neoliberalism contains a claim about the proper relation
between the state and the market in that it advocates limited government and a free
market. This mainstream normative view was very effective in insulating the
corporations from regulation since a consequence of this normative view is that
government should not interfere in the auto market. For instance, CAFE standards
were subject to claims such as “Congress has no business dictating automotive fuel
efficiency. That's a job for consumers, not vote-hustling politicians” (Taylor and
126 Over many years, this pressure can become self-sustaining as the auto corporations “make
changes that the customer will see, be delighted in, and then demand [next time they buy a vehicle]”.
Recorded interview with GM Spokesperson, 6th May 2011.
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Doren, 2007). There was also a belief, then, that if the market is allowed to do its job,
it will (if consumers wish it to). This idea was deployed less than the positive
arguments, but could be seen as partially responsible for Republican antipathy
towards CAFE standards and subsequent support of the automakers. In total,
neoliberalism provided an anti-regulatory environment that worked well to hide many
aspects of corporate power and to shield the automakers from greater regulation.
The second invisible power reason why corporations were successful was a view of
the national interest as maintaining current jobs and GDP growth. This conception of
the national interest positioned corporations well, allowing them to claim that
proposals were “job-killing” and to rally political opposition to such proposals on the
grounds that it will hurt societal well-being. For example, in 2003, Senator Domenici
(R-NM) spoke of his happiness at the defeat of the “job-killing anti-safety” McCain-
Kerry CAFE amendment (Domenici, 2003 p.S9890). Likewise, while NHTSA was
finalising new CAFE standards in 2008, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
was claiming that the proposals would kill 82,000 jobs (Shunk, 2008). What is most
interesting about these claims is that they were being made while the Big Three were
shedding jobs due to competition with foreign firms and their smaller, more fuel
efficient cars; the Big Three had lost 215,000 jobs collectively between 2000-2006
(Smith, 2006 p.7). The focus on growth and jobs – which was also a long-standing
feature of Republican rhetoric (Smith, 2007 p.15) – allowed automakers to scare
politicians into thinking that the automaker-opposed policy would primarily hurt the
public by hurting the corporations.
However, these first two discourses – the free market and a view of growth as the
national interest – are contradictory and combined in a way that further empowered
the corporations. So, when the financial crisis of 2008 hit and both GM and Chrysler
were faced with bankruptcy the principles of non-intervention, and allowing the free
market to operate according to the invisible hand, were discarded; Schumpeter’s
idea of the “creative destruction of the market” was reined in so as to preserve jobs
and to bolster declining GDP. So, with CAFE (and to an extent with FreedomCAR),
free marketism was used as a justificatory mechanism for non-intervention when the
corporations did not need, nor want, intervention. Yet when GM and Chrysler faced
bankruptcy they were rescued with a far greater intervention than was on the cards
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previously.127 Bush even tried to justify this intervention utilising a somewhat tortured
logic of rescuing the free market through intervention, saying that “I have abandoned
free market principles to save the free market system” (CNN, 2008). In their
combination, then, these two ideas worked to promote an environment whereby the
auto corporations got the best of both worlds in terms of selective intervention and
non-intervention.
Third, the automakers were given a privileged position on the policymaking table
because of a view of the major corporation as “the politico-economic expert” in a
capitalist democracy (Fuchs, 2005b). This view, like their control of scarce
information, gave weight to their pronouncements on technology and the
marketplace. It was also one of the main reasons the FreedomCAR partnership was
formed in the manner it was. FreedomCAR, through the ESG, had the automakers
deciding which technological paths to pursue and what research would benefit the
country, rather than a panel of outside experts or even a broader panel that allowed
the participation of US start-ups.
Similarly, the auto corporations benefitted from the view of them as major
stakeholders in certain areas of regulation. The view of the corporations as
stakeholders led to their inclusion in, and consultation throughout, the policy-making
process. So, for example, in deciding the CAFE standards, the auto corporations
communicated a great deal with NHTSA. While NHTSA stressed that it wasn’t
exclusive in whom it communicated with – that it met “with all stakeholders” – it was
contacted by the autocompanies to a much greater extent than other groups and
communicated, confidentially, with the autocompanies. Moreover, CAFE standards
directly impacted upon basic environmental issues – such as air pollution and global
warming – where everyone (even citizens of other states) would be considered
stakeholders, yet it is only those who were organised, cognizant and aware of the
rule-making who could effectively communicate with NHTSA or that NHTSA could
meet with. The understanding of corporations as stakeholders and politico-economic
experts, then, helps explain why corporations were listened to to a larger degree
than other actors in the policy evolution of both case studies.
127 Somewhat ironically, had the car companies accepted Bryan bill CAFE standards they would have
been in a far better position to compete with foreign automakers in the higher-oil-price market of the
2000s. As one interviewee said, these companies weren’t “in trouble because [they were] smart”.
Interview with Congressional Staffer, 11th May 2011.
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Fourth, the automakers were empowered by notions of output legitimacy taking
precedence over input legitimacy. Like being viewed as stakeholders and experts,
output legitimacy facilitated corporate involvement in government decision making as
their involvement was meant to allow the achievement of public goals. This notion of
output legitimacy was most present in FreedomCAR and the inclusion of the
automakers, but was also evident in NHTSA’s operating procedures – whereby the
corporations were involved in confidential discussions and had the rule-making
process based on information they submitted on the grounds that it would allow
better policy to be made. Thus, the notion of output legitimacy served as an
important cover for corporate involvement in nominally democratic decision-making
processes and procedures.
Fifth, corporate interests were successfully represented because they fitted well
within, and consciously utilised, the sound science discourse. The sound science
discourse served two main functions for the corporations. The first function was to
allow the construction of an official science supportive of business goals and of the
executive position and the dismissal of any scientific position opposed to the official
science. Such construction was evident in the creation of the 2002 NAS report, in
NHTSA’s cost-benefit analysis, in the deployment of Jevons’ Paradox in debates,
and, more generally, with executive, and industry, scepticism towards climate
change. In order to support such construction, other scientific viewpoints had to be
marginalised. In the main, such marginalisation was done by relying on simplistic,
partial and “common sense” arguments that were easily repeatable and so easy to
disseminate to a wide audience. For instance, the safety argument was premised on
“simple physics” – in a collision, all things being equal, a heavier object will deform a
lighter object. This common sense and simply-expressed viewpoint undercut more
nuanced and complex views that sought impartiality and fairness in considering
points. Hence, the minority chapter in the NAS study, which expressed the view that
an issue “is complex, ambiguous, poorly understood, and not measurable by any
known means at the present time”, (National Academy of Sciences, 2002 p.117) was
left out of the political record. This use of sound science, then, moved scientists into
a weak position if they express any level of scientific doubt and thereby allowed a
scientific position supportive of automaker interests to be built.
The second function of the sound science discourse was to focus policy on
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supporting advanced technological solutions to societal problems in a manner that
serves to hide the political decisions that were available. As Žižek (2009 p.25)
argues
“confronting ecological problems requires making choices and decisions –
about what to produce, what to consume, on what energy to rely – which
ultimately concern the very way of life of a people; as such they are not only
not technical, but are eminently political in the most radical sense of involving
fundamental social choices”.
Such appreciation and reflection of the fundamentally political nature of these
choices is not apparent, for example, in Cheney’s exhortation, while announcing a
large expansion in fossil fuel drilling, that "conservation may be a sign of personal
virtue but it is not a sufficient basis for a sound, comprehensive energy policy"
(Benedetto, 2001). Likewise, the implicit model of the hydrogen economy was a
replication of the current US transportation system128 , which is marked by high
private car ownership, inefficient energy usage, urban sprawl and weak public
transport infrastructure. The championing of FreedomCAR, then, avoided broader
questions about the desirability or sustainability of such a system, which is
internationally unique in its widespread high use of energy. In both of these functions,
sound science helped the corporations develop a scientific high-ground that
protected their interests.
Additionally, corporations were supported in their use of this discourse because
Republican policy-makers were actively being urged, behind the scenes, to make
use of sound science tactics, particularly in regards to global warming. Revealed in a
2002 leaked memorandum from political strategist Frank Luntz to Republican
leaders, Republicans were reminded that
“the most important principle in any discussion of global warming is your
commitment to sound science. Americans unanimously believe all
environmental rules and regulations should be based on sound science and
common sense. Similarly, our confidence in the ability of science and
technology to solve our nation's ills is second to none. Both perceptions will
work in your favor if properly cultivated” (as quoted in McGarity, 2003 p.899).
128 Recorded interview with American Petroleum Institute staff, 14th April 2011
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Likewise, reflecting the FreedomCAR-CAFE tradeoff and neoliberal discourses,
Luntz wrote that “we need to emphasize how voluntary innovation and
experimentation are preferable to bureaucratic or international intervention and
regulation.”
Thus, many of the reasons why corporations were successful in having their
interests represented underlie how they represented their interests and had their
interests represented. The auto corporations could rely on already-existing societal
discourses and privileges that decreased the cost, and increased the likelihood of
success, in pursuing the representation of their interests. With the invisible power
discourses mentioned above, the automakers were structurally empowered and so
able to realise their interests to a far greater extent than had the discursive
environment been more neutral, or even hostile. As such, these mechanisms are
another important aspect of corporate power.
3. What was the impact of the inclusion of corporate interests in
the policy-evolution process?
The inclusion of the interests of the American automobile corporations had a large
impact upon the two cases studies, and on the goals associated with these case
studies. The most notable impact of their inclusion on both case studies was the
continuation and worsening of US oil dependence. While neither policy could have
seen an end to US oil dependence in the timeframe of this study, they could have
begun to make an impact. Instead, CAFE standards were continually delayed and
FreedomCAR pursued unhelpful goals.
With CAFE standards, the inclusion of corporate interests saw a legislative deadlock
that lasted from 1990 to 2007. In helping to ensure this legislative deadlock, the
corporations gave themselves room to use fuel economy improvements on
increasing performance and to sell profitable SUVs. The cumulative impact of the
inclusion of corporate interests in this policy area can be seen in the lowering of
proposed CAFE increases, whereby the 1990 attempted increase in CAFE
standards proposed by the Bryan Bill would have seen many manufacturers having
to achieve 40 mpg by 2000, rather than the 35 mpg by 2020 that EISA 2007 finally
settled on.
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Similarly, American automaker involvement in PNGV delayed the widespread
deployment of new technology that could have helped reduce US oil dependence.
The refusal of the automakers to comply with the spirit of the partnership and to carry
the policy through under President Bush meant that hybrid technology was not
significantly deployed in the US market by the US automakers. By contrast, Toyota
and Honda both introduced hybrid vehicles that had greater efficiency than
conventional vehicles and that could link into future, non-oil, technology. Both the US
automakers refusal to deploy technology and their opposition to CAFE standards will
have a drag effect on US oil dependence as such moves also contribute to poor fleet
fuel efficiency over the medium-term future; vehicles sold in the 2001-2007 period
will continue to be used for the next 10-20 years and will work as a drag on realised
fuel economy.
When CAFE increases were finally secured, they came with many concessions to
the auto corporations. Not only were the increases “exceedingly modest”129 but EISA
2007 also offered the Big Three billions worth of grants and low-interest loans; it
opened the public purse so that it could help subsidise losses incurred by the US
corporations. EISA, through shifting to a size-based standard for calculating CAFE,
also freed the Big Three from having to produce more fuel efficient small cars and
instead had a greater impact on the more fuel efficient foreign automakers. In doing
so, the shift to an attribute standard effectively cemented the place of the SUV in
both policy and society, thereby ensuring the continuation of the US automakers’
business model.
Unfortunately for the US automakers, the business model that they had adopted was
not particularly robust, and their actions (and government policy inaction) helped the
US automakers continue down a path that would see two of the Big Three go
bankrupt. Their SUV-focus made the US automakers very vulnerable to later oil price
rises and their refusal to deploy hybrid technology cost them both potentially high-
selling models and the company prestige that went with hybrids such as the Toyota
Prius. So, somewhat ironically, the inclusion of US automaker interests in policy
could have not been in the long-term interests of the corporations; getting the
policies they asked for allowed the US automakers to continue to shoot themselves
in the foot.
129 Recorded interview with environmental think-tank staff, 11th April 2011.
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With FreedomCAR, corporate involvement in the formulation of policy saw the
federal pursuit of a technology that required major breakthroughs, decades of
research and that, if the technology was made both sufficiently cost-competitive and
durable, would have required an overhaul of the entire US transport fuel
infrastructure. At the same time, there was no requirement for the deployment of
currently available technology. Corporate involvement, then, pushed US research
policy towards spending time on research with uncertain payoffs and limited real
world applicability to the detriment of other technologies with more definite and
immediate payoffs. In arguing for such a situation, the auto corporations
simultaneously dismissed small improvements in fuel efficiency as too difficult and
endorsed a policy that required a number of breakthrough technologies and an
overhaul of the entire transport infrastructure as a reliable and sensible strategy.
Similarly, while working at the state level, other potentially useful policies were also
headed off by the work of the auto corporations; most notably California’s ZEV
mandate and its 1990s experiment with electric vehicles.
Finally, on a slightly different note, at the implementation level of the FreedomCAR
partnership, the inclusion of the Big Three occurred with little public oversight or
democratic accountability. So not quite an outcome, but more of a procedural issue
with the inclusion of the automakers was the horizontal nature of the partnership and
the inclusion of corporations on an equal footing to government while exercising the
traditionally-public role of the disbursement of public research funding. Through the
partnership, then, the corporations effectively “appropriate[d] public authority while
evading mechanisms of accountability for the exercise of that authority” (Moran,
2002 p.405), thereby discrediting and neglecting US democratic norms.
The overall impact, then, of the representation of corporate interests was to secure
US oil dependence, to give concessions to the US automakers, to allow the US
automakers to continue to shoot themselves in the foot, to pursue an imprudent
government-funded research strategy, and to neglect democratic norms. In summary,
the representation of automaker interests had a negative impact on government
policy, the US economy and on society.
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Academic Contribution
This thesis has four main original contributions to knowledge; one analytical, one
empirical, one methodological and one pertaining to a real world problem. First, it
provides an analytical framework for understanding the power of a corporation
working as a political actor that reconciles many diverse mechanisms of influence
and allows understanding of how these mechanisms can reinforce and complement
one another. Such a framework is reasonably rare; as Hacker and Pierson (2002
p.279) state, “a central task for studies of business power is to specify the ways in
which influence is exerted in the political process”. In American interest group
literature such a framework does not exist at all because both the research questions
and the methodology of contemporary interest group researchers encourage a focus
on small parts of the policymaking process rather than developing broader
explanatory frameworks.
In the political economy literature, however, Fuchs (2005a, 2007) has built a similar
framework for exploring the power of a corporation as a political actor in global
governance. Like the framework developed here, Fuchs’ framework utilises Lukes’
three dimensions of power (Fuchs, 2007 ch.3), so it also tries to consider agenda
setting and the power of ideas. Yet, Fuchs’ account is built solely from the literature
and has loosely applied the three dimensions of power to the literature, rather than
building from the concept of power up and clearly establishing the assumptions of
the framework. The result is that Fuchs’ framework is both uneven in its treatment of
power and incomplete in the mechanisms of power included.
As such, the framework of this thesis is an improvement of that of Fuchs in four
respects. First, it gives a political economy account of corporate visible power that
includes market decision making, rather than a more narrow focus on instrumental
power in the political process. Second, it provides an account of hidden power
mechanisms that are entirely absent in Fuchs’ framework – think-tanks, for instance,
get one footnote in an entire book (ibid. p.158). Third, this thesis’s framework
advances an understanding of invisible power that considers how actors can be
discursively empowered from the start of the period of study (and not necessarily
responsible for that empowerment), rather than focusing on how corporations work
to improve their image and frame debates; power is understood in the framework as
the capacity to realise interests and is not limited to being understood through its
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exercise. Finally, by using Gaventa the analytical framework of this thesis avoids the
well-documented problem with Lukes’ third dimension of power in determining real
interests (see Bernhagen, 2007 pp.41-42), which Fuchs’ framework still faces. Thus,
the analytical framework of this thesis is both an important contribution to US interest
group literature, as it allows a better understanding of the influence of corporations,
and an improvement on the only political economy framework (Fuchs) for
understanding the power of corporate political actors.
Second, in applying the framework, there is an empirical contribution from this thesis.
Both case studies concern recent events for which many accounts are yet to be
generated. As such, original data was gathered on fieldwork in Washington D.C. and
Ann Arbor, Michigan and, alongside primary data, was used in the construction of
the chapters; such data allowed the chronology to be understood and causation to
be inferred. In particular, the hydrogen case study, owning to its currency, required
significant work understanding the history, let alone the role of corporations in this
history. In comparison, CAFE, at least, had previously been mapped by accounts of
the policy in its 30 year history, although it still required original work for the Bush
time period. The thesis therefore provides two new accounts of policies which can be
drawn upon in other work.
Third, the thesis develops a novel methodological approach in terms of the casing of
corporate power. Linked very much to the assumptions of the analytical framework,
this thesis has used cases of policy evolution, rather than policy making. Exploring
policy evolution – with its emphasis on how policy ultimately affects society – allows
the classical and important questions of interest group literature of “who governs?” –
or Held and McGrew’s (2003, p.8) “Who rules, in whose interests, by what
mechanisms and for what purposes?” – to be returned to from its current narrow
focus on “who wins in politics”. Thus, this thesis has helped develop a case study
approach that facilitates the exploration of substantive issues concerning US
democracy and corporate capitalism, rather than missing them.
Fourth, this thesis shows how corporate power in domestic politics is connected to
the international consequences of US oil dependence and the real world problems
that such dependence exacerbates. As chapter one showed, the literature on, and
politics of, oil dependence primarily considers the issue as one of international
relations; it is a supply-side focused literature that seeks solutions to problems of
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supply. Yet, as demonstrated by this thesis, US oil demand is both comparatively
high, and constructed through domestic politics and the power of corporations in US
domestic politics; there are important demand side issues that are missing from, and
that complement, the picture. Hence, the final contribution of this thesis is a (partial)
understanding of the domestic construction of US oil dependence.
Limitations
The main limitations of this research relate to the difficulty of studying influence
generally, and of studying corporate influence in particular. Studying influence
involves investigating the existence of an intangible and non-concrete concept
through exploring actions and discourse, which necessitates drawing causal
relationships between actions, discourses and outcomes; in short, it is like looking for
a “black cat in a coal bin at midnight” (as quoted in Cigler and Loomis, 1995 p.28).
These causal relationships could be misunderstood because there could be
unaccounted-for influences or factors that were missed in the analysis but that were
the actual cause.
Equally, establishing that one action (lobbying, PAC contributions, etc) caused
another (defeat of a bill) is very difficult and there are many cases that can only be
decided through evaluative (and fallible) decisions made by the researcher. For
instance, “should the realisation of CAFE standards in 2007 be understood as a
decline of the power of the auto industry?” was a question that requires researcher
evaluation. In this case, it was decided that economic and political circumstances
(increase in the price of oil, the poor financial position of the Big Three, and a
Democratic Congress) had altered the CAFE policy environment in a way that
weakened the position of the automakers. However, EISA 2007 wasn’t understood
as marking a decline of the power of the industry generally because the
autocompanies managed to both extract concessions in return for higher CAFE
standards and continued to operate powerfully in the other case study. Careful
analysis, and sensitivity to data and context, therefore, is necessary to understand
and investigate influence.
Studying corporate influence, in particular, is even more difficult due to a great deal
of the information not being in the public domain. Corporate confidentiality, and the
operation of closed policy-making spaces (such as that underlying the Cheney
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report), operate very effectively to limit investigations into corporate influence;
perhaps explaining why “there are about a hundred political scientists studying
parties and elections for every one studying business and politics” (Wilson, 2006).
This limitation was significantly mitigated by the openness of the American system,
the moves to digitise American government material, and the work of non-profit
organisations such as the Center for Responsive Politics to sort through and make
accessible a lot of the information that is available because of the American system’s
openness. In less open systems a far greater reliance on interviews (which would
make the problems with interviews and access much greater) and the creation of
much more original data would be required. However, despite the openness of the
American system, there is a wealth of information that was unavailable for this thesis.
Judgement, evaluation and second-hand accounts were thus required to fill in the
narrative at points with sparse documentation.
Further Studies
This thesis has covered many different issues and raised many questions which
could provide the groundwork for further research. Primarily the most direct further
studies from this thesis could utilise the analytical framework and policy evolution
cases to study other instances of corporate power in the US; other policy areas could
be explored for corporate power. Fig 7-2 is a general framework for such studies that
brings together some of less policy-specific mechanisms of influence seen in the
case studies (the safety argument, for instance, is very CAFE-specific).
Figure 7-2: Generic Framework of Corporate Power
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Extending the scope of the work more, this framework could serve as a useful guide
for exploring corporate power in other national or international political arenas.
However, some mechanisms will be more applicable in different contexts than others
– for instance, sound science may not be an established political discourse, nor cost-
benefit analysis an established practice in a particular national context.
Equally, a direct follow-up to this thesis – a research project that explored CAFE
standards and FreedomCAR in the Obama period – could be very interesting. Such
a study would encounter both the difference in Republican and Democratic
Presidents and the impact of the bankruptcies of General Motors and Chrysler on the
power of these corporations. Perhaps, in light of these changes, such a study would
reveal some very different corporate-government dynamics than were present during
the Bush period.
Conclusion
In exploring the two case studies, this thesis found that a significant degree of
influence was coming from the Big Three automakers, with the result that US oil
dependence was not challenged in the Bush period. The thesis also documented
how automaker power worked through many direct and indirect mechanisms – only
some of which had been covered in the interest group literature – and which was
successful, in part, due to the discursive environment that corporations worked in
and had helped to shape. In order to account for these mechanisms of influence, this
thesis developed a novel analytical framework for understanding how corporations
working as a political actor can be powerful, which was built using Gaventa’s forms
of power, a wide array of literature and with some of the case study analysis. This
analytical framework allowed the exploration of the different manners in which power
can work and helped show the interlinkages between different mechanisms of
influence. It is this analytical framework and the method for applying that is the
primary contribution of the thesis and which, as shown in the preceding section,
could be used for further studies of corporate power.
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion
“The President believes that it’s an American way of life, that it should be the goal of
policy-makers to protect the American way of life. The American way of life is a
blessed one…the President considers Americans’ heavy use of energy a reflection
of the strength of our economy, of the way of life that the American people have
come to enjoy.”
Ari Fleischer (2001)
While the research questions were answered in the previous chapter, an explicit
answer to the motivating question of this research project remains, namely “Why,
despite the numerous problems stemming from it and high-level political concern,
have successive US administrations failed to enact policies that reduce oil
dependence?” The Bush administration is, in fact a good example of this situation;
like many administrations before it, and despite some loud rhetoric, the
administration failed to substantially improve either US oil dependence or US import
reliance. The policies that were put in place were limited; with either very low
technically-achievable goals or ridiculously-high technically-difficult goals. Equally,
effective policies that have worked well in other countries, such as gasoline taxes,
were again ignored.
While the thesis can only shed limited light on why previous administrations failed to
reduce US oil dependence, it can point quite directly to three of the reasons why the
Bush administration failed to enact policies that successfully reduced US oil
dependence. The first reason was the influence on domestic politics of corporations.
As this thesis has demonstrated, these corporations – particularly the Big Three
automotive corporations – have used a variety of methods to represent their interests,
to alter the terms of the debate and to promote policies not harmful to their interests;
they worked as powerful political actors to realise their private interests at the
expense of the public interest. Because the interests of these corporations are
aligned with the oil-dependent status quo, they successfully worked to maintain the
status quo.
Second, the thesis demonstrated that alongside the automakers, elements of the
political establishment worked to help auto interests in many different arenas and in
many different ways. The story told by this thesis is not simply one of external actors
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bending the government to its will, but the government being receptive to, and
inclined toward, the interests of corporate actors. This receptiveness helped bolster
the corporations efforts to realise their interests and allowed the automakers to
operate even more powerfully to maintain the oil dependent status quo.
Third, the discursive environment in which policy evolved supported the status quo,
supported corporate political actions and supported the indirect political support the
automakers received. Of all of the discourses mentioned in chapters 3 and 7, the
most notable of these for oil dependence were neoliberalism and GDP growth.
These two discourses served to broadly validate the status quo, to direct attention to
certain issues while neglecting others and justified the major political and economic
roles that corporations were playing. These discourses, alongside the many others
mentioned in this thesis, imbued the avoiding of the problems of oil dependence with
legitimacy and, by lack of challenge, ensured that they continued to operate after the
Bush period.
So, the failure of the Bush administration to institute effective policy that deals with
oil dependence can be understood as caused by opposition from powerful actors in
society, by the representation of auto interests by other actors internal to the
government, and by exclusionary discourses that discount oil dependence and the
problems associated with it. These reasons are not the whole story as to why the
Bush administration failed (or other previous administrations have failed), nor are
they exclusive from one another; yet, understanding these points – which have been
neglected by many – and critically re-evaluating the reasoning and actions
supporting them is necessary to deal with many of the serious and pressing
ecological, health and social problems that exist for both the US, the international
system and the world stemming from US oil dependence. If progress on the
substantial real world problems caused by US oil dependence is going to be made,
many of the configurations of power seen in the Bush administration must be
challenged.
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Appendix A – Ethical Consent Form
Title of Research Project:
The Impact of Business on US Oil Dependence Policies under George W. Bush
Name of Researcher:
Terry Hathaway
Please mark the appropriate box
1. I agree to take part in the above research project.
2. I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research
3. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet explaining
the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions
about the project.
4. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw
at any time without giving any reason. In addition, should I not wish to
answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.
5. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.
If you do not wish to be recognizable in any publication resulting from this
research leave the following box unmarked and your answers will be strictly
anonymised.
6. I consent that my name can be identified or identifiable in the publication(s)
or report(s) that result from the research.
________________________ ________________ ____________________
Name of Participant Date Signature
Terry Hathaway ________________ ____________________
Researcher Date Signature
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant
Copies:
Once this has been signed by both parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and
dated participant consent form and the information sheet. A copy of the signed and dated consent
form should be kept with the project’s main documents which must be kept in a secure location.
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Appendix B – Example of the CAFE Arguments
The consumer choice argument, safety argument and Jevons’ paradox have all been
put in bold in this article. Seeing as the author also works for the Cato Institute, this
article can also be seen to tie into hidden power use of thinktanks.
Killing Drivers, Increasing Costs
BYLINE: Doug Bandow – Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
SECTION: The American Spectator Online, December 4, 2007 Tuesday
LENGTH: 1495 words
Congress is running out of floor time before the Christmas holiday, but legislators still
hope to push through the mishmash energy bill. The measure, which could hit the
House floor this week, likely will include increased fuel economy standards for
American autos. Democratic leaders and the White House alike are backing the
proposal in the name of saving energy. But these rules have proved far better at
increasing automaker costs and killing drivers than reducing America's dependence
on foreign oil.
The desire to save energy seems to bring out the worst in Washington micro-
management. Over the years, Uncle Sam has set the speed limit for every road and
temperature in every public building in America. In 1975, Congress concocted
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which set the average fuel
economy to be attained by cars sold by each automaker.
It's a thoroughly nutty approach. First, CAFE put Detroit, America's home auto
industry, at a disadvantage because U.S. producers concentrated on the larger cars
that Americans liked to drive. Japanese exporters primarily produced small cars,
which more easily satisfied CAFE. The regulation is one reason stationwagons, once
an American favorite, have disappeared.
Today American firms concentrate on light trucks (including SUVs), which outsell
autos. The administration's new CAFE rules for light trucks are expected to cost the
three U.S. automakers about $2 billion--and their Japanese competitors nothing.
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Second, CAFE is supposed to cut total energy use as people buy the same cars and
do the same amount of driving. But CAFE actually creates an incentive to drive more,
changing people's behavior.
Increasing mileage requirements lowers the cost of driving. Raising mileage from 20
to 30 mpg would have the same effect as cutting the price of gas from $3.00 per
gallon to $1.50 per gallon. The marginal cost of driving another mile would fall 50
percent. Yet many of the advocates of increasing CAFE to save energy are the same
people who want to raise the gas tax to save energy.
In fact, the National Research Council reported that CAFE "reduces the fuel
cost per mile of driving, thereby encouraging faster growth in vehicle travel
than would otherwise be the case." Economists Randall Lutter and Troy
Kravitz concluded that "By lowering the costs of driving, [CAFE] increases
vehicle miles traveled, thereby boosting traffic accidents and congestion. The
increase in the costs of accidents and congestion fully offsets and probably
outweighs the social benefits resulting from greater fuel economy." The
Department of Transportation reports that the number of miles driven by cars
and light trucks more than doubled between 1975 and 2000.
Third, meeting CAFE raises automaker and consumer costs by forcing companies to
make cars that people don't want. Numerous high mileage vehicles are currently
available, but many people prefer larger cars for reasons of family size, work
requirements, personal comfort, or recreational preference. That has forced U.S.
companies to lower prices on smaller autos (often losing money as a result), since
hiking sales is the only way to meet CAFE, and increase prices on larger vehicles.
Ford reportedly loses money on its cars while making $8000 per light truck sold.
CAFE's cost to consumers is obvious. Moreover, CAFE likely puts more cars on the
road, and more cars mean more driving. Again, price matters: if you reduce
automobile costs, more cars will be sold and driven, particularly as second or third
vehicles in a family.
But raising prices for lower-income families who need a larger car likely causes
some of them to hold onto their older vehicles, which have lower gas mileage and
emit more pollution. Which further undercuts the objective of reducing energy
consumption.
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Fourth, CAFE kills. Weight is destiny when it comes to both conservation and
safety. Design modification and materials substitution can make cars lighter
and safer, but doing so costs money and it is not easy to do both at the same
time. The easiest way to improve mileage is to cut vehicle weight, but reducing
the amount of metal surrounding drivers and passengers leaves them more
vulnerable in an accident.
In 2002 the National Academy of Sciences found that CAFE kills an extra 1300
to 2600 people a year. Some CAFE advocates suggest that the problem is too
many pick-ups and SUVs, which could be pushed off the road entirely with a
sufficiently high standard. But there always will be trucks, buses, and other large
vehicles plying the roads. Smaller cars will remain more vulnerable in an accident.
What a policy. Observes James Taylor of the Heartland Institute: "More Americans
needlessly die on the roads each and every year as a result of these fuel econony
standards than have died in Iraq during the entirety of both Gulf wars combined. All
of this merely to 'conserve' a little fuel."
But the dumber the idea in Washington, the more support it seems to have these
days. And from Republicans as well as Democrats.
The administration, after doing nothing for years, now supports raising CAFE four
percent annually. Earlier this year the Senate voted to hike the level to 35 pmg in
2020, up from 27.5 and 22.5 for cars and light trucks, respectively.
The U.S. industry is currently set to spend $2 billion to comply with new fuel
economy rules for light trucks. The Senate bill would cost automakers, who already
suffer huge "legacy" costs from previous generous pension and health insurance
contracts, about $114 billion to retool their assembly lines.
Explains Gary Witzenburg of the Car Connection: "Almost no one outside the fuel-
economy business understands how incredibly tough, probably impossible, and
enormously expensive that really would be. Even Toyota -- whose hybrid-boosted
2006 car and truck CAFEs were 34.4 and 23.7 mpg, respectively -- calls the 35-mpg
standard 'very aggressive' and 'difficult to meet,' adding that, 'the time frame is too
soon.'" The only way to meet the standard, he adds, "would be to dieselize and
hybridize virtually everything -- at an incremental cost (not retail price) of $5000-
$8000 per vehicle -- and downsize trucks to where they could barely haul the
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contents of a homeless auto worker's shopping cart. New emissions standards are
making diesels way more expensive, and there's not enough battery raw material on
the planet for an all- hybrid fleet."
Yet even accepting the flawed assumptions of the bill's backers, the energy benefits
would be minimal. Explains Jerry Taylor of the Cato Institute: "If the Senate's
proposed CAFE standard of 35 mpg by 2020 were to become law, proponents
believe that it would reduce oil consumption by, at most, about 1.2 million barrels a
day. Given that the Energy Information Administration thinks world crude oil
production would be 103.8 million barrels a day by 2020, the reduction would be 1.2
percent of global demand and result in a 1.3 percent decline in price-- nowhere near
enough to defund terrorists, denude oil producers of wealth, or secure energy
independence."
No matter. Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) rhapsodized: "Now, in our vehicles, we have
better cup-holders, we have keyless entry, we have better music systems, we have
heated seats. It is time that we expect more automobile efficiency."
The main alternative comes from Reps. Baron Hill (D-Ind.) and Lee Terry (R-Neb.),
who have introduced what they call a "tough piece of legislation, with no loopholes
and no gimmicks." It would maintain separate standards for autos and light trucks,
hiking the levels to 35 mpg and 32 mpg, respectively, by 2022. Although only slightly
less stringent than the Senate bill, the Hill-Terry legislation was denounced as
"feeble" by the Sierra Club.
Actually, the Sierra Club is right. The "moderate" position is to only wreck the
industry, kill people, and limit consumer choice more slowly, while having even less
impact on energy use. To think that we pay lawmakers to come up with such
klunkers.
Rising fuel costs are the best antidote to high energy consumption. As prices rise,
people drive less and switch to more fuel-efficient vehicles. Indeed, Sen. Barbara
Boxer (D-Cal.) didn't realize the import of her remarks when she chided
Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta last year for not unilaterally hiking CAFE
standards more: "You are so far behind what's even happening in the marketplace."
If so, why not leave the issue up to the marketplace?
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Washington has come up with a lot of bad policies over the years. Few are worse
than CAFE. If someone in the nation's capital doesn't wake up and fight this
counterproductive legislation, we might wake up to find that we have no auto industry
left.
